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Abstract 
 
Although evidence is utilised by claims-makers to strengthen their arguments, quality 
evidence is not necessarily the precursor to driving or explaining policy decisions. Actors 
who share a common frame are more likely to perceive a policy problem and solution in the 
same way. Therefore, decision-making processes are not about finding the highest quality 
evidence to support decisions; they becomes about which actor is better at presenting a 
believable argument that will persuade others their claims are more agreeable. 
Using a single case study design, qualitative methods are used to examine the role of 
evidence in the context of the construction of a new high speed rail network in the UK, High 
Speed Two (HS2). It examines how these actors frame the debate and how they negotiate 
evidence with one another in different policy environments, through a process of claims-
making.   
The study provides a new perspective to the High Speed Two debate, one which has received 
little attention in academic circles. A claims-making framework is utilised to provide a rich 
description of the naturalistic processes occurring in the decision-making processes of High 
Speed Two and it offers a sophisticated understanding of how evidence is interpreted and 
negotiated by policy actors. In addition, it unpacks and refines notions of argumentation 
which acknowledges the subjective nature of evidence.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction  
 
 ‘To our despair, mega-projects often develop lives of their own and their lives sometimes 
defy control by us mere mortals’ 
(Engesser, 1982, cited Merrow et al., 1988) 
1.1 The problem of evidence in mega-projects 
Engesser’s observation on the power of mega-projects is as true today as it was in 
1982.  Projects like the Millennium Dome and the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (High Speed 
One) grip the political imagination and appear able to sustain themselves regardless of the 
countervailing evidence. These projects are often referred to as ‘mega-projects’. They are 
understood as being large schemes or developments that are complex in nature and extremely 
expensive to construct (Flyvbjerg, 2005). One of the reasons that they are of significant 
interest to politicians and the general public is that investment in them places a considerable 
burden on a country’s gross domestic product (GDP). Globally, there has been an increase in 
the number of projects that are considered ‘mega’ in nature. However, with a growing 
population there is an inherent need for increased large transportation projects so it is likely 
that transport mega-projects (MTPs) will continue to be built.  
When deciding whether to proceed with a mega-project, decision-makers rely on evidence 
that is predominantly speculative rather than qualitative. It consists of cost-benefit analyses 
(CBA) which attempt to determine whether the benefits of the project will outweigh the 
costs. CBA is probably the most comprehensive method and theoretically sound form of 
economic evaluation available to decision-makers (Robinson, 1993). Evidence often consists 
of evaluations of other mega-projects in order to help determine what the costs of another 
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project might be. In fact, what counts as evidence often comes to be shaped by the accepted 
wisdom that the project is a ‘good thing’. Politicians often see mega-projects as a way in 
which to leave a legacy and they know that the ones that develop the project are unlikely to 
be around at the end due to the longevity of them. This phenomenon of pursuing a project 
because it is a ‘good thing’ challenges the view that evidence is the precursor to a policy 
decision.  It suggests that policy decisions come prior to evidence, at least in part.  And rather 
than evidence being a ‘neutral’ component of the policy process, it is highly contested. The 
concept of evidence-based policy making emphasises a desire to make sure that policy 
decisions are informed by rigorously and systematically reviewed evidence and assumes that 
it is possible to make these decisions whilst eliminating politics and values from the process. 
It has been defined as an approach that ‘helps people make well informed decisions about 
policies, programmes and projects by putting the best available evidence from research at the 
heart of policy development and implementation’ (Davies, 2004:3). 
These issues surrounding evidence in the decision-making process are important for a number 
of reasons (academically and in practical policy terms).  Academically they are important 
because this rational model of policy making is subject to challenges from theorists that do 
not view knowledge as objective and value free. It raises questions about knowledge and 
power, rationality and politics. In practical policy terms, the attempt by government to reduce 
public expenditure and increase value for money means that evidence should have an even 
greater role to play in decision-making. It would appear that in the case study explored by 
this thesis that the project has received continued support from politicians despite concerns 
regarding the increasing costs and negative environmental impact. Decisions, then, emerge 
from politics, judgement and debate, as well as  being deduced from empirical analysis 
(Head, 2008). 
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The thesis is concerned with how the UK Government makes decisions about mega projects, 
and more specifically about how evidence is utilised by policy actors within these decision-
making processes. It challenges some of the assumptions of the concept of evidence-based 
policy making and claims that beliefs and values shape or frame the way in which we view a 
policy problem and in turn affect the types of evidence that policy actors draw on to 
formulate a solution. Obtaining more evidence does not necessarily lead towards policy 
decisions being made, because much of the policy process is about reconciling different value 
perspectives. Evidence is understood in the thesis as: 
Information or knowledge that supports a claim or conclusion. This includes (but is not 
limited to) scientific research, quantitative and qualitative data including both written, verbal 
and visual, expert knowledge, tacit information, policy evaluations, stakeholder or public 
opinion 
Policy making does not take place within a vacuum; it occurs within the context of values, 
ideologies and political beliefs. While values may be important in the process of defining 
policy problems and helping to define the criteria for policy objectives, the evidence-based 
policy making (EBPM) approach suggests that they can be quarantined from the analytical 
process of determining which means are optimal for the desired ends (Dror, 1971). This is 
one of the basic aspirations for the rational evidence-based approach but one that has been 
questioned as far back as Lindblom (1959) in the late 1950s who argued that ‘muddling 
through’ was a more accurate description of how decisions were made. It serves as a useful 
model for seeking precise solutions to well-defined problems; however, not all policy 
problems are well-defined. In regards to decision-making within government the course of 
action is often chosen because it the most agreeable or consensual. What this means is that if 
political actors cannot agree on a course of action then they will compromise with one 
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another in order to reach an agreement. This means that decisions can only be partially based 
on the best available evidence.  This compromise can be thought of as a process of 
negotiation. If policy actors have different opinions about a particular issue or they frame it 
differently to one another then they will not necessarily share the same idea of how to solve 
the problem. The thesis focuses on these negotiations in a number of different policy 
environments within the case study of High Speed Two.  
1.2 The Case Study 
The case study that has been chosen for this research project is a high speed rail project that is 
being developed in the UK. It is due to be constructed in two phases; phase one will be built 
between London and the West Midlands and phase two will continue from Birmingham to 
the North of England as far up as Leeds. There are considerations for a High Speed Three that 
could continue further into the North of England and include Scotland. Phase one is on course 
to begin construction in 2017 and the whole project is expected to be completed in 2035. For 
the last decade there has been a concern that the current rail network will not be able to cope 
with the increased demand (Network Rail, 2004). Passenger ridership figures indicate that the 
number of people using the rail network is increasing every year (Atkins, 2003). From this 
they have predicted, using forecast models, how much demand will increase by in the next 
fifty years and some believe that the current rail network will not be able to cope with this 
demand. Herein lies the issue; some believe that the only way to increase capacity 
sufficiently is to construct a new train line, whereas others believe that the current network 
can be upgraded to meet demand. Most accept that there is an issue with capacity but they 
have different opinions about how this issue should be solved. In 2001 the Labour 
government proposed that a new high speed rail network should be developed and 
constructed. The project has been taken forward by the Coalition Government of 2005 to 
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2010 and the Conservative government of 2015 have been committed to carrying on with the 
project. As mentioned previously, mega-projects have a large financial impact on those 
funding the project and with governments having to tighten the purse strings it is no wonder 
that there is a great deal of interest when the UK government suggested spending over £50 
billion on a new high speed train network. The point that the project has cross-party support 
is important because the politicians are the main decision-makers.  
The thesis follows the mega-project from its development in the early 2000s to the end of 
March 2015 when Parliament was dissolved before the General Election of May 2015. The 
reason that this time period has been chosen is because this is considered the development 
stage of the project. It was in 2001 that political discussions about a new high speed line 
began and it was in 2013 that the Preparation Act received Royal Assent following its 
successful passage through Parliament. By March 2015 the preferred route for phase one had 
been chosen and discussions are now beginning for phase two of the route.  High Speed Two 
is an interesting case to study because it is the ‘biggest and most ambitious infrastructure 
project in the UK, and the first new railway to be built north of London in over 120 years’ 
(HS2 Ltd, 2015). It is the largest mega-project currently under development in Europe and its 
success or failure is likely to set the future tone of railway investment. Secondary data 
informs the majority of the research with empirical research focusing on 2012 to 2014. By 
conducting real time research rather than retrospectively, it brings the researcher much nearer 
to the subjects’ experiences. This immediacy of events is a benefit in terms of understanding 
the nuances of the use of evidence in the decision-making process.  
The thesis makes a number of contributions to academic literature. Until now, previous 
research on decision-making in mega-projects has tended not to focus on evidence utilisation 
and how actors negotiate evidence with one another. Academics seem to prefer to take an 
evaluative approach that focuses on the cost benefit analysis of a mega-project. Therefore, 
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this project diverges in that it provides a different perspective to decision-making in mega-
projects research as well as a new perspective to the chosen case study (HS2) that has not yet 
been explored. In doing so it improves understanding of the role evidence plays within the 
policy process. The thesis addresses how actors within the case study conceptualise evidence 
and how they understand the policy problem. By investigating the way in which people 
within the case study understand the policy problem and the various solutions paired with 
looking at what evidential resources they draw on, some conclusions can be made about the 
relationship between the two. For example, some inferences can be made about the types of 
evidence that particular groups favour.  
Another contribution relates to the way in which evidence is negotiated in different 
environments. Decisions within mega projects occur in a multitude of places, and so by 
examining evidence negotiation in three different policy settings some conclusions can be 
made about the effect they have on evidence utilisation and negotiation. The researcher 
obtained access to an entire scrutiny process relating to the case study in one Local Authority 
and was actively involved. This ‘inside view’ of the evidence-gathering process was 
invaluable and one that most researchers are unable to experience. 
1.3 Map of the thesis 
This section sets out the map of the thesis. Chapter two documents the use of evidence in 
policy making in the United Kingdom and discusses the concept from post WW2, followed 
by the initiatives in the 1970s such as the creation of the Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS) 
and the use of evidence within the policy process by the Conservative government of 1979 to 
1997. From 1997 to 2010 the New Labour government developed a number of programmes 
and initiatives to increase the use of evidence within policy making and from 2010 to 2015 
many of these programmes were either continued or altered by the Coalition government of 
7 
 
the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties. The chapter makes reference to the various 
government initiatives and White Papers that influenced the use of evidence within 
Government policies. The purpose of the chapter is to highlight the issues faced by various 
governments to increase the use of evidence within decision-making and the inherent tension 
that exists between political judgement and evidence utilisation. Most importantly, the 
chapter demonstrates that there has been an assumption amongst politicians that more 
evidence will lead to better decision-making.  
The literature regarding ‘evidence’ is introduced in chapter three which includes the different 
models of  evidence as suggested by Weiss (1986; 1987) and Young et al. (2002).  
The chapter also introduces the theoretical approach that the thesis adopts and the analytical 
framework that is utilised in future chapters. The analytical framework draws on multiple 
literatures which include how actors frame and construct a policy problem and their evidence, 
to how they choose their evidential resources to make claims and the claims-making process 
itself. A theoretical framework is used that acknowledges that the policy process is complex 
and problematic, and that the process is not a linear one. It also argues that evidence is 
continuously added to the policy process and claims are constructed and reconstructed in a 
number of different arenas. The first research question is addressed from a policy frames 
perspective drawing on social problems theory. The second research question which is 
concerned with claims-making and evidence utilises Toulmin’s theory of argumentation 
(1958) and the claims-making framework according to Best (1987).  
Chapter four focuses on evidence in a particular policy area: transport mega-projects (MTPs). 
The thesis is dedicating a chapter to the use of evidence in MTPs in order to provide a context 
for the case study. It is also important to highlight the difficulties encountered by policy 
actors within these projects in terms of evidence utilisation. This is due to the nature of 
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evidence that is often used to either support or oppose a large infrastructure project. For the 
purpose of this research, a number of different decision-making models have been examined 
in order to draw some conclusions about the way in which decisions are made and the role 
that evidence plays within these decisions. Firstly the chapter considers the literature that 
explores the definition of a mega project and what the main characteristics are. The literature 
review identified four key themes relevant to MTPs which include complexity, risk, 
uncertainty and deception. The chapter then focuses on how decisions are made within these 
projects, in particular the techniques used to gather and evaluate evidence. This establishes 
what the issues are and how evidence connects to policy making in MTPs. By identifying 
past approaches to decision-making in MTPs the thesis shows in the next chapter whether or 
not the processes within High Speed Two are path dependent or whether they have taken a 
different approach.   
Chapter five provides a detailed documentation and discussion of the history and 
development of a specific project: High Speed Two (HS2).  HS2 is the new high speed rail 
network being designed and built in the United Kingdom with the aim of resolving capacity 
issues on existing routes. It tracks the evolution of the venture from the rationale and 
development stage up to the present day. This further sets the context for the two empirical 
chapters later in the thesis. Secondly, the chapter explains the development of HS2 from the 
creation of the company HS2 Limited until the present day. Thirdly, the chapter sets out the 
main arguments being put forward by those in favour and those against the project. This 
highlights the key issues that those for the project consider answerable by HS2 and why the 
opposition to the project disagree with them or suggest a different solution.  It is important to 
understand what the key arguments are informing the debate on HS2 because they are 
relevant in both empirical chapters and relate to the research questions within the thesis. 
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Chapter six considers all issues relevant to the research design and methods used throughout 
the duration of the research. The chapter begins by setting out the reasoning behind using a 
single case study approach in order to answer the research questions. The aim of research is 
to make sense of the meanings of the participants involved within the case of HS2; by 
understanding how they frame the policy issue and negotiate evidence with one another 
through a process of claims-making. The strategy of inquiry that informs the procedures is 
the case study design and research methods include participant observation of a community 
meeting, semi-structured interviews with policy actors and secondary data analysis of 
evidence presented to the Birmingham City Council Overview and Scrutiny Committee’s 
review of HS2 entitled ‘Maximising the Benefits of HS2’. All ethical considerations are 
discussed that are relevant to each approach. This is followed by a discussion about the data 
analysis being used in the thesis which relates to the previous chapter and the claims-making 
framework. 
Analysis of the case study is provided in chapters seven and eight.  Chapter seven 
concentrates on answering the research question: How do actors within HS2 construct the 
policy problem? This question is answered by drawing on two literatures including social 
problems theory and policy framing theory with an emphasis on the latter. Firstly the chapter 
explains how High Speed Two came to be on the political agenda 
. This provides both further background to the case study and sets out the reasoning behind 
the policy. Secondly, it focuses on how policy actors within HS2 have constructed and 
framed the policy problem. By examining the frames of those involved in HS2 and the types 
of evidence they utilise some conclusions are made about the relationship between a person’s 
framing of an issue and their preference of evidence. In chapter eight the attention centres on 
Toulmin’s theory of argumentation and the claims-making framework within the process of 
argumentation about HS2. It leads on from the previous chapter that sought to examine how 
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policy actors within HS2 frame and construct the policy problem. Firstly it answers the 
research question: What evidential resources do policy actors within HS2 draw on? And 
secondly, it demonstrates and analyses how the policy process for HS2 enables and constrains 
particular kinds of claims-making by the different actors involved in the process as it relates 
to the Toulmin model of argumentation and draws on other relevant theoretical frameworks. 
This chapter focuses on answering the final research question: How are different forms of 
evidence negotiated between policy actors in different environments? 
 
In order to answer the question, data is taken from the community meeting in Castle Vale1, 
interview transcripts, media reports and a scrutiny review conducted by Birmingham City 
Council. This provides a number of different arenas in which policy actors must select 
evidence in order to present claims. This thesis suggests that actors negotiate the evidence 
through a process of claims-making and counter-claims. The chapter also shows that those in 
favour of the project have the advantage in terms of the claims-making process due to their 
resources and expertise as opposed to those against the project who are constantly in a 
process of offering counter-claims. The ways in which evidence is negotiated is dependent on 
a number of things which is discussed in this chapter including the setting in which the 
evidence is negotiated, the forms of expertise amongst stakeholders, the alliances that actors 
have with one another and the timing of events affects what evidence is used and how it is 
negotiated.  
Chapter nine draws together the main conclusions from the thesis and reflects on the research 
process. It revisits the research questions in order to demonstrate the value of the arguments 
that are developed throughout the thesis. It summarises the key findings and the explains the 
                                                          
1
 Castle Vale is a residential estate located in Birmingham six miles north east of the city centre. The proposed 
route of HS2 will pass next to the estate. 
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contributions that the research makes to academic literature. The reflections consider the 
research process as a whole, discussing what can be considered a success and what issues 
were faced throughout the course of the project. Finally, some suggestions are made for 
further research that could be developed from the thesis. 
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Chapter 2 
Tensions between political judgement and evidence utilisation 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter historically documents evidence utilisation by policy makers from post WW2 up 
until early 2015. The purpose is to demonstrate that there have been a number of efforts to 
increase the use of evidence within decisions but that an inherent tension exists with political 
judgement which has reduced the opportunities to do so. Attempts have also been made to 
improve the quality of evidence that decisions are based on but these attempts have also 
proved to be ineffective in some cases. What this chapter identifies is that an assumption 
exists, and has done for some time now, that more evidence will lead to better decision-
making. It also highlights how policy actors give preference to specific types of evidence. 
The chapter looks more closely at the attempts by various reigning governments to increase 
and improve the use of evidence followed by examples that support the argument that this 
inherent tension exists. Some politicians believe that due to representative democracy they 
have been given the power to make policy decisions for the general public. However if they 
are requested to take advice and guidance from researchers then there will be some inevitable 
tension between them. This chapter is divided into stages that have been identified by the 
researcher rather than by terms of a Government. The stages are identified on the basis of 
initiatives because some span more than one term of government and more than one political 
party.  
Stage one begins with the post WW2 period of the 1950s and continues to the end of the 
1970s. In this era some politicians perceived social research as being of little value to the 
decision-making process. There was some tension during this time about the role evidence 
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should play and how much public money should be spent on research (Bale, 2012). However, 
some progression was made in terms of establishing a number of research bodies, such as the 
Social Sciences Research Council and the Bow Group, and attempts were made to make sure 
that decisions were informed by evidence (James, 1986). The Roskill Commission on 
expanding airport capacity for London acts as an example of politicians ignoring evidence in 
favour of their own agendas. Next the 1980s and 1990s saw a period of ‘rolling back the 
state’ which is classed as stage two. This refers to an era in which the Conservative 
Government had the intention of reducing public spending and adopting a private sector ethos 
which led to a decrease in the amount of government-funded research. Their research 
interests focused more on economic rather than social issues which mirrors their approach to 
governance. What is apparent from this period is a change in the way policy actors influenced 
decisions such as the rise of think tanks.  Up until the 1990s there is evidence that ‘time and 
misunderstandings of the social sciences plus prejudice and suspicion got in the way’ 
(Nichol, 2001:ii).  
From the late 1990s when the Labour Party took control, the concept of evidence-based 
policy making was born as it is understood today. The Party promoted the use of social 
research to influence policy decisions and coined the phrase ‘what works’ when deciding 
what course of action to take. The expression ‘what works’ came from New Labour’s desire 
to be ideology-free and pragmatic and focus on basing policy on evidence of what works.  
They developed a number of initiatives and commissioned a number of large scale studies in 
order to increase evidence utilisation (Alcock et al. 2013). However, some instances can be 
identified, most notably drug policy, that show politicians going against expert advice. The 
Coalition Government of 2010 to 2015 also promoted the use of evidence within decision-
making and continued many of New Labour’s initiatives and programmes in order to ensure 
that policy was informed by evidence such as their ‘What Works’ centres. This is the third 
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and final stage that is explored in this chapter. The chapter concludes by discussing what the 
implications are for evidence utilisation and decision making.  
2.2 Post WW2 era and evidence utilisation 
Looking further back in time to the 1920s and 1930s the literature identifies that Western 
governments supported little to no social science research and ‘made very little use of the 
results of such research produced with support from other sources’ (Bulmer, 1987:1). Few 
researchers graduated from universities (Payne et al. 1981) and many scholars within the 
natural sciences believed that the social sciences did not warrant the same recognition 
academically. This was because they believed their work was more rigorous and meaningful 
as it used mathematical and scientific techniques of measurement and deduction. By the time 
the Second World War began a slight increase in social survey research occurred due to the 
creation of the War-time Social Survey in 1940 and the increase in Ministries establishing 
their own information units. The War-time Social Survey2 was established in 1940 with the 
support of the National Institute for Economic and Social Research with the aim of 
investigating questions of sociological importance. Several government departments 
requested for evidence to be collected about specific social and economic problems as well as 
investigations of more general factors affecting public opinion and morale. However, 
independent scientific sponsorship was lost in 1941 and many of the survey’s employees 
resigned. The Survey continued to exist under the surveillance of the Ministry of Information 
and work carried out was in response to departmental directives which would have been 
based on the preferences of the department in question. So although some efforts were made 
during this time period to inform decisions based on evidence, researchers were only able to 
conduct research based on departmental directives. The quality of the questionnaires during 
this time were not considered as robust as they are today as the majority of surveys in the 
                                                          
2
 Now known as the Government Social Survey. 
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1940s used quota sampling and had a very narrow focus, only answering clearly defined 
research questions (ESRC, 2011). This may have been due to the lack of researchers and 
resources at the time. What the literature does reveal is that some policy actors recognised a 
need for evidence to inform decisions albeit a small amount.  
Towards the end of the Second World War in 1944, the Department of Scientific and 
Industrial Research (DSIR) suggested that ‘post-war development would require the 
appointment of a council to look into the “psychological reactions imposed by modern life”’ 
(ESRC, 2011:4). However, the Medical Research Council, part of the DSIR, argued that 
sociology had not yet reached a stage of scientific development that an Advisory Council for 
Sociological Research could be justified as an official Government body (ESRC, 2011). This 
is consistent with the beliefs from the 1920s and 1930s amongst professionals in the fields of 
medicine and the natural sciences who did not view the social sciences as being able to make 
legitimate generalisations because they believed that human actions are not subject to the 
regularities that govern the world of nature (Coser, 1977). In other words, they did not 
believe that it was possible to apply the same methods of generalisation to the subject matter 
of human action because there were too many variables that could not be controlled. Also 
during this year, the Deputy Prime Minister commissioned Sir John Clapham to chair a 
committee that would ‘consider whether additional provision was necessary for research into 
social and economic questions’ (Bulmer, 1987:78). After two years of investigation the 
Clapham Committee concluded that social science research in the universities was inadequate 
because there were only 52 social science professors and readers in the UK compared to over 
450 in pure sciences and medicine (ESRC, 2011), yet it recommended against the founding of 
a Social Science Research Council.  
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In 1946 the Government Statistical Service was created in order to produce evidence for 
policy makers that consisted of ‘hard facts about social conditions established by the now 
normative statistical methodology of social policy research’ (Payne et al. 1981:142). 
Referring to evidence as ‘hard facts’ and using quantitative data is indicative of a government 
that wanted to apply scientific methods to social research. This may have been due to 
criticisms from the natural science scholars about the quality and value of social research as 
well as a desire to be accepted by the natural sciences by utilising methodologies that support 
epistemological and ontological beliefs of theirs. What this indicates is that the government at 
the time regarded the natural sciences highly which is evident by their desire to apply 
scientific methods to social research.  
Another factor that increased social research during the 1950s and 1960s was the huge 
increase in the amount of spending in Britain on housing, health care, education and other 
social services. This led to a greater demand for evidence about disadvantaged groups in 
society and a greater interest in the impact of social and economic policies upon individuals 
and groups. Questions were asked  about  ‘whether services were reaching those for whom 
they were intended, or how far equity was being achieved required research to answer them’ 
(Bulmer, 1987:4). Prior to WW2 there was less demand for social science research and 
evidence by policy makers so there was a smaller supply of data. When the demand for 
research and evidence increased, so did the supply of researchers and evidence. With this 
being said, although the academic world experienced a take-off in the social sciences, the 
changes were slightly less dramatic within government. It was not until the 1960s that the 
interest accelerated in terms of expenditure on research and evidence utilisation within policy 
making. Bulmer (1987) has written in detail about the lack of social scientists, economists 
and sociologists that were available to influence decision-making. He noted that ‘in the early 
1960s there were as many sociologists teaching in universities throughout the country as 
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there were historians teaching in Oxford alone’ (Bulmer, 1987:2). Within government social 
science research was limited and until Harold Wilson took power in 1964 with the Labour 
Party there were less than fifty economists practicing in central government.  
Two key reports were produced in the 1960s that led to an increase in social research; the 
Committee on Higher Education report (1963) and the Report of the Heyworth Committee on 
Social Studies (1965). The Committee on Higher Education expanded the number of places 
available for students to study the social sciences in universities and the Heyworth 
Committee was responsible for recommending the creation of the Social Sciences Research 
Council (SSRC) and recommended that social science research should be increased. This 
meant there would be more researchers which would in turn theoretically lead to more 
research being conducted. Discussions about the creation of a state funding body for the 
social sciences had been under discussion since the Second World War, however, it was not 
until the 1964 election of Prime Minister Harold Wilson that the political climate for the 
establishment of the SSRC became sufficiently favourable. Then in 1968, the Head of the 
Civil Service, Sir William Armstrong and the Secretary to the Cabinet discussed whether or 
not to create a long-term planning unit within the Cabinet Office, which would undertake 
economic, social and scientific research (Pollit, 1984). The Prime Minister at the time, Harold 
Wilson, decided not to proceed with the proposal but his reasons for not doing so are unclear. 
Two years later a White Paper was published entitled ‘The Re-organisation of Central 
Government’ (Cabinet Office, 1970) and it set out a plan to create a ‘central capability unit’ 
called the Central Policy Review Staff that would assist Ministers: 
‘…to take better policy decisions by assisting them to work out the implications of their basic 
strategy in terms of policies in specific areas, to establish relative priorities to be given to 
different sections of their programme as a whole, to identify those areas of policy where new 
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choices can be exercised and to ensure that the underlying implications of alternative courses 
of action are fully analysed and considered’ 
(Cabinet Office, 1970) 
In 1971 Lord Rothschild, a former head of research with Shell International3, was appointed 
as director of the CPRS. The CPRS was considered a ‘hybrid’ as its membership consisted of 
both civil servants and outsiders from commerce, academia and industries. It was a strategic 
thinking unit that carried out a number of research projects varying in length and detail. Some 
of the issues that they addressed included ship-building, energy, nuclear power and the future 
of London as a financial centre (James, 1986). Staff advised Ministers on economic matters 
throughout the 1970s and helped to run Programme Analysis and Review (PAR), which 
comprised of a series of reviews of selected departmental programmes inaugurated in the 
1970 White Paper (Gray and Jenkins, 1982) as well as giving private advice to the Prime 
Minister. During the 1970s there was a commitment to evaluating government programmes 
in order to understand how to improve them which can be likened to the emphasis that future 
government’s placed on evaluation.  There was a belief at this time amongst many politicians 
that rational policy-making was possible, based on consideration of long-term goals, policy 
outcomes and so on (Bulmer, 1987). In his book, ‘Mediations of a Broomstick’, Rothschild 
conceptualised policy analysis as ‘political impartiality and intellectual honesty, analysing all 
evidence without concession to ministerial preconceptions, always reaching firm conclusions, 
never fudging a compromise’ (1977:167). This approach to policy analysis resonates with the 
notion of evidence-based policy making. Rothschild was commissioned to conduct a report 
which was produced as a Green Paper and he ‘attacked several well-established traditions in 
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 Shell International Limited owns and operates oil and gas plants in the UK and internationally and performs 
downstream activities.  
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scientific research and was specific about how they should be changed in terms of 
organisation and finance’ (Whitehead, 1978:11). Following his recommendations, there was 
tighter control on research commissioned by the government.  
One of the ways in which we can assess the use of evidence by previous governments is to 
examine public inquiries and Royal Commissions of their time. They provide some indication 
about issues that were important to Governments during their time in power and their desire 
to collect evidence in order to reach some conclusions. Inquiries are set up for a number of 
reasons including accountability, reassurance, to establish the facts and learn from events to 
help prevent their recurrence as well as serving a wider political agenda for government 
(Walshe, 2003). They provide a valuable focus of the influence of social science research 
upon public policy (Bulmer, 1982). One such example of apparent disregard for social 
research by politicians is the case of airport expansion in London. Still to this day a 
prominent subject discussed in Westminster can be dated back to the late 1960s.  
In 1968 an inquiry was established, chaired by Mr Justice Roskill, entitled the ‘Third London 
Airport Commission’ to determine whether or not a third airport should be built and if so, 
where. The Commission anticipated rapid growth in air transport between the late 1960s and 
the end of the century and concluded that a new airport should be built to the north west of 
London at Cublington between Aylesbury and Milton Keynes (Kay, 2012).  The report was 
highly criticised for its reliance on cost benefit analysis (Mishan, 1970) and that it was argued 
that the ‘quantitative findings of the Report cannot be used alone to decide the issue’ 
(Mishan, 1970:223). They acknowledged that quantitative data had its limitations by saying 
this; however, they may have disagreed with the findings which led to this criticism. What 
else is striking is that the government at the time rejected its findings immediately and 
decided to build an airport at Foulness instead which was considered the most costly of all 
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four options in the Report. The Roskill Report had decisively rejected this option as he 
considered it too expensive to build and too far from London. Foulness was never built and 
shortly after it was suggested that Stanstead should be expanded. Roskill had also assessed 
this option and considered it not to be a viable answer to the capacity issue.  
What this demonstrates is that politicians at the time rejected evidence presented to them in 
favour of another option that was based on their own preferences. Their political agenda 
trumped the evidence presented to them and they settled on an option that was less cost 
effective. This era was dominated by a lack of respect for social sciences coupled with 
politicians using their judgement rather than listening to specialist advice, something which is 
common within all three stages. It would seem that sometimes politicians utilise evidence 
when it supports their agenda and reject it when it does not. This has been referred to as 
policy-based evidence (Marmot, 2004). What this concept implies is that policy makers 
decide what course of action they would like to take and then look for the evidence to support 
the decision rather than the other way around (evidence-based policy making).   
2.3 Rolling back the state in the 1980s and 1990s  
In 1979 Margaret Thatcher was elected as Prime Minister and she led a Conservative 
government that was quick to criticise the spending of previous governments. The defining 
feature of this government was its intention to ‘roll back the state’ (Hills, 1998). What this 
meant is that much of the politics revolved around cuts and restrictions in public spending 
because Margaret Thatcher argued that economic difficulties in the UK were mostly due to 
high public expenditure (HM Treasury, 1979). There were reservations among some MPs 
about the value of research in the social sciences (Posner, 2002) and some politicians argued 
that it should not be publicly funded which could in turn lead to more savings. It was clear 
that ‘the social sciences in general and the SSRC in particular were in the firing line ever 
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since the Conservatives came to power’ (Bulmer, 1987:353). In December, 1981, Lord 
Rothschild, the former director of the Central Policy Review Staff, was asked to lead a study 
that would be used to determine the fate of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) 
which had only been in existence since 1965. The report was published in 1982 and shortly 
after it was agreed that the SSRC would remain but that its remit would be expanded beyond 
the social sciences, to include more empirical research and research of ‘more public concern’ 
(Rothschild, 1982). To reflect this, the SSRC was renamed the Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC) in 1983. This shift in focus from social to economic research 
reflects the preferences of the Conservative government during this time. For example, when 
the Audit Commission took over audit responsibilities for NHS trusts in the early 1990s, it 
conducted value-for-money studies on the cost-effectiveness of day-case surgery. The 
findings of these studies subsequently contributed to the development of a policy agenda that 
promoted the benefits of day-case surgery (Nutley and Webb, 2000). So one cannot argue 
that there was a complete disregard for evidence during this era and it is possible to identify 
different ways in which decision-making was influenced.  
The situation regarding the CPRS was not as successful.  Between 1974 and 1979, the CPRS 
suffered a decline in its audience due to ‘economic crisis, the dominance of political 
expediency, political polarisation and the decline of the Cabinet’ (James, 1986:431). It had 
little credit and by 1979 their audience in the Cabinet was small which was further reduced 
by Margaret Thatcher and in 1983 she sought to abolish the CPRS and was met with no 
opposition from her colleagues. Without the faith and support from Cabinet required by the 
CPRS it was deemed redundant by Lord Rothschild. This lack of support further strengthens 
the claim that some politicians did not have a great deal of faith in social research at this time. 
However, the CPRS did survive for thirteen years and had an impression on many different 
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government departments and is considered the Prime Minister’s ‘Think Tank4’ of its time 
(Pope et al. 1986). During the 1980s an expansion took place in the number, type and variety 
of ‘Think Tanks’ (Parsons, 1995). These ‘Think Tanks’ aimed to influence the policy agenda 
through the creation of research and policy advocacy. They can be seen as organisations 
attempting to fill a void left by the Conservative government due to the decrease in social 
research being funding by the state and a desire to influence decision-making.  
One notable organisation that was created later in the Conservative era is the Institute for 
Public Policy Research in 1988, which supported the idea that the policy process was 
centralised and inputs should be fed into the centre (Parsons, 1995). It produced, conducted 
and published research into, and promoted public education in the economic, social and 
political sciences. Policy knowledge, or evidence, during the 1980s came from an 
increasingly diverse number of places because the Conservatives reduced some of the 
traditional avenues for participation so people looked for other ways. This may have been due 
to the reluctance of politicians to acknowledge certain types of evidence from particular 
sources and their preference for economic data. Davies et al. (2000) argued that during the 
1980s and into the 1990s ‘there have long existed mechanisms for keeping research evidence 
at arm’s length from government…this distancing or even the dismissal of research was 
particularly apparent with the ideologically driven government of the 1980s’ (2000:19). 
What is interesting about this time period is that government spending did not reduce under 
the Conservatives even though they had every intention of doing so. They reduced spending 
in certain areas but because of increased unemployment, an ageing population and a rise in 
lone parents in the 1980s, demand for welfare services increased rapidly so money was spent 
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 A ‘Think Tank’ is considered to be an organisation that performs research and advocacy concerning political issues. They 
are usually non-profit organisations that sometimes receive funding from governments, advocacy groups, businesses or 
revenue from consulting or research related to their projects (Stone, 2006). 
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tackling these issues. Much has been written about the way in which ‘the gap left by the 
crumbling of the social democratic consensus was filled by a ‘new right ideology’ with the 
election of the Thatcher government in 1979’ (Nutley and Webb, 2000:19). Policy making 
throughout the 1980s and in part in the early 1990s was driven by this ideology. However, the 
concurrent development of a managerial agenda in the public sector led to a greater focus on 
programme evaluation, an increase in performance indicator systems and increased powers 
for audit and inspection regimes (Pollitt, 1990; Hood, 1991). These in turn provided 
systematic information on the effects of policy and practice interventions that was sometimes 
fed into the policy-making process.  
2.4 The evidence-based policy making movement 
It would be imprudent to suggest that prior to 1997 policy was not based on evidence and as 
examples in the previous section demonstrate, there were attempts made to increase evidence 
utilisation in policy making but these attempts were often met with some resistance by 
politicians. It is difficult to address the concept of evidence-based policy making without 
making reference to the New Labour governments of 1997 to 2010. They promoted the 
concept that policy should be based on ‘what works’ and driven by systematically reviewed, 
rigorous evidence and modern literature rarely discusses the approach outside the context of 
New Labour. If it is accepted that policy decisions were made on the basis of some evidence 
previous to 1997 then it is important to try to draw out from the literature how New Labour’s 
approach was different (if it was) and how they promoted its use. Evidence Based Policy 
Making (EBPM) is defined by one author as an approach that ‘helps people make well 
informed decisions about policies, programmes and projects by putting the best available 
evidence from research at the heart of policy development and implementation’ (Davies, 
2004:3). The aim of evidence-based policy making is the modernisation of the policy making 
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process. Modernising policy making in turn involves the idea of 'professionalising'. The 
'professional model' (Cabinet Office, 1999b) defines various stages which can be broken 
down into clear and distinct sets of management tasks. Professional policymaking ‘involves 
the idea that there are specific skills which policy makers have to acquire in order to be 
“effective”' (Parsons, 2001:93). 
Within this model the policy making process is perceived as being a ‘highly mechanistic 
system which necessitates improvements in systemic communications and co-ordination 
(wiring- up and joining-up)’ (Weerakkody, 2012:85). More professional/rational policy 
making is, to a large extent, dependent on the better use of evidence and the management of 
knowledge. The model excludes some central aspects of policy making: people, power and 
politics. It also assumes that if we have a policy problem then a systematic review of 
evidence will provide us with a solution. It does not acknowledge that policy actors may 
interpret a policy problem in different ways thus suggesting different solutions. With this 
being said, the Labour government promoted the use of evidence and rejected the belief that 
policy can be made based on ideologies. In 1997, the leader of the Labour Party at the time 
said in the manifesto for the 1997 General Election: 
‘We will be a radical government. New Labour is a party of ideas and ideals but not of 
outdated ideology. What counts is what works. The objectives are radical. The means will be 
modern. Britain will be better with New Labour’ 
Tony Blair in Labour Party Manifesto (1997)  
Shortly after this manifesto, a Labour Government was elected into power with a landslide 
victory seeing them win the most seats the Party had ever held (Geddes and Tonge, 1997). 
From the mid-1990s until the early 2000s the Party was referred to as ‘New Labour’ which 
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was taken from a conference slogan first used by the party in 1994 which was later seen in a 
draft manifesto published in 1996 entitled ‘New Labour, New Life for Britain’ (1997). What 
this shift explains about the party is that they wanted to be seen differently to previous 
governments and claimed that the Conservative government before them had shaped policy 
on the basis of political ideologies (Nutley, 2003) rather than evidence and that they were 
going to change and modernise the way in which policies were formulated and implemented. 
They closely associated with an agenda of EBPM coupled with understanding ‘what works 
and why’ within the central element of their political strategy of modernisation. The most 
notable document that sets out the modernisation agenda of New Labour is the 1999 White 
Paper entitled ‘Modernising Government’. Within this document, the party sets out the key 
characteristics of ‘modernised’ policy stating that: 
‘…this government expects more of policy makers. More new ideas, more willingness to 
question inherited ways of doing things, better use of evidence and research in policy making 
and better focus on policies that will deliver long term goals’ 
(Cabinet Office, 1999a:16)  
The document outlined a range of reforms to improve the functioning of government. It 
placed considerable emphasis on joined-up government5, a focus on meeting a diversity of 
customer needs and demands in the delivery of public services, and the use of use of targets 
and measures focused on results rather than inputs. However, Wyatt (2002) argues that the 
majority of the White Paper can be seen as a continuation and development of programmes of 
reform and change that had been implemented in the UK through the 1980s and 1990s. 
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 Joined-up government was a policy to compel different government departments to work together and 
collaborate with one another. 
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Evidence-based policy making was recognised as a central element of New Labour's plans for 
the modernisation of government. For example, the Paper stated that:  
'…policy decisions should be based on sound evidence. The raw ingredient of evidence is 
information. Good quality policy making depends on high quality information, derived from a 
variety of sources - expert knowledge; existing domestic and international research; existing 
statistics; stakeholder consultation; evaluation of previous policies ...'  
(Cabinet Office, 1999a:31)  
 
The notion that policy should now be based on evidence ‘rather than based on unsupported 
opinion is difficult to refute’ (Wells, 2007:23). There was little acknowledgement from New 
Labour that ‘research-based evidence is also generated in different ways reflecting both the 
inherent nature of different policies but also the differing epistemological and ontological 
bases of different professions’ (Wells, 2007:4). For example, the use of evidence in education 
is very different from areas such as medicine or transport policy. All these areas of policy 
employ different methodologies based on their suitability to generate evidence. Education 
research often utilises experimental or action research methodologies, transport policy relies 
heavily on cost-benefit analyses and medicine favours the use of randomised control trials 
and systematic reviews. This is why Davies et al. (2000) stress that it is overly simplistic to 
have a singular conception of EBPM based on a single epistemology. This being said, the UK 
Cabinet Office attempted to define its understanding of evidence in its 1999 White Paper 
Modernising Government into a singular definition, stating that evidence was: 
 
‘expert knowledge; published research; existing research; stakeholder consultations; 
previous policy evaluations; the Internet; outcomes from consultations; costIngs of policy 
options; output from economic and statistical modelling’  
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(Cabinet Office, 1999a:33).  
 
The breadth of what was considered evidence during this time was therefore wide and 
dynamic (Shaxson, 2005). Marston and Watts (2003) supported this interpretation and listed a 
number of other sources of ‘evidence’ including photographs, literary texts, official files, 
autobiographical material such as diaries, newspaper files, ethnographic and observer 
accounts. In the same year as the White Paper was published, there were two important 
conferences held that focused on the role of evidence in the policy process followed by a 
special number on EBPM being published in the journal ‘Public Money and Management’. 
Parsons (2002) notes in his paper on EBPM that the ESRC ‘were also working on plans to 
establish a national resource centre for evidence-based policy’ (Parsons, 2002:44). This tells 
us that not only were New Labour drawn towards the concept of EBPM, but others including 
prominent organisations were eager to promote the approach. The underpinning rationale of 
New Labour’s position on evidence-based policy making was further expressed by David 
Blunkett, then Secretary of State for Education and Employment, who argued in a lecture to 
the ESRC in 2000: 
 
‘…rational thought is impossible without good evidence…social science research is central 
to the development and evaluation of policy’ and that ‘having ready access to the lessons 
from high-quality research can and must vastly improve the quality and sensitivity of the 
complex and often constrained decisions we, as politicians, have to make’ 
(DfEE, 2000:4-24) 
 
The ‘knowledge as power’ model contained within Blunkett’s speech is an argument that 
runs throughout the documents which provide the key texts for EBPM in the Blair 
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government which includes the papers ‘Better Policy Making’ (Cabinet Office, 2001) and 
‘Modern Policy-Making’ (National Audit Office, 2001). Professional policy making, 
according to these documents, must be driven by evidence of ‘what works’. New Labour 
suggested that EBPM involved the management of two types of knowledge: academic 
research and professional experience (Parsons, 2002). Once New Labour had established 
their place within Whitehall they set out and launched a series of major social and economic 
programmes. Among them were the Sure Start programme, New Deal for Communities, the 
Children’s Fund and New Deals in employment. They all focused on delivering the 
government’s strategy for social inclusion, neighbourhood renewal and community cohesion 
(Social Exclusion Unit, 1998). It has been argued that the rationale for these interventions is 
‘based on addressing the “wicked issues”6 of policy making and seeking to join-up policies 
and agencies to address deep-seated social and economic problems’ (Wells, 2007:4). There 
was a strong emphasis placed on identifying ‘what works’ as set out in the Labour Party 
Manifesto (1997) as well as seeking to inform delivery and mainstream service provision. 
The programmes were evaluated including longitudinal assessments of their impact as well as 
seeking to provide ‘on-going feedback to government and the organisations and partnerships 
delivering the initiatives’ (Wells, 2007:4). What is novel about New Labour’s approach to 
evaluation design is their shift in focus away from value for money and towards better 
understanding how and why programmes work in different contexts. The commissioning of 
evaluations was a major component of New Labour’s approach to EBPM, in particular within 
education, employment and communities.  
 
Once New Labour had established their approach to evidence-based policy making they then 
focused on the collection and use of evidence by government. This is apparent in documents 
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 Wicked issues are social problems that are defined differently by people and there is little agreement over a 
solution, for example, climate change.  
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such as ‘Adding it Up’ (Performance and Innovation Unit, 2000), ‘Getting the Evidence - 
Using Research in Policy Making’ (National Audit Office, 2003), ‘Trying it Out: The Role of 
'Pilots' in Policy Making’ (Cabinet Office,2003a), ‘The Magenta Book: Guidance Notes for 
Policy Evaluation and Analysis’ (Cabinet Office, 2003b) and ‘Quality in Qualitative 
Evaluation’ (Cabinet Office, 2003c). The government also set up the UK Centre for Evidence 
Based Policy where they intended to share and develop good practice in evidence based 
policy making. The ‘Adding it Up’ report represents a review of evidence-based policy 
making across government. The paper highlights the variation in the use and type of evidence 
across departments; however, it makes reference to quantitative data throughout. It refers to 
the United States as being a ‘benchmark’ for best practice in regards to evidence-based policy 
making. This is because in the United States ‘ there is a strong willingness to invest in 
gathering the necessary data; outside expertise is transmitted easily to government; and there 
is a richer environment for analytical debate' (Wells, 2007:5). Discussions about the United 
States and their use of randomised control trials7 (RCTs) further supports the argument that 
New Labour favoured quantitative research methods over qualitative ones. They considered 
RCTs as the ‘gold standard’ for evidence-based policy making.  
 
New Labour sought to set themselves apart from previous governments and worked towards 
the ‘de-politicisation’ of the policy process (Monaghan, 2011). However, a closer look at 
particular policy decisions indicates that they were only slightly more successful in increasing 
the use of evidence or its quality within decision-making and that evidence often became 
secondary to the preferences of politicians. There were a large number of policies created 
under New Labour that were criticised for being far from evidence-based. One of the most 
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 RCT is a type of scientific experiment, where the people being studied are randomly allocated one or other of 
the different treatments under study. It is considered to be the most rigorous way of determining whether a 
cause-effect relation exists between treatment and outcome and for assessing the cost effectiveness of a 
treatment (Sibbald and Roland, 1998). 
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widely publicised issues of the time, the drug debate, is an example of evidence being 
ignored by politicians from the leading party. Towards the end of 2009 a ‘significant schism 
occurred between the New Labour government and the chair of the Advisory Council on the 
Misuse of Drugs (ACMD), Professor David Nutt’ (Monaghan, 2011:1). They disagreed about 
the classification of ecstasy in 2009. Nutt accused the government of ‘de-valuing’ the science 
in their decision-making process after claiming that both cannabis and ecstasy were less 
harmful than legal drugs such as tobacco and alcohol and should, therefore, be downgraded 
(Nutt et al. 2007). Their research placed twenty substances in a scale according to the harm 
they cause users and ranked alcohol as 5th with ecstasy being ranked far down the list at 
number 18. Professor Nutt publicly called for the new knowledge of drugs to be 
acknowledged as well as suggesting that the current classification system may not be fit for 
purpose (Nutt, 2009). Professor Nutt was famously dismissed for his criticisms government 
policies in 2009 when it was claimed that he overstepped his remit. This issue highlights the 
reluctance of policy makers to accept evidence presented by experts on a topic that is highly 
politicised (Monaghan, 2010). The preferences of politicians tend to favour zero-tolerance 
approaches to drug misuse. By accepting the evidence and advice of Professor Nutt they 
would have had to admit that previous government policy was inadequate and that they 
would change current drug policies to reflect the new evidence. It could also impact on public 
opinion and affect the number of votes that they received. By 2010 support for the Labour 
Government declined due to a number of reasons including their involvement in a war with 
Iraq, the negative economic issues the country was facing and the party was struggling with 
leadership issues (Giddens, 2010). This led to a change in government at the general election 
of 2010 which leads us to our final section of the chapter.  
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In May 2010, a general election took place in which no political party achieved the 326 seats 
needed for an overall majority. The Conservative Party, led by David Cameron, won the 
largest number of votes but still fell twenty seats short. This hung Parliament led to the 
creation of a Coalition Government between the Conservative Party and the Liberal 
Democrats which was the first in British history to eventuate directly from an election 
outcome (Seldon and Finn, 2015). This meant that government programmes would have to 
involve compromises on the part of both parties. In the early months of the new 
administration it appeared that ‘little or no research or evaluation was commissioned by 
government or its agencies’ (Meager, 2011). During the first year it was revealed that the 
coalition government would aim to reduce public spending by £81 billion between 2011 and 
2015 (HM Treasury, 2010). This had implications for policy makers and in such an 
environment, the need for robust, timely and accessible evidence of ‘what works’ and what 
offers best value for money would have been greater than ever (Meager, 2011). During the 
first year in office, the coalition government was accused of ‘having turned its back on 
evidence-based policy’ (LSE, 2014). However, it may have been too early to tell whether or 
not this apparent decline in the use of social research in policy making was permanent or 
temporary.   
There are a number of examples that indicate the Coalition Government did not always 
acknowledge the evidence they were presented with. They have been criticised for a number 
of policies including the under occupancy charge and alcohol pricing8. One of the first pieces 
of legislation implemented by the coalition government was the Welfare Reform Act 
(Cabinet Office, 2012). The Welfare Reform Act gave the Government the power to 
introduce new size criteria, also known as the ‘Bedroom Tax’, ‘under-occupation penalty’ or 
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 The Government’s policy to ban ‘below cost’ sales of alcohol was dismissed as almost wholly ineffective in 
reducing alcohol harm by alcohol and health NGOs and even by sections of the alcohol industry (Institute of 
Alcohol Studies, 2011). 
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‘removal of the spare room subsidy’ for housing benefit claims in the social rented sector. 
Under the criteria, which came into force on 1 April 2013, working-age households deemed 
to be under-occupying their council or housing association homes faced a reduction in 
housing benefit, resulting in them being obliged to fund this reduction from their incomes 
(NHF, 2013). The aim of this policy was to reduce the amount of spending on social housing 
and to encourage those ‘over-occupying’ to move into smaller properties allowing more 
space for larger families (Wren-Lewis, 2013). The Department of Work and Pensions utilised 
an economic model that estimated potential savings of £480 million in 2013/14 which was 
published in June 2012 (DWP, 2012). Research conducted into the effects of the ‘bedroom 
tax’ have indicated that twenty eight percent of those affected have fallen into arrears for the 
first time, only six percent have relocated to smaller properties and three percent of those 
affected have had legal action, such as eviction, taken against them (Buchanan, 2014). The 
manager of the Centre for Social Justice, a think tank set up by Iain Duncan Smith9, conceded 
that there were weaknesses in the policy and said that the CSJ recognised the extra social 
costs that the bedroom tax could cause (Duxbury and Brown, 2013). So the evidence 
indicates that the aims of this particular policy have not necessarily been met. However, the 
coalition government did not alter its stance on the bedroom tax other than to downgrade the 
projected savings from £480 million to £390 million (Butler, 2014). 
Another example of the coalition government not responding to evidence presented to them 
concerns alcohol pricing. In 2010 Professor Kelly and Professor Michie argued that there was 
substantial evidence ‘about the effectiveness of alcohol pricing on reducing alcohol related 
harm but that it had not fed through to Government alcohol policy’ (Science and Technology 
Committee, 2011). The policy created in 2011 has been criticised for not reflecting the 
evidence about the level at which pricing effects behaviour. Either Ministers were unaware of 
                                                          
9
 The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions. 
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relevant evidence, or they were aware of the evidence but choose not to reflect this in policy 
decisions.  The Coalition government were committed to promoting the use of evidence 
within policy-making and it is clear that they had the intention of continuing the work of New 
Labour and endorsing their philosophy of ‘What works’.  
In July 2011 the Coalition Government made a commitment to investigate the creation of a 
‘NICE for social policy’10 in the Open Public Services White Paper (HM Government, 2011), 
reiterated in the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills Innovation and Research 
Strategy (Department for BIS, 2011). It was also a key action in the policy section of the 
Civil Service Reform Plan (HM Government, 2012). The Plan stated that: 
‘There must be a clear focus on designing policies that can be implemented in practice, 
drawing on a wider range of views and expertise. At the same time, policy makers must have 
the skills and tools they need to do their jobs. And they should have a clear understanding of 
what works based on robust evidence. Policy resources should be focused on ministerial 
priorities, while improving the ability to scan the horizon better for threats and opportunities 
ahead’  
(HM Government, 2012:14) 
During 2012 the government worked with the Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC), the Big Lottery Fund, Nesta and a wide range of partners in the public services, 
policy and academic arenas, ‘to identify sectors of pressing social need and major public 
spending, where an evidence base exists but there is limited authoritative synthesis and 
communication of this evidence base’ (Cabinet Office, 2013:1). In 2013 the government 
published a policy paper entitled ‘What Works: evidence centres for social policy’. The 
                                                          
10
 NICE is the National Institute for Clinical Excellence established in 1999 to provide national guidance and 
advice to improve health and social care.  
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initiative was based on the principle that good decision-making should be informed by the 
best available evidence on both what works and what does not work. Within the paper it 
states that the new initiative: 
‘…will build upon existing evidence-based policy making through launching a series of 
independent specialist centres. These will produce and disseminate research to local 
decision-makers, supporting them in investing in services that deliver the best outcomes for 
citizens and value for money for taxpayers’ 
(Cabinet Office, 2013:1) 
The creation of the What Works centres meant that they would cover areas with public 
spending of over £200 billion and each would have a policy focus. They will be joined in a 
new What Works network by two already established centres including NICE and the 
Education Endowment Foundation. The list of new areas includes: 
 Crime reduction 
 Local economic growth 
 Ageing better 
 Early intervention 
The policy paper claims that the centres will be independent of government and ‘will collate 
published evidence on the effectiveness of interventions, assess these using a common 
‘currency’, publish clear synthesis reports and share findings in an accessible way with 
practitioners and commissioners and policy makers’ (2013:i). The What Works centres will 
also highlight where it is possible to further the evidence base. Some of the tasks that the 
centres will undertake include systematic assessments of relevant evidence, producing a 
common currency for comparing the effectiveness of interventions, publishing findings in a 
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format that can be ‘understood, interpreted and acted upon’ (2013:5) and advising policy 
makers to ensure that their work can be evaluated effectively.  
Puttick and Mulgan (2013) wrote a short paper recommending five ways that the What 
Works centres can ensure that they maximise their impacts and avoid the mistakes of past 
evidence initiatives. They argue that these previous initiatives ‘often overly focused on 
supply rather than demand and use, and on academic research to the exclusion of other types 
of evidence’ (Puttick and Mulgan, 2013:1). The paper makes reference to the Nesta 
‘Standards of Evidence’ (Puttick and Ludlow, 2012) which provides a shared language for 
understanding evidence underpinning particular policies or practices. The highest level (5) 
suggests that systematic methods of randomised trials and controls are still considered the 
most rigorous type of evidence to show ‘what works’. However, they acknowledge that ‘in 
many fields there is very little evidence of this kind’ (Puttick and Mulgan, 2013:2). The 
lowest level (1) states that ‘you can describe what you do and why it matters, logically, 
coherently and convincingly’ (Puttick and Mulgan, 2013:2) which suggests that a person 
must be able to argue their claim or case convincingly. These standards are similar to those 
suggested by New Labour who promoted the use of RCTs and systematic reviews.  
Examples of initiatives promoted  by the Coalition government include the ‘Sutton Trust-EEF 
Teaching and Learning Toolkit’ which is a collection of education research studies accessible 
to teachers and schools on ‘how to improve the attainment of disadvantaged pupils’ (Cabinet 
Office, 2013:7). The developers claim that the studies included have been rigorously 
evaluated. Another initiative under the Coalition government was the Family Nurse 
Partnership which is being evaluated in England through a formative evaluation of sites and a 
RCT to show how effective the programme is compared to other services. Further RCTs have 
been used to test strategies to improve tax collection. In February 2011, HMRC supported by 
the Cabinet Office Behavioural Insights Team began a trial to establish the impact of altering 
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the messages sent in letters to encourage tax debtors to pay tax owed. HMRC and BIT 
designed a suite of letters, which were sent to people owing self-assessment tax debts for the 
first time. The trial was on a large scale, comprising around 140,000 debts worth £290 
million. The results were that letters which informed people that the majority of people in 
their area had already paid their tax, and which reminded people about the importance of 
paying tax for their local services, outperformed the control group letters by around 15 
percentage points. When rolled out, it is estimated that using the highest performing letters 
would save the Exchequer around £30 million in additional tax revenue. 
2.5 Conclusion 
There are mixed opinions about how far each previous reigning Government have based their 
policies on evidence. Examples were identified in the literature of initiatives and programmes 
that are designed to increase the use of evidence but there are also a number of examples of 
instances where political judgement has interfered with decisions. Politics is integral to policy 
making and attempts to exclude it have so far proved unsuccessful. Some level of judgement 
is needed in order to answer certain research questions such as how to decide what 
programmes are funded or whether education should be better funded than health care. 
However, the EBPM model serves as a useful tool for decision-making as it promotes 
consistent and high quality decisions, and reduces the risk and uncertainties associated with 
decisions. 
The ways in which the evidence is used in  policy processes are largely determined by the 
beliefs and values of policymakers, as well as by considerations of timing, economic costs, 
and politics. How and when evidence is used often depends upon the political agenda and 
ideology of the government of the day, not the nature of the evidence, however compelling. It 
also depends on the way in which a policy actor prioritises different types of evidence. Nutley 
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et al. (2003) suggest that the best we can hope for is evidence-informed policy as there needs 
to be an acknowledgement of the other factors that influence decisions.  
So if decisions are made based on a number of factors then the whole process becomes quite 
messy and as Lindblom argues, we ‘muddle through’. If values and beliefs of policy actors 
affect the decision making process then it is important to understand them. One of the ways 
this can be achieved is by using framing theory to identify the way in which people think 
about and understand a policy problem. Over the last sixty to seventy years these problems 
have become more complex, and we see more and more issues being referred to as ‘wicked’ 
that cannot simply be solved by only appealing to evidence. In the next chapter the theoretical 
framework that is used to underpin the analysis in future chapters is presented.  
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Chapter 3 
 Constructing the Problem and Negotiating the Evidence  
3.1 Introduction 
Evidence as a concept is understood in different ways by policy actors. There are a number of 
models that seek to explain different understandings as to how evidence is thought to shape 
or inform policy.  The purpose of this chapter is to outline some of these models and explain 
how they can be used to comprehend the relationship between evidence and policy. The 
second part of the chapter introduces the theoretical approach that the thesis adopts and 
presents the analytical frameworks that are drawn on and utilised in the empirical chapters. 
The first empirical research question is concerned with how policy actors within the chosen 
case study frame the policy problem of High Speed Two (HS2). In order to answer this 
question the thesis draws on two relevant literatures: social problems theory and policy 
frames. Social problems theory argues that social problems are ‘socially constructed, both in 
terms of the particular acts and interactions problem participants pursue, and in terms of the 
process of such activities through time’ (Schneider, 1985:209). The literature acknowledges 
the use of claims-making by policy actors concerning a problem that there is little agreement 
over. This is coupled with a policy frames perspective which was developed by Schön and 
Rein (1994) to set out how policy actors construct a social problem through policy framing. It 
is another approach to policy analysis that focuses on the construction of social reality and 
the way in which policy actors attempt to impose order upon the social world which is open 
to an array of interpretations (Hajer and Laws, 2006). They are useful to the research because 
they allow the researcher to identify the positions that different policy actors within the case 
study adopt in order to understand and shape their claims. 
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The second empirical research question is concerned with discovering which evidential 
resources actors within the chosen case study draw on and thirdly, how they negotiate these 
with one another through a process of claims-making. In order to answer these questions the 
thesis draws on two main literatures: argumentation theory and the claims-making 
framework. Toulmin’s theory of argumentation (1958) presents a model that provides a way 
of analysing the logical relationships between the constituent parts of an argument. He 
focused on the justificatory function of argumentation rather than the inferential function of 
theoretical arguments. The model serves as a tool for distinguishing between the ways 
individual policy actors construct their policy argument as opposed to claims-making which 
focuses on the way policy actors negotiate between their individual arguments. The claims-
making framework (Best, 1987) acknowledges the complexity of the policy process and 
rejects traditional policy analyses of policy problems that assume these problems are well 
defined and there is implicit agreement in society about their presence and seriousness.  
3.2 Models of the relationship between evidence and policy 
This section outlines four of the models used to understand how evidence is thought to shape 
or inform policy in order to explore the assumptions underlying the concept of evidence-
based policy making. A number of different theorists (Weiss, 1979; Young et al. 2002; 
Monaghan, 2008)  examined the use of social science research in the public policy domain 
and have extracted different meanings that have been associated with the concept. These 
models are set out in the following table: 
Model Is evidence central to policy? 
Linear (also known as knowledge 
driven or problem driven) 
Yes 
Interactive No 
Political/tactical No 
Enlightenment Yes 
 
(Table 1: Models of evidence in policy making) 
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3.2.1 The Linear model 
The first model of evidence utilisation is called the ‘linear’ model (or the ‘knowledge-driven’ 
and ‘problem-driven’ models according to Weiss, 1986) and is often referred to as the 
rational model or purist model by Booth (1988). According to Lindblom (1980:11), the linear 
model represents the 'typical' understanding of the relationship between research and policy. 
This stems from the statement that there is a general view that to make policies more 
effective, it is necessary to bring 'more information, thought and analysis into the policy-
making process'.  Young, et al. (2002: 216) distinguish between the two manifestations of the 
linear model by suggesting that in the knowledge-driven variety research 'leads' policy with 
the role for the expert 'on top'. By contrast, in the problem-solving model, research follows 
policy and the expert is 'on tap'.  It derives from the natural sciences and makes a number of 
assumptions about the policy process and evidence. Its first assumption is that there is a linear 
application of research findings to policy-making. Weiss (1986) claims that the sequence is as 
follows:  
 
Basic research              Applied research                Development of appropriate 
technologies             Application 
 
Within this sequence, basic research highlights an opportunity, applied research is then 
conducted to define and test these findings, ‘appropriate technologies are developed to 
implement the findings’ (Weiss, 1979:427), and finally application occurs. This model is 
premised on the assumption that because knowledge exists, it will subsequently come to be 
used in policy-making. Similarly, the problem-solving model is also premised on a linear 
sequence of the evidence-policy relationship and suggests that ‘research is used to fill gaps in 
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knowledge where problems have arisen’ (Monaghan, 2008:224) but the steps are different 
from the knowledge-driven model because the policy decision drives the application of 
research. The expectation is that research provides empirical evidence and conclusions that 
help to solve a policy problem. What is implicit about this model is ‘a sense that there is 
consensus on goals’ (Weiss, 1979:427). The linear model is a static view of the evidence and 
policy relationship. It is questionable; as to how well, or poorly, this model describes data 
produced in the natural and physical sciences, let alone the social sciences. However, it is the 
most widely recognised as being the ideal model of the evidence and policy relationship. It 
provides a structured and sequenced approach to decisions which is beneficial for those 
trying to bring logic and order to decision-making.  
 
3.2.2 The Interactive Model 
The next model suggested by Weiss is the interactive model which views research as entering 
the decision arena through an interactive search for evidence. She proposes that ‘those 
engaged in developing policy seek information not only from social scientists but from a 
variety of sources -administrators, practitioners, politicians, planners, journalists, clients, 
interest groups, aides, friends, and social scientists, too’ (Weiss, 1979:428). Unlike the linear 
process, this model suggests that the process is a ‘disorderly set of interconnections and back-
and-forthness that defies neat diagrams’ (Weiss, 1979:428). This supports Lindblom’s (1959) 
observation of the policy process as being a ‘messy’ one. In this account, research is just one 
element of a policy process. What often happens when a policy problem emerges is that 
several different groups of people come together and share their understandings and beliefs 
with one another in order to make sense of the problem. Social scientists are one such group 
as well as politicians, field experts, specialist groups and think tanks. It is unlikely that social 
scientists will have specific evidence to hand that relates explicitly to the policy problem. 
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They may have evidence that relates to a similar problem or scenario and so are able to 
engage with other policy actors in order to reach an agreeable policy response. Each group 
are able to contribute to an extent about certain aspects of the policy problem but are also 
able to learn at the same time. So the model recognises the contributions of different sources 
in shaping knowledge and accepts that evidence can have an indirect effect on policy. The 
model fits with an incremental view of the policy process. This view emphasises that the 
policy process is ongoing and experience, political judgement and pressure are also 
acknowledged. Therefore research and policy become mutually influential. For example, 
research agendas and policy decisions are shaped within ‘policy communities’ (Young et al. 
2002) that contain a range of actors.  
 
3.2.3 The Political/ Tactical Model  
This model sees policy as the outcome of a political process (Young et al. 2002). Weiss 
(1979) distinguishes between the political and the tactical model but Young et al. (2002) and 
Monaghan (2008) discuss them in parallel to one another. The model sees the research 
agenda as politically driven, ‘with studies commissioned and/or used to support the position 
adopted by the government of the day, the relevant minister, or perhaps the civil servants 
most closely concerned’ (Young et al. 2002:217). This does not coincide with the evidence-
based policy making model which suggests policy decisions follow evidence rather than the 
other way around. In the political model research may be commissioned to confirm existing 
arguments and evidence utilisation may be selective to satisfy the short-term interests of 
policy-makers. In other words, research is political ammunition and is used to support a pre-
determined position. For example, if a politician takes the position that all school children 
should be provided with school meals regardless of their parents’ income based on his beliefs 
then he will seek evidence that supports this position. In the political/tactical model, the 
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findings of research are less significant than the actual process of research taking place. It 
recognises that political imperatives are central to policy making and suggests that evidence 
often becomes “politicised” (Young et al. 2002; Monaghan, 2010).  
 
3.2.4 The Enlightenment Model  
The final model is the enlightenment model which Weiss and Bucuvalas (1980a) suggest is 
the one that most closely typifies the relationship between research and policy formulation. 
Within this model, single pieces of research rarely have a direct impact on policy. Research is 
often addressed ‘not to the decision process itself, but to the context within which that 
decision will be taken, providing a framework for thinking about it’ (Young et al. 2002:217). 
It shares some similarities with the linear model in that evidence is central to policy making. 
It also highlights how research can be conceived as part of the process of policy-making, as 
opposed to just helping to shape the outcomes, as in the linear approach. It corresponds with 
what we might term ‘evidence-informed’ rather than ‘evidence-based’ policy making (Young 
et al. 2002). Much of social research is inspired by an urge to understand and explain rather 
than by a compulsion to provide policy solutions as we see in the linear models. The idea that 
research can be problem-solving is based on an assumption of the nature of the policy 
process, ‘which is rarely characterised by rational decisions made on the basis of the best 
information’ (Young et al. 2002:218). There is a mismatch between notions of how the policy 
process should work and its actual uncertain and unstable realities. Substantial amounts of 
money are committed to fund policy research yet it does not appear to contribute a great deal 
to solving policy problems. This paradox of policy analysis (Shulock, 1999) is due to the 
misconceptions about how the policy process typically works.  
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History suggests that policy makers and researchers do not always agree on what the desired 
outcome should be. This is often because they have different perspectives to one another 
because they work in different fields. An example of this is the classification of cannabis 
debate in 2004-2009. In 2001 the Commons’ Home Affairs Select Committee conducted a 
major study that focused on drug use entitled ‘The Government’s Drug Policy: Is it 
working?’ in which a number of recommendations were made that concentrated on education 
and harm reduction. The report recommended that cannabis should be re-classified from a 
class B drug to a Class C drug. There was also a report conducted by the House of Lords 
Science and Technology Committee the same year that recommended cannabis should be 
used for medicinal purposes. Three years later, cannabis was downgraded from a class B to a 
class C drug in January. There was a lot of media attention on this policy change and many of 
the public did not agree with the re-classification. Professor Nutt’s findings from 2009 in 
‘Estimating Drug Harms: A Risky Business’ found in his MORI polls that over half of those 
quizzed wished for a stronger categorisation of cannabis, with 32% believing that cannabis 
should be reclassified as Class A even though research suggested that it should not be 
reclassified.  
 
In March 2005, the Home Secretary at the time (Charles Clarke) asked the Advisory Council 
on the misuse of drugs11 (ACMD) to examine new evidence on the harmfulness of cannabis 
in order to determine whether they would change their stance on the classification of the 
drug. This request may have been spurred by the recent public opinion poll. The ACMD 
concluded that cannabis should remain a class C drug; a decision that was accepted by the 
Home Office. Then in 2007 Prime Minister Gordon Brown signalled that he would consider 
                                                          
11
 The Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs makes recommendations to government on the control of 
dangerous or otherwise harmful drugs, including classification and scheduling under the Misuse of Drugs Act 
1971 and its regulations. It is an advisory non-departmental public body, sponsored by the Home Office. 
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reclassifying cannabis as a class B drug (Woodward, 2007). This went against several expert 
recommendations and sparked renewed debates amongst MPs. Some argued that certain 
evidence indicated that more of the available cannabis was now stronger and so was more 
dangerous for people’s health, whilst others thought that cannabis should remain a class C 
and admitted to smoking it in their youth (Batty, 2007). In May 2008, the government 
announced its decision to reclassify cannabis as a Class B drug under the Misuse of Drugs 
Act 1971. Following debates in both Houses of Parliament reclassification came into effect 
on 26th January 2009. What this case demonstrates is an example of a lack of consensus 
among all interested parties and the public which ‘is ultimately a form of political policy 
making in which politics is the art of what is possible, rather than what is rational or what 
might work best’ (Leicester, 1999:6). 
 
3.3 Theoretical underpinnings of the thesis 
The thesis began with the premise that all social science knowledge is ‘historically 
contingent, not universal across time and space’ (Mulgan, 2005:225). This means that 
knowledge bases need to be constantly replenished over time and our different ways of being 
and living create different experiences of the world and meanings. The reality of policy 
making is ‘messier, more contingent, dynamic, iterative and political’ (Russell and 
Greenhalgh, in Glasby, 2011:50) than the evidence-based policy making model suggests. The 
policy making process does not consist of a series of technical ‘stages’ and the relevant types 
of knowledge for policy making go far beyond conventional research evidence; policy 
decisions do not usually occur as clearly defined decision points. By adopting this theoretical 
lens, it allows for the acceptance of multiple realities and the focus of the research  is on 
understanding the processes through which meanings are created, negotiated, sustained and 
modified (Schwandt, 2003).   
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The thesis is concerned with understanding how people make sense of the data or evidence 
they collect or have to hand such as local knowledge. For example, the first empirical 
research question aims to understand how policy actors frame the issue of High Speed Two 
and the third empirical research question aims to explain how policy actors negotiate 
evidence with one another through a process of claims-making. The researcher argues that 
there is an interactive relationship between themselves and what is being inquired. The 
background and values that they have shape interpretation based on personal, cultural and 
historical experiences (Bryman, 2004). These views are consistent with a constructivist 
paradigm. It argues that realities exist in the form of multiple mental constructions dependent 
on their form and content on the person who holds them (Guba, 1990). This enables policy 
actors to provide a broader definition of evidence such as user opinion, expert advice and so 
on.  
3.4 Constructing the Policy Problem 
At every stage of the policy process, whether in defining a problem, setting a goal, choosing a 
policy instrument, or evaluating a policy, choices must be made. These choices are based on 
particular interpretations of a particular context and are always, to some extent, subjective. 
The first empirical research question that the thesis answers is: 
 How do policy actors within HS2 frame or construct the policy problem?  
In order to answer this question the thesis draws on two main literatures which are social 
problems theory and framing theory. These two literatures are the most useful in 
understanding how and why policy actors construct an issue in a particular way. This is 
because the approach assists the researcher in identifying the positions which different actors 
adopt on a particular issue, the terms in which their arguments are couched and the evidence 
they cite for their positions. Social problems theory originates from sociology. During the late 
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1960s into the 1980s many academics argued that “facts” and evidence were not independent, 
direct observations, but embedded in our underlying implicit assumptions that form our 
understanding of the world (Aronson, 1984; Mulkay, 1979). Schneider defined social 
problems as problems that are socially constructed, ‘both in terms of the particular acts and 
interactions problem participants pursue, and in terms of the process of such activities 
through time’ (1985:209). Since the topic of social problems emerged the dilemma for many 
has been about how social problems are conceptualised and how they should be studied. It 
was Bulmer (1971) who campaigned for a change in the way they were viewed. He argued 
that social problems are products of a process of collective definition rather than objective 
conditions and social arrangements. This was developed further by Spector and Kitsuse who 
defined social problems as: 
‘the activities of groups making assertions of grievances and claims with respect to some 
putative conditions’ and argue that social problems theory should ‘account for the emergence 
and maintenance of claim-making and responding activities’ 
Spector and Kitsuse, (1974:415) 
Although this particular theory is concerned with ‘social’ problems, their definition is 
discussed in a similar way to policy problems. Public policy is inherently concerned with 
finding solutions to social problems. What determines whether something is a ‘policy 
problem’ compared with a ‘social problem’ is often a result of the literature of choice. Just as 
evidence-based policy making and research utilisation literature share similar traits, so does 
the literature that discusses policy and social problems. Hajer (1993) viewed political 
problems as socially constructed. He studied the global controversy of acid rain in the 1980s 
to demonstrate how evidence is utilised by competing coalitions and how they interpret a 
policy problem.  
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The central proposition of social problems theory is that social problems are the ‘definitional 
activities of people around conditions and conduct they find troublesome, including others' 
definitional activities’ (Schneider, 1985:209). In short, they are socially constructed rather 
than objective conditions. Each social problem has its own story and unique natural history 
that has developed over time. The idea of natural history model was first raised by Fuller and 
Myers in 1941 but was considered ‘too rigid’ in its specification of a ‘common order of 
development through which all social problems pass’ by Spector and Kitsuse (1973:147). 
They proposed a heuristic four-stage natural history model derived from an extensive but 
informal survey of the histories of several social problems and from detailed histories of six 
social problems compiled by graduate students in a seminar on social problems: 
 
 
Figure 1: Heuristic four-stage natural history model, developed from Spector and Kitsuse, 
(1973) 
Stage one is concerned with awareness and comprises ‘collective attempts to remedy a 
condition that some group perceives and judges offensive and undesirable’ (Spector & 
Kitsuse 1973:148). It focuses on the early stages of the policy process and their attempts of 
Stage 1 
• Claimsmaker establishes and defines a condition as problematic, 
which in effect transforms the condition into a public issue.  
Stage 2 
• Involves the recognition, legitimation, and acceptance from an 
institution, agency, or official organisation. 
Stage 3 
• Members begin to express dissatisfaction with the established 
procedures for dealing with the social problem at hand. 
Stage 4 
• Members develop alternative procedures in response to the 
problematic procedures discussed in stage 3.  
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groups or individuals to assert the existence of some problem, define it as undesirable, to 
publicise the assertions and stimulate controversy thus creating a political issue over the 
matter. Stage one is concerned with ‘how claims and grievances are formed and presented, 
the varieties and nature of the claims and grievances, strategies to press these claims and gain 
wider attention and support, the power of the group making claims, and the creation of a 
public controversy are important issues’ (Schneider, 1985:212). If one group ascertains that 
certain conditions are intolerable another group may claim that the conditions are fine as they 
are and there is no need for change. Such groups may ‘challenge the claims of the protesting 
group, mount their own campaign, and lobby against proposed changes’ (Spector and 
Kitsuse, 1973:151). This is an example of value conflict – each group has different value 
judgements of a particular condition which brings them into conflict with groups that do not 
share these values. A social problem may remain at this stage or transform into stage two, 
depending on whether or not a group’s claims are recognised.  
Stage two begins with recognition of these claims by ‘governmental agencies or other official 
and influential institutions’. To continue beyond stage two a social problem must involve ‘an 
institution…to deal with the claims and complaints concerning the condition in question’ 
(Spector & Kitsuse 1973:154). They may do this through a number of channels including 
demonstrations, use of the media, or confrontation tactics. Social problems thus become 
‘routinized in an organisation charged with doing something about the alleged conditions’ 
(Schneider, 1985:212). Social problems that reach this stage can still disappear. When policy 
actors claim a response is problematic, stage three begins. 
 Stage three is what can be thought of as the dissatisfaction stage. It is where claims and 
demands by groups re-emerge, expressing dissatisfaction with  the established procedures for 
dealing with the policy problem and the failure to generate a condition of trust and 
confidence in the procedures as sympathetic to any complaints. Within the chosen case study 
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for this thesis dissatisfaction exists already and an institution is involved to deal with the 
claims and complaints. Claims and demands have already re-emerged and so it is stage four 
at which the empirical research focuses on.  
Stage four is concerned with creating alternatives. It is marked by claimants' (policy actors) 
‘contention that it is no longer possible to 'work within the system' . . .’ and their attempts to 
develop alternative institutions (Spector & Kitsuse 1973:156). This stage occurs through the 
‘rejection of the response or lack of response of the agency or institution to their claims and 
demands, and the development of activities to create an alternative, or counter institutions as 
responses to the established procedures’ (Spector and Kitsuse, 1973:147). This means 
sociologists of social problems ‘should not concern themselves with the validity of 
participants' (their colleagues included) claims about conditions, but with how such claims 
and definitions are created, documented, pressed, and kept alive’ (Schneider, 1985:212). 
Documenting claims or definitions about conditions constitutes participation. The point is to 
account for the viability of these claims, not to judge whether they are true. And while social 
problems’ participants attribute values to their own and others' activities, sociologists of 
social problems should not. Gusfield (1981) has characterized this stance as being "on the 
side" or neutral, rather than choosing "whose side" we are on (Becker, 1967). 
Researchers of social problems are not expected to make independent assessments of the 
claims-making activities they investigate. It is not for them to decide whether or not the 
claims made by individuals are valid or ‘true’. What is more of interest to them is ‘how 
participants come to make these statements, what they take to be evidence of the conditions 
and to whom they direct their claims’ (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:126). Social problems 
theory is appealing as a starting point as it has a subjective component to it; it recognises the 
importance of language within claims-making and argues that social context facilitates 
definitions and claims. Spector and Kitsuse (1977) state that the activity of making claims or 
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demands for change is central to the core of what they call social problems activities. 
Language plays an important role in policy making and actors must master the art of claims-
making.  
3.5 Framing the policy problem 
The second theory that the thesis draws on is framing theory. It has much in common with 
other interpretative or critical approaches to policy analysis which focus on the construction 
of social reality and the symbolic use of language within policy debates (Taylor, 1971; 
Edelman, 1977; 1988; Gusfield, 1981; Lakoff, 2004). Framing refers to the processes through 
which actors attempt to impose order upon an ambiguous social world open to a multiplicity 
of interpretations (Hajer and Laws, 2006:254). Exploring the specific framing of an issue 
within the policy process is important because it opens up certain policy responses whilst 
excluding others (Hawkins and Holden, 2013). Therefore, the competition to define the terms 
of the debate is a vital component of the policy process. How an issue is framed influences 
whether or not it is considered a political issue and thus enters onto the political agenda. Once 
it is on the agenda, the framing of the issue opens the way to certain types of evidence, who 
will be considered legitimate participants in policy debates, what coalitions of interest will 
form and what the policy responses might be as well as what will be excluded. Therefore, 
policy actors have an interest in how an issue is framed in order to satisfy their interests and 
objectives. Schőn and Rein ‘see policy positions as resting on underlying structures of belief, 
perception, and appreciation, which they call frames’ (1994:23). They understood conflicts 
between frames as the cause of many policy disputes. These situations cannot be resolved 
merely by appealing to facts or persuasive arguments because ‘conflicting frames determine 
what counts as a fact and what arguments are taken to be relevant and compelling’ (Schőn 
and Rein, 1994:23).  
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Schön and Rein (1994) used a theoretical lens that suggests humans construct knowledge and 
meaning from their experiences to set out how policy actors construct a policy problem 
through framing and its significance for how these problems are resolved. They argued that 
frames are ‘underlying structures of belief, perception and appreciation’ on which distinct 
policy positions depend (Schön and Rein, 1994:23). Policy frames construct a particular view 
of social reality and are underpinned by a set of broader institutional and meta-cultural 
frames. Whilst these frames ‘help to shape how particular individuals or groups perceive their 
interests, political actors can be highly instrumental, framing issues in ways that furthers their 
specific interests’ (Hawkins and Holden, 2013:55). Schön and Rein (1994) distinguished 
between two types of policy discourse which are a policy disagreement and a policy 
controversy. A policy disagreement indicates differences between parties that can be resolved 
by examining and evaluating scientific evidence. In contrast, a policy controversy refers to 
gaps between parties that cannot be solved solely by quantitative data. Political controversies 
emerge where mutually incompatible policy frames compete to define a given issue and to 
dictate the policy responses to it (Hawkins and Holden, 2013:55). What this means is that 
political contestation is a struggle between competing frames to define the terms of a policy 
debate (Edelman 1988). Schön and Rein (1994) focused on policy debates amongst decision-
makers, and the possibility of resolving protracted policy controversies through a process of 
‘frame reflection’. However, ‘framing approaches can be applied to the way in which policy 
actors located outside the institutions of government attempt to establish their particular 
framing as the predominant mode of thinking and speaking about an issue’ (Hawkins and 
Holden, 2013:55). By using this framing approach it is possible to identify the positions 
which different actors adopt on a particular issue, the terms in which their arguments are 
couched and the evidence they cite for their positions. Within public policy there are 
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numerous examples of disagreements amongst actors about how a policy problem should be 
solved. This is likely to continue as policy problems become more complex and intertwined.  
 
As mentioned previously, the thesis assumes that the social world is open to a multitude of 
competing interpretations and meanings. People understand an issue in different ways and 
reality exists only in the context of a mental construct for thinking about it. According to 
Goffman, frames are ‘schemata of interpretation that guide individuals to locate, perceive, 
identify, and label events and conditions around them’ (1974:21). In other words they guide 
how people in a policy sphere identify problems, specify and prioritize their interests and 
goals, and make causal and normative judgments about effective and appropriate policies. 
Different frames reflect group’s ‘values contending for public recognition and validation’ 
(Yanow, 2000:11). This means that the policy process must be recognised as consisting of 
policy actors attempting to persuade their audience to accept their particular frame of an 
issue. This relates to the claims-making framework which considers the audience key in any 
discussions about the acceptance of evidence and claims. 
 
In a policy formation context, framing, a device used by social actors to create inter-
subjective significance, refers to the process of paying selective attention to the partial 
characteristics of a policy problem and naming them according to the goal, context and 
binding conditions of a policy issue. As a set of cognitive and moral maps, frames guide how 
people in a policy sphere identify problems, specify and prioritise their interests, and make 
causal and normative judgments about effective and appropriate policies. Framing 
‘constitutes the social significance of the policy situation, redefines policy problem and 
suggests solution for the problem’ (Schön and Rein, 1993: 153). The theory emphasises that 
more and better evidence does not necessarily solve a disagreement amongst policy actors. 
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The case study being utilised by this thesis is a case of a frame conflict. The opposing 
interpretive communities both have well-articulated arguments and evidence. However, 
neither side is convinced by each other;  and the schism between them seems to be widening. 
Is it the case that one side is right and the other wrong? Conventional policy analysis rooted 
in the positivist scientific tradition would offer little help in this situation because it does not 
take into account the beliefs and preferences of the parties involved. It also does not 
recognise that the same evidence can be understood differently by different groups of people. 
Taking an interpretive analytical approach may however, prove helpful. Examining what this 
policy means for the relevant interpretive communities and investigating the values upon 
which their frames are based could provide meaningful clues for moving toward resolution or 
at least greater understanding.  
The main focus of research studies that utilise framing theory are explorations of discourses 
surrounding particular policy issues. The value of the approach is that it acknowledges that 
the interests around policy problems are not given externally, ‘but are created in the policy-
making process via discursive practice of idea generation and exchange’ (Kang and Jang, 
2013:2). This is in contrast to traditional approaches to policy analysis which assumes that 
policy problems and solutions are determined by preferences and interests that are fixed 
externally (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003). Some examples of studies that utilise framing theory 
and discourses include the acid rain controversy (Hajer, 1993), airport expansion in the UK 
(Griggs and Howarth, 1998; 2013) and a study that explored the discourses surrounding the 
policy of siting a radioactive waste disposal facility in South Korea (Kang and Jang, 2013). In 
each of these studies, the researchers encountered a number of similar discourses relating to 
economics, the environment and modernisation (or progression). These academics 
highlighted the importance of the process of constructing or framing a policy problem in the 
policy process. These constructions develop in the contexts of historical discourses which 
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‘contain knowledge of how similar phenomena were dealt with in the past’ (Hajer, 1993:45). 
The focus in the framing literature on claims making within the public domain reflects ‘the 
importance of rhetorical framing in influencing the broader societal debates and the impact 
this has on policy debates’ (Hawkins and Holden, 2013:57). Framing theory offers a lens 
through which we are able to understand the process of political contestation between actors 
with differing agendas and priorities. However, the thesis does not wish to identify 
discourses, rather it is interested in identifying the frames that policy actors use within a 
debate and explore the relationship between the frames and the types of evidential resources 
that actors draw on within the claims-making process. It argues that the way in which a 
person frames a policy issue influences the choices they make about the evidential resources 
that they draw on and the way in which they present their claims.  
3.6 Deconstructing the policy arguments  
This section of the chapter discusses the contribution that argumentation theory makes to the 
thesis and how it assists in data analysis in the empirical chapters. The model used serves as a 
tool to allow the researcher to make the structure of arguments more transparent and provides 
a useful starting point for the analysis of claims and evidence. Argumentation theory is the 
study of how conclusions can be reached through logical reasoning; that is claims based, 
soundly or not, on premises. It includes studying debate, dialogue, conversation and 
persuasion. It studies rules of inference, logic and procedural rules in different settings. It 
includes debate and negotiation that are concerned with reaching mutually acceptable 
conclusions. It links a post-positivist epistemology with social theories and methodology 
often applies interpretive and framing theoretical approaches. This is an example of what 
Guba (1990) refers to as the ‘inter-breeding’ between theories. Argumentation theories give 
special attention to language and ‘the process of utilising, mobilising, and weighing 
arguments and signs in the interpretation and praxis of policy making and analysis’ 
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(Gottweis, 2006:461). In accordance with the constructivist approach, argumentation theories 
do not consider policy analysis to be value free and argue that both policy making and policy 
analysis involve argumentation that needs to be at the centre of policy studies. It has its roots 
in European philosophy and theory and is always connected to considerations of the notions 
of logic, communication and persuasion. Argumentation is about attempts to convince 
another party, not about revealing truths as there can be no absolute standard for truth. It is a 
social activity and an activity of reason (Eemeren et al. 1996). When two or more people 
have a different opinion or standpoint about an issue then they are able to have an argument 
with one another about that issue. Argumentation is about justifying one’s standpoint to 
another person or group or about refuting someone else’s. The argument that is presented by 
an individual is subject to scrutiny by the audience.  
Argumentation theory is appropriate for this research because the researcher is concerned 
with understanding how actors utilise evidence in order to convince others of their argument. 
It acknowledges the role of the audience who are tasked with accepting or refuting a claim 
presented by a person. The notion that argumentation is not about revealing truths and being 
about reasoning speaks to this research because evidence reviewed in chapter two suggests 
that reasoning falls quite short of reliably delivering rational beliefs and rational decisions. 
Reasoning can often lead to poor outcomes, such as the decision to build an expensive high 
speed train line perhaps; but it reveals that people systematically strive for arguments that 
justify their beliefs or their actions. There are three main categories of argumentation models: 
monological, dialectical and rhetorical. Monological models emphasise the argument itself 
and focus on the relationships between the components of the argument. Toulmin’s model 
(1958) is perhaps the most well-Many have developed ideas set out by Toulmin such as Clark 
(1991) and Stranieri and Zeleznikow (1999). Dialectical models focus on the issue of 
fallacious arguments. They are ‘rule-governed structures of organized conversations in which 
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two parties, or more, speak in turn in an orderly way’ (Bentahar et al. 2010:224). Rhetorical 
argumentation, deals with arguments, which are both based on the audience’s perception of 
the world, and with evaluative judgments rather than with establishing the truth of a 
proposition. 
In 1958 Stephen Toulmin developed a model representing the layout of arguments. He 
believed that absolutism lacked practical value and so he aimed to develop practical 
arguments that focus on the way in which opinions or claims can be justified. He argued that 
theoretical arguments made inferences based on a set of principles to arrive at a claim. In 
contrast, a practical argument seeks a claim of interest first, and then provides justification for 
it. His theory (1958; 2003) stated that actors in a policy process are part of competing 
coalitions that argue about a chosen policy, and out of this argument decisions are made by 
policy makers, depending on the strength of each coalition’s argument.  His model has been 
used for the analysis, evaluation, and construction of arguments. It incorporates evidence, 
claims and warrants. He believed that the procedure of argumentation begins with the 
formulation of a problem in the form of a question. In regards to the level of single 
argumentation (micro-level), this will likely be the expressing of a standpoint or opinion. 
Then they must defend this standpoint ‘in the event that it should be attacked…the standpoint 
put forward and to be upheld is called the claim’ (Eemeren et al. 1996:139). Toulmin’s layout 
of an argument is as follows: 
Data/evidence                            Claim 
Warrant 
(Toulmin, 2003:162) 
He suggested that actors make claims about a particular issue based on evidence, and 
warrants are the hypothetical and logical statements that serve as bridges between the claim 
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and the evidence. Toulmin believed that the way in which to defend a claim is to appeal to 
evidence. Therefore there must be a stage in the process that consists of the construction of 
evidence to support the claim. The warrant is then justified by the actor for using the 
evidence concerned as support for the claim (the evidence-claim relationship). The reason 
that Toulmin distinguished between evidence and warrants is that ‘data are appealed to 
explicitly, warrants implicitly’ (2003:92). This suggests that when analysing an argument, 
one should be able to identify both the claim and the evidence each time but it may not 
always be possible to identify the warrant. In principle, the warrant is expressed as a general 
statement and its hypothetical form will be “if (evidence) then (claim)”. Warrants are defined 
as ‘statements which justify drawing conclusions from the grounds’ (Best, 1987:108). For 
example, in regards to the issue of drink driving a claims-maker might argue that even one 
person losing their life due to a drunk driver is one too many, and that, therefore, something 
must be done. Concluding that something should be done demands that a person accepts 
some warrant that the problem deserves attention. As Toulmin (1958:100) argued: 
‘Unless in any particular field of argument, we are prepared to work with warrants of some 
kind, it will become impossible in that field to subject arguments to rational assessment. The 
data we cite if a claim is challenged depend on the warrants we are prepared to operate with 
in that field, and the warrants to which we commit ourselves are implicit in the particular 
steps from data to claims we are  prepared to take and to admit’ 
This implies that for an argument to be persuasive, the people being persuaded must 
ordinarily belong to a field which deems the warrant valid. Or a person may be persuaded by 
another warrant, ‘perhaps one which the person making the argument would not find valid’ 
(Best, 1987:108). It is the warrant in which values most often come into play. It is assumed 
that the warrant is a rule without any exceptions, and that the accuracy of the warrant itself is 
not an issue. The data or evidence in Toulmin’s model refers to facts we appeal to as a 
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foundation for the claim (1958). It answers the questions of what is the proof, and why 
questions. According to Toulmin, the evidence can consist of a number of different data 
including statistics, quotations, reports, findings, or various forms of reasoning.  Evidence is 
significant because it is the reasoning behind the claim and the basis of real persuasion.  For 
Toulmin (1958) the evidence can sometimes be used as the backing for a warrant, or to 
confirm or deny that a warrant satisfies the conditions of a rebuttal. The claim is the 
statement that a claims-maker is asking their audience to accept. It is defined as the 
conclusion ‘whose merits we are seeking to establish’ (Best, 1987:102). It is also referred to 
as the thesis. Toulmin (1958) stated that people often start their argument with the claim and 
then present evidence to support the claim. If the audience do not agree with the claim or 
claims being made then argumentation is required in support of the claim. Toulmin argued 
that the degree to which a claim can justifiably be asserted depends on the quality of the 
argumentation that can be advanced in its support. However, the quality of the evidence does 
not necessarily mean that a claim will be accepted by the audience. In many instances a claim 
will not be accepted, regardless of the evidence presented.  
Toulmin argued that in a more complex argument it is necessary to include qualifiers and 
rebuttals. Qualifiers are conditions under which the claim is true and rebuttals are statements 
which contradict the evidence or warrant (Toulmin, 2003). According to the model, these two 
elements are not vital in every argument but in a multi-layered, complex argument there is 
more than one piece of evidence and rebuttals are used to extend the argument further. A 
detailed argument on a complex issue such as HS2 may involve several simple arguments 
where the intermediate conclusions build up to an overall claim such as HS2 should not be 
built. The strength of the overall argument depends on the strength of the component parts.  
For the purpose of this research, only the three (essential) elements of an argument are 
identified which includes the claim, warrant and evidence. Because it is not the aim of the 
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researcher to analyse the argument itself, it is not necessary to identify all the elements. The 
model is only serving as a tool for identifying the key components within the arguments 
presented in the data. The model does have some criticisms which are discussed below.  
Toulmin did not explain in much detail how he conceptualises evidence. When naming 
something as data he used the term ‘facts’ or the ‘truth’ on which the claim is based. This 
may be due to the theoretical lens that he has applied to his work. He assumed that the data 
will accepted at face value, otherwise it risks becoming a claim itself that must be defended. 
However, this does not coincide with the assumptions in this thesis. The thesis argues that 
evidence itself is contested and not accepted at face value, and it is because of this that we 
have policy controversies. If a person frames an issue in a particular way then this will affect 
the way in which they interpret evidence and the claims that they make. Another issue with 
the model is that Toulmin believed that rationality can, in principle, be claimed for every sort 
of argumentation and that its soundness criteria depend on the nature of the problems at issue. 
However, this thesis argues that human beings are not always capable of rational activity, 
especially concerning highly contentious and emotive policy decisions. The model assumes 
rationality on both the side of who is arguing and on the audience. In order to address this 
assumption, an additional arrow should point towards the data/evidence to indicate that 
evidence is interpreted and not taken at face value. The process is not a linear one.  
There have been critiques of Toulmin’s model in that it has its origins in foundationalism. 
This is a view about the structure of justification or knowledge. Foundationalist arguments 
claim that all knowledge and justified belief rest ultimately on a foundation of non-inferential 
knowledge. This model is useful for the research because it allows the researcher to separate 
an argument that they are reading into parts for analysis. The model separates two of the key 
aspects of the research which are claims and evidence. Rather than viewing arguments as 
rational activities the literature review sought out an approach that included argumentation as 
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well as negotiation of evidence through claims-making. This led to the work of Spector and 
Kitsuse (1973; 1977) and Bulmer (1971). They use a social constructionist lens to define, 
understand and study social problems that is quite distinct from previous perspectives. The 
model is useful for analysing argumentation, not so much as a model for its evaluation. In 
analysing spoken discourse and written texts, it allows the researcher to make the structure of 
argumentation more transparent and it provides a good starting point for the analysis of 
claims and evidence. The model is applied to the case study to distinguish between different 
elements of the argumentation process and to see whether or not the model fits the 
complexity of the HS2 debate.  
The reason that there is a strong focus on the Toulmin model of argumentation within the 
research as opposed to other models of argumentation is that his diagram is very helpful to 
display premises and conclusions in an argument and to show how groups of premises 
support conclusions that can in turn be used as a premise in adjoining arguments. The 
approach allowed the researcher to look at two sides of the policy debate and examine their 
arguments, in particular, how propositions interact with each other and reveals the strengths 
and weaknesses in each argument. It was important to use a monological model because they 
stress the link between the different components of an argument and how a conclusion is 
related to evidence and they emphasise the structure of the argument itself. Alternative 
models of argumentation such as dialogical do not take into account the micro-structure of 
arguments and the audience’s perception of such arguments. Rhetorical models of 
argumentation the emphasis is put on the audience rather than on the argument. The intention 
of the researcher was to use a model of argumentation that focused on the argument itself in 
order to deconstruct it.  
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3.7 Negotiating evidence using the claims-making framework 
Following on from argumentation theory, once the arguments have been deconstructed into 
the various elements, it is possible to concentrate on the evidence and claims being made. 
The thesis classifies claims within the case study using Toulmin’s distinctions among 
evidence, warrants and conclusions as a framework. It conceptualises policy actors as claims-
makers who play a role in shaping how a policy problem is constructed and perceived. 
Specifically, the thesis examines the role evidence plays in making claims about a particular 
policy and how these claims were constructed. It seeks to understand more generally the 
social construction of knowledge by policy actors, particularly those campaigning for or 
against the project. The claims-making framework recognises the power of language within 
policy making and politics. Analysing the claims of individuals and groups allows the 
researcher to understand how claims are used to promote and shape public policy (Meindl et 
al. 2002). Claims may have greater influence over another depending on whether or not it 
supports the interests of political and economic actors, or if it runs parallel with prevailing 
ideological visions within society such as a modernisation agenda. This section of the chapter 
explains what the claims-making framework suggests happens in the policy process paying 
particular attention to the role of evidence and how it is negotiated. Claims have received 
some critical examination (Aronson, 1984; Gusfield, 1981; Best, 1987). In particular, 
Gusfield argues that evidence used to support claims must not be viewed simply as objective 
evidence but should be seen in terms of rhetoric.  
A claim is always an expression of an opinion and it does not necessarily have to be verbal. A 
claim also has a challenging nature calling on another for something due. The thesis defines a 
claim as: 
An expression of an opinion by a policy actor whose merits we are seeking to establish  
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Claims are normative statements with varying degrees of assertion. They are not measured on 
their own merit, but rather by how effectively they appeal to the policy formation audience. A 
claims-maker inevitably hopes to persuade. Their goal is to convince other actors that 
something is a problem and that their solution to that problem is the right one. As Best 
pointed out: 
 ‘while the success of claims-making may well depend, in part, on the constellation of 
interests and resources held by various constituencies in the process, the way claims are 
articulated also affects whether they persuade an move the audiences to which they are 
addressed’  
(Best, 1987:102) 
This means that claims-making becomes a rhetorical activity. As he goes on to argue in 
another text: 
‘Claims-making inevitably involves selecting from available evidence and arguments, placing 
these chosen arguments in some sequence, and giving some arguments particular emphasis. 
These are rhetorical decisions’  
(Best, 1993:41) 
The claims that are made are then usually revised and reconstructed depending on how their 
audience respond to the claims or if the audience differs. They do this in order to attempt to 
make the claims more effective and persuasive. In these instances, ‘even the most ingenuous 
claims-maker must become conscious of doing rhetorical work’ (Best, 1993:41). A rhetorical 
perspective recognises that problems of action involve conflict between people; they are 
essentially contestable (Garver, 1978). One of the ways that the rhetoric approach enriches 
analysis of the policy process is the focus it places on the audience to the claims. These 
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rhetorical decisions will depend upon the nature of the claim, who the claimant is and who 
they are addressing. Rhetoric has received a poor press in modern times as it is often seen as 
something dishonest and undesirable (Garsten, 2006). However, there is an alternative 
conceptualisation of rhetoric provided by Booth (1974) that highlights its value in bringing to 
the fore the role of human agency and judgement in policy making. He defined rhetoric as the 
‘art of discovering warrantable beliefs and improving those beliefs in shared discourse’ 
(1974:xiii).  
And so the task in solving a policy problem is not necessarily to acquire more information 
like the EBPM model suggests, but to exercise practical reason. It was Aristotle who 
introduced this practical reason and it involves deliberation about moral and political issues, 
persuasion, reflection on values and disclosure of ideas. He acknowledged that in politics 
people must come to their decisions on the basis of claims and that there are multiple and 
varied perspectives in each decision. Aristotle ‘saw rhetoric as needed to make people see 
and understand the truth but also because some matters do not yield to a single, indisputable 
truth and the task before us is that of convincing others to see things in the same light as we, 
to define the situation in a particular way and to win others over to seeing it that way too’ 
(Finlayson, 2007:550).  
 
Policy actors often disagree about the meaning and values of things.  This contestability is 
more than just a difference of opinion. These differences are due to the parties involved 
having different criteria of assessment and approaching the dispute from a different context to 
one another. For the wicked issues or policy controversies there is often no agreed external 
evaluative standard; disputes are often not reducible to epistemological problems because 
people disagree not only about a particular policy problem but about what that policy 
problem is and what a resolution might look like. To believe something is to accept the many 
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kinds of reasons that can be presented for so believing it; to present and explain a belief to 
others is to present the arguments that are part of the belief. In a policy argument, statements 
about evidence provide the foundations for the discussion which follows. The evidence is 
socially constructed knowledge and claims-makers and their audiences may agree to accept 
evidence without question, or one or multiple parties may disagree with the validity of the 
evidence. Although definition might seem the logical first step in claims-making, it 
frequently follows an introductory example. For example, in the case of HS2 the discussion 
of a capacity problem on the WCML began before the debate for high speed rail did. Once a 
problem has been established through framing, claims-makers often try to assess its 
magnitude. The bigger the problem, the more attention it can be said to merit, so most claims-
makers will emphasise a problem’s size. They will argue that there is an urgent need for a 
solution to a particular problem.  
Best (1987) suggested that there are three different types of estimates concerning the size of a 
problem. The first is incidence estimates which estimates the number of incidents or people 
affected. The more widespread a problem is, the more it demands attention. Growth estimates 
are concerned with claims that state a policy problem is getting worse or growing and unless 
action is taken there will be further deterioration. The third type of claims is range claims. By 
claiming that a policy problem’s range extends throughout society serves as an important 
rhetorical function. This may make the audience feel that they have a vested interest in the 
problem’s solution. Just as campaigners for the reclassification of cannabis from a C to a B 
argued that if we do nothing then the country will see a decline in mental health and the only 
solution is to reclassify the drug (Hope, 2008). The way in which claims-makers try to shape 
perceptions of social problems is by presenting examples or case histories. They also try to 
get the audience to imagine how they would feel in the same circumstances. This can invite 
sympathy and understanding, so the problem becomes less abstract and the claims easier to 
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comprehend. They will often insist that existing policies and resources cannot handle a 
problem therefore justifying the need for a new policy or an amendment to an existing one.  
Claims-makers often emphasise consistency with past policy as this can be especially useful 
when they address institutions or bureaucracies. Other claims-makers may take a different 
approach and argue that ‘a problem calls for a revolutionary break from the past’ (Best, 
1987:111). Such a claim can persuade those with little invested in past policies. 
Understanding claims-making as it plays out in public policy can provide a vital tool. If an 
actor understands a claims-maker’s values and interests and is aware of their connections to 
other claims-makers and other issues, they are better able to predict their reaction to their own 
claims. They may be able to anticipate potential counter claims that may arise and be ready 
with further claims to expose these counters. Certain groups and actors have made this a true 
art in public policy and a lot can be learned from applying their claims-making strategies and 
practices. In order to truly influence public policy, claims-makers need to think like 
policymakers and present their evidence in claims that appeal to the way decision makers 
think and feel about an issue. Claims-makers learn ways to mobilise and maintain public 
support; they learn how to get media coverage by constructing claims that are newsworthy; 
and they learn to identify key policy makers and recognise the levers which can move policy. 
The legitimacy of certain claims hinges on questions of generalizability, operational 
definitions and measurement, and data analysis. The relative legitimacy of competing claims 
‘is an issue that is fought out between different interest groups in the public arena and within 
the scientific establishment itself. In the final analysis, the legitimacy of such definitional 
claims rests on the adequacy of empirical documentation-documentation that is in turn 
subject to paradigmatic disagreements and political struggles’ (Gillespie and Leffler, 
1987:491) 
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Claims-making literature does not focus on the role of evidence within policy making.  A 
small literature base exists concerning representative claims-making and a slightly larger one 
on political claims-making but neither address all the elements that are important to this 
study. The limitations of the literature are that it does not recognise how different types of 
evidence impact on claims or how claims-makers select evidence, on what basis, and how 
they negotiate with each other. The existing and somewhat outdated literature explains that 
claims-making is a ‘rhetorical exercise in which claims-makers use persuasive arguments to 
advance their position, status or goals’ (Mulcahy, 1995:450). Concepts within and concepts 
that have developed from the literature are the strength of claims, the specificity of each 
claim and the types of claims that are being made. Returning to Toulmin’s (1958) theory of 
argumentation, the structure of arguments was examined. He drew a distinction between the 
claim and the evidence we appeal to as a foundation for the claim. The link between the 
evidence and claim can only be established by reference to warrants. He argued that warrants 
act as ‘bridges, and authorised the sort of step to which our particular argument commits us’ 
(Toulmin, 1958:98). Rhetoric approaches have found his scheme useful in analysing more 
complex arguments. 
3.8 Connecting the theorems 
The thesis addresses a number of research questions that have been answered by drawing on 
three main theories or frameworks. They are framing theory, argumentation theory and the 
claims-making framework. This section explains how they complement each other and why 
each has been used. The diagram below sets out the relationship between the three and how 
they relate to the research questions: 
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Figure 2: Connecting the Theorems 
Initially, the aim was to explore the extent to which policies are based on evidence. In order 
to answer this some pilot interviews were conducted and participants were asked questions 
about their understanding of the role of evidence within the policy process. The participants 
discussed the policy problem in different ways to one another. What became apparent after 
conducting some of the pilot interviews was that some understanding was required about how 
policy actors came to present the claims and evidence that they did as this impacted on the 
types of evidence they drew on. Therefore a theory needed to be identified that would explain 
the way in which policy actors perceived a policy problem. When making a policy decision if 
the actors involved have different understandings of the problem that they are trying to solve 
then they will have different opinions of what the solution should be. This can be explained 
using framing theory. Policy actors that have different frames enter into a process of 
argumentation in order to persuade the audience (usually the public and/or decision makers) 
that the way in which they frame the issue is the “right way” and therefore their solution 
should be chosen. For example, people within a community have different understandings of 
what anti-social behaviour is and so they have different opinions when asked the question 
‘how should we solve the anti-social behaviour problem in our area?’  
Framing theory - 
How policy 
actors 
perceive/think 
about policy 
problem X 
Argumentation 
theory - How 
policy actors 
construct 
arguments 
about policy 
problem X 
Claims-making 
framework - 
How policy 
actors negotiate 
evidence about 
policy problem X 
with one 
another 
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Framing theory allows the researcher to identify the positions that different policy actors 
within the case study adopt in order to understand and shape their claims. This in turn has an 
impact on the types of evidence that they draw on in the process of argumentation. However, 
it is unable to explain how policy actors negotiate claims and evidence with one another. The 
claims-making framework is able to address this. It recognises the power of language and the 
importance of the audience within the policy process. It identifies the ways in which a person  
attempts to persuade their audience of a solution to a policy problem through a process of 
negotiation. What the claims-making framework does not explain is how claims and evidence 
should be identified so an argumentation model is used to deconstruct the arguments in order 
to analyse the way in which the evidence is negotiated. The model is very helpful for 
displaying evidence and claims in an argument and to show how groups of evidence support 
claims that can in turn be used as evidence in adjoining arguments. For example, within the 
chosen case study it is possible using the argumentation model to identify how the arguments 
interact with one another and whether policy actors that adopt different frames appeal to the 
same evidence and if so how.  
The reason that framing theory and the claims-making framework complement each other is 
that they are both concerned with constructions of reality. Framing is ‘a process in which 
actors simultaneously create meanings of events and situations in the world and publicly 
apply these meanings to what they are confronted with (van Hulst and Yanow, 2009: 9). It 
involves (re)constructing policy issues and problems whilst the claims-making framework 
concentrates on the social organisation of claims-making, identifies the key policy actors 
within the process, attempts to show how claims-making is related to their interests and how 
claims-makers mobilise to affect a policy decision. Argumentation theory tends to be 
concerned with logical reasoning which does not necessarily support the theoretical approach 
of the other two theories. However, the thesis does not make any inferences about the logic of 
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the arguments presented, it only uses a model derived from argumentation theory as a basis 
for understanding and identifying arguments within the case study in order to analyse the way 
in which evidence is negotiated.   
3.9 Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrated that the reality of policy making is ‘messier, more contingent, 
dynamic, iterative and political’ (Russell and Greenhalgh, in Glasby, 2011:50). Evidence is a 
product at the end of a long line of assumptions and choices at the levels of epistemology, 
theory, methodology, and methods (Crotty, 1998).  Our understandings of existence and 
knowledge impact on our understanding of evidence and there are a number of models that 
suggest there are different ways that evidence enters the policy process and its role. Although 
the rational model of decision-making is useful for helping decision makers to deal with 
difficult problems in a complex environment by providing a well-defined step by step 
approach, the thesis is in agreement with the view that we should move away from this model 
of policy making and consider it more as indeterminate and ambiguous comparable with an 
interpretive approach. Policy makers are not simply responding to problems that exist in the 
community, but are constructing ‘problems’ through the policy problems that are offered in 
response. Problems are never objective but are framed within policy proposals where power 
undoubtedly plays an important role. How these problems are framed or constructed affects 
what can be thought about and acted on. Both framing theory and argumentation theory as 
well as the claims-making framework identify language as an important part of the policy 
process. It is through language that policy makers and other actors within the process 
communicate ideas and promote policies. Therefore, policy making is based on strategically 
crafted arguments. And policy is a ‘set of shifting, diverse and contradictory responses to a 
spectrum of political interests’ (Russell and Greenhalgh, in Glasby, 2011:54). Argumentation 
theory is preferable to the EBPM concept because it does not disregard its audience and we 
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must move away from this disembodied evidence, towards not only how evidence is 
constructed, but also by whom, for whom and how the evidence is negotiated and received by 
an audience. As Russell and Greenhalgh (2011) state, ‘evidence can no longer be considered 
as an abstract knowledge separate from its social context (in Glasby, 2011:60).  
The thesis demonstrates how policy actors negotiate evidence with other policy actors and 
make claims based on evidence, beliefs and ideas. They enter into a process of argumentation 
and attempt to persuade others of the validity of their claims. They do this by presenting 
evidence and persuasion. The study of argument has the potential to illuminate dimensions of 
the policy process that remain hidden when policy making is studied through a predominantly 
rationalist lens, enabling a rich description of policy making. Acknowledging that in the 
messy world of policy making there is no single right answer, only good reasons to arrive at 
plausible conclusions, rhetorical theory directs analysis towards the human processes of 
judgement and justification, and thus supports critical inquiry into how evidence is 
constructed by policy actors. A social constructionist framework is very useful for 
understanding the public policy arena, and can explain why unfounded anecdotes can easily 
override rigorous scientific effort and investment. It provides a framework for examining the 
real world of negotiated order that lies at the heart of public policy formation. By viewing the 
policy process in this way, evidence is open to interpretation which allows the expertise and 
claims made by policy actors to be challenged. Rather than the limited EBPM approach and 
explanation, the claims-making framework can provide a rich description of the naturalistic 
processes occurring in the policy making process and it provides a more sophisticated 
understanding of the audience. 
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Chapter 4  
Evidence in Transport Mega-Projects 
4.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter explained the various models of the relationship between evidence and 
policy and set out the theoretical models used to understand this relationship. This chapter 
focuses on evidence in a particular policy area: transport mega-projects (MTPs). Mega-
projects can be understood as being large schemes or developments that are complex in 
nature and expensive to construct. Investment in them places a considerable burden on a 
country’s gross domestic product (GDP). Globally, there has been an increase in the number 
of projects that are considered ‘mega’ in nature. MTPs are a category of mega-projects. They 
are known for being the worst transport category in terms of finishing overtime and not on 
budget (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003). However, with a growing population there is an inherent need 
for increased large transportation projects so it is likely that MTPs will continue to be built. 
The case study in this thesis, as mentioned before, is High Speed Two. It is considered a MTP 
due to its size and complexity. It will be the largest rail project that has ever been built in the 
UK since the original railways were built in the Victorian era and it will also be the most 
expensive. The thesis is dedicating a chapter to the use of evidence in MTPs in order to 
provide a context for the case study. It is also important to highlight the difficulties 
encountered by policy actors within these projects in terms of evidence utilisation. This is due 
to the nature of evidence that is often used to either support or oppose a large infrastructure 
project.  
Mega-projects have a number of similar characteristics regardless of their type. They require 
strategic and collaborative decision-making due to the number of different actors involved 
and the wide range of interests. The literature commonly focuses on the characteristics of 
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projects and evaluation ex-post. There are only a small number of authors that explore the 
decision-making processes of mega-projects. The majority of evaluation research seeks to 
explain the reasons behind the success or failure of a project and how projects could be 
delivered more effectively. For the purpose of this research, a number of different decision-
making models have been examined in order to draw some conclusions about the way in 
which decisions are made and the role that evidence plays within these decisions. Firstly the 
chapter considers the literature that explores the definition of a mega project and what the 
main characteristics are. The literature review identified four key themes relevant to MTPs 
which include complexity, risk, uncertainty and deception. The chapter then focuses on how 
decisions are made within these projects, in particular the techniques used to gather and 
evaluate evidence. This establishes what the issues are in how evidence connects to policy 
making in MTPs. By identifying past approaches to decision-making in MTPs the thesis 
demonstrates in the next chapter whether or not the processes within High Speed Two are 
path dependent or whether they have taken a different approach.   
4.2 Conceptualising a mega-project 
There are a number of different ways of understanding mega-projects; one common 
definition is that they are thought of as a very large investment project (Flyvbjerg et al., 
2003). It is similar in nature to the definition of a project in that there are a number of 
stakeholders who share the aim of completing a task within time, scope and budget 
(Söderlund, 2004). What makes them ‘mega’ is usally due to their size and scope. Their 
defining features are the cost and complex causal relationships. Any infrastructure project 
that costs more than $1 Billion US can fall into the category of ‘mega’ (Altshuler and 
Luberoff, 2003). Mega-projects display a number of other characteristics including their size, 
being large scale and are also geographically dispersed. They have continuous evolution and 
dynamism as well as large temporal scales (Lehtonen, 2014). For example, building a new 
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motorway would involve a huge deal of planning and design as well as costs in order to be 
constructed. The Millennium Dome in London was considered ‘mega’ partly due to it being 
one of the largest of its kind in the world. Due to the size of these projects there are a huge 
number of stakeholders and interested parties involved throughout. Certain actors may not be 
present for the entirety of the project, some could be involved for the duration and others may 
only be involved at certain times. Gellert and Lynch (2003) defined mega-projects as:  
‘projects which transform landscapes rapidly, intentionally, and profoundly in very visible 
ways, and require coordinated applications of capital and state power. They use heavy 
equipment and sophisticated technologies, usually imported from the global North’ 
(2003:16) 
 
This definition focuses on the visible transformation to landscapes and the need for co-
ordination amongst stakeholders to complete a project. This leads to the next defining 
characteristic of a mega-project: the impact that they can have. Whenever a mega-project is 
built it often has an impact on communities, on budgets and on the environment. In many 
instances, opposition to these projects are based on the negative effects it may have on the 
surrounding environment (Griggs and Howarth, 1998; 2013; Huys and Annema, 2009). In 
terms of budget, global spending on infrastructure is the largest it has ever been as a share of 
world GDP (Flyvbjerg et al. 2009) and it is estimated that over the next ten years $22 trillion 
US could be spent in emerging economies. In the UK alone, Kulcher (2013) reported that the 
UK Government plans to spend more than £100 billion on infrastructure projects. It is not 
surprising then that these mega-projects warrant a great deal of interest from a number of 
different parties. Due to the huge costs involved with them, they are often referred to as being 
controversial in nature. This is due to the potential displacement and impacts they can have to 
nearby communities and businesses. Gellert and Lynch (2003) claimed that they are 
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‘inherently displacing’.  For example, when constructing a new road or bridge a person’s 
property may need to be removed thus displacing them from their home. This is why in many 
instances there is resistance to the building of certain mega-projects.   
There are frequent issues with control within mega-projects in relation to who the final 
decision makers are on various aspects of the scheme, who is responsible for managing the 
project and who should be funding it (Frick, 2008). Following on from control issues, this can 
be due to the period of inception until realisation which can be several years. In a mega-
project’s life span from design to construction there may be a change in the political 
environment, persons involved may retire or change their job and the project may encounter 
unexpected changes and uncertainties. A change in political affiliations of the Government 
responsible for the project can cause issues for a mega-project. In regards to the case study 
that is presented in this thesis, High Speed Two was envisioned by the Labour Government 
up to 2009, then the Coalition Government (Conservatives and Liberal Democrats) adopted 
the policy, and in 2015 there was another General Election in which the UK which saw yet 
another change in Government control (Conservative Party). The aim must be to have strong 
change management plans throughout the life cycle of the project. Another characteristic of 
mega-projects is that they are collaborative in nature. This could mean that they are part of a 
Public Private Partnership, a Private Finance Initiative or simply funded by the Government 
in full and delivered by private companies. This relates to the issues with control that some 
projects experience as it can be unclear who is responsible for certain aspects of it. 
Sometimes the mega-project will depend on the use of new or unproven technologies and 
legislation. Often decisions are made between ‘on the one hand, innovative, relatively 
unknown technologies and, on the other, proven, less risky technologies, which may be 
regarded as outdated by some parties’ (Priemus, 2010a:1027). As Frick (2008) found in her 
evaluation of the Bay Bridge in San Francisco and Stoop et al. (2007) discovered when 
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evaluating the HSL-South line in Amsterdam, using innovative and untested technologies can 
have a detrimental effect on the decision-making process and cause delays in the project.  
There are a number of authors who have conceptualised these projects in a different way. Del 
Cerro Santamaria (2013) perceived megaprojects in an urban context as large-scale 
development projects that sometimes have an iconic design component, that usually aim at 
transforming or have the potential to transform a city’s or parts of a city’s image, and are 
often promoted and perceived by the urban elite as crucial catalysts for growth and even as 
linkages to the larger world economy. Whereas Salet et al. (2013) considered mega-projects 
to be ‘a loosely coherent accumulation of single elements framed as a single unitary package’ 
(p.1985). They claimed that new projects usually just ‘restructure’ what is already there and 
complement existing networks. More often than not, when these mega-projects are unpacked 
we are able to identify a number of different smaller projects under the same umbrella. This 
is closely linked to a discussion by Lehtonen (2014) who raised the question of the extent to 
which mega-projects can be seen as projects. He provided an alternative perspective that 
understands them as being ‘organic, open systems, co-evolving with their context’ (p.283) 
and so they should be described as a ‘programme of projects’ (OMEGA, 2012). This means 
that boundaries defining these projects will be more vague and subject to change.  
MTPs are developments that entail infrastructure investments such as roads, railways, bridges 
and tunnels. According to OMEGA Centre, MTPs should be defined as:  
‘land-based transport infrastructure investments within and connecting major urban areas 
and metropolitan regions in the form of bridges, tunnels, road and rail links, or combinations 
of these. They are projects that entail a construction cost of over US$1 billion (at 1990 
prices), completed since 1990 and are frequently perceived as critical to the ‘success’ of 
major urban, metropolitan, regional and/or national development’ 
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(OMEGA Centre, 2012:2) 
From this definition,MTPs are a category of mega-projects and they receive their name by 
being solely about land-based transport infrastructure. MTPs do share a number of 
characteristics, although they must still be considered as one-of-a-kind in nature (Lehtonen, 
2014). As Lehtonen argued, ‘despite their several common characteristics, mega-projects do 
not represent a homogenous group of entities’ (2014:281). The next section of the chapter 
looks more closely at the recurring themes that  have been identified within the literature that 
relate to large infrastructure projects which includes complexity, risk, uncertainty and 
deception. 
4.2.1 Complexity  
Complexity is generally used to characterise something that has a number of parts or layers 
where those parts interact with each other in a number of different ways. Much of the earlier 
definitions concerning project complexity focused on concepts of numbers, such as tasks, 
components and technical specialities as well as levels or depth and connectivity (Lessard et 
al. 2013). If something is considered complex it often perceived as being complicated. What 
may seem to be a project with a single primary function, for example, building a bridge that 
connects two areas, but in practice it is often much more complex. Baccarini (1996) 
suggested that large projects in general are complex and since WWII had increased in 
complexity. He argued that project complexity could be defined as ‘consisting of many varied 
interrelated parts, and operationalised in terms of differentiation and interdependency’ 
(1996:202). A mega-project usually experiences an ‘emergence of different purposes and 
interests in an ever-changing and unpredictable context of possibilities and constraints’ (Salet 
et al. 2013:1984). More recent definitions of complexity have identified a conceptual 
distinction between project feature that are inherent, those that are conditional and those that 
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are architectural (Lessard et al. 2013). Some examples of inherent features include the 
legislative context, the geological challenges, interdependence and the number of 
stakeholders involved. Examples of conditional features include governance structure and 
timing as well as financing. Lessard et al. (2013) argued that the architectural features 
‘represents the project concepts that were actively chosen or shaped, given the inherent 
features’ (2013:11). Martens and van Weelden (2014) distinguished between two interrelated 
dimensions: 
 Technical complexity of infrastructure projects 
 Complexity of the societal and organisational context in which decisions have to be 
made 
The first dimension relates to the ‘physical object of planning’ (2014:649). This includes 
aspects of the project such as its size, scale, and time. The second dimension relates to the 
external effects of projects such as effects on the economy and citizen well-being. This 
complexity leads to uncertainty about the characteristics and effects of MTPs. When 
examining complexity in large infrastructure projects it is important to recognise the 
interaction of both generic and unique features of a built area. Although there are often many 
generic patterns that occur in certain locations, there will usually be specific local conditions 
present such as the social fabric. Verweij and Gerrits (2012) argued that ‘a built area becomes 
even more complex if its social fabric is taken into account – individuals and social groups 
living, working, travelling and recreating in any given area – since it directly influences the 
existing and future infrastructure requirements’ (2012:43). If the same mega-project were to 
be built in two different cities there would be different outcomes. Some authors such as Hecht 
and Niemeier (2002), Lee (2008) and Yang (2007) focused on generic patterns of complexity 
whereas others gave more attention to idiosyncratic events (Anguera, 2006; Priemus, 2007; 
Walter and Scholz, 2007). There is no way to remove the complexity from a mega-project 
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due to its nature and many of the features that define a project’s complexity are inherent. 
However, if the complexity is acknowledged by those involved and understood then they may 
be better equipped to deal with the complexity throughout the project. Due to mega-projects 
complex nature, risk and uncertainty are other common characteristics associated with the 
design, funding and construction of these projects.   
4.2.2 Risk and Uncertainty  
Risk is usually portrayed as the potential of losing something of value, weighed against the 
potential to gain something of value. It can also be defined as the intentional interaction with 
uncertainty. A course of action or decision is considered a risk if a person has a good 
understanding of the situation and can assess the chances of different outcomes in advance. 
This means that they might be able to produce a numerically balanced judgement. When a 
person believes they do not fully understand elements of a decision then they are considered 
to be uncertain. The reason that mega-projects are often laden with uncertainty is their life-
span. On average, mega-projects can span over a number of decades. In the Netherlands the 
decision-making process for infrastructure development ‘takes about eleven years on 
average’ (Verweij and Gerrits, 2012:41). Depending on the size of the project it can take up 
to thirty years or more. Another cause for uncertainty in mega-projects is the boundaries 
which are often subject to change. Even when they are ‘precisely defined at the beginning, 
they often appear to change during the processes of decision making because of often 
unforeseen interrelationships with other developments’ (Salet et al. 2013:1986). Because of 
long planning horizons and the complexity of mega-projects they are often defined as being 
‘inherently risky’ (Flyvbjerg, 2009). Due to the huge costs of mega-projects the global 
economy often rests on the success of investments in these projects. A successful 
development could lead to an increase in investment and employment; if the project is not 
successful then it may hinder the economy rather than improve it.  
80 
 
Martens and van Weelden (2014) defined uncertainty as the ‘lack of reliable knowledge 
about the characteristics and future effects of infrastructure projects’ and ‘distinguish four 
causes that may give rise to uncertainty’ (2014:650). The first cause is due to the nature of 
evidence used within MTPs. There is no way to know exactly what will happen in the future 
and so evidence relating to future developments can only ever be predictions or estimates. 
For example, if a new metro line was built in a city then economists would usually predict the 
expected economic benefits using statistical modelling. However, there are a number of 
variables involved such as passenger ridership, the economic climate in terms of growth, and 
these variables cannot be controlled. Thus, evidence ‘used with regard to these variables is 
always disputable’ (De Bruijn and Leijten, 2007:53). The second cause relates to the system 
boundaries regarding the effects of projects, ‘as these boundaries directly influence the types 
of effects which will be taken into account in project analyses, thereby also shaping the 
results of the effect analyses’ (Martens and van Weelden, 2014:650). This means that the 
wider the system boundaries are then the greater the uncertainties will be. The third cause 
related to uncertainty is how different research methodologies can lead to different 
conclusions about a project. If there is no consensus on the methods used within MTPs then 
there is likely to be uncertainty within these projects. Lastly, Martens and van Weelden 
(2014) identified the issue of optimisation of desired effects as the fourth cause for 
uncertainty. They argued that: 
‘Decision-making about infrastructure is often about the comparison of alternatives and 
selecting the optimal option; however, which alternative scores best depends strongly on the 
variables that are taken into account and the assumptions that are used’ 
(2014:650) 
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These four causes of uncertainty play a role in all decision-making processes but are more 
prominent in MTPs due to their size and scale. The second dimension of complexity, as 
discussed by Martens and van Weelden (2014) relates to the multi-actor environment in 
which decisions on MTPs are made. The larger the project, more actors are usually involved. 
They are likely to have a wide range of opinions and interests and will frame the project and 
its elements in a different way. This means that the project could be viewed from a number of 
different perspectives which are often ‘incompatible and lead to fundamentally different 
interpretations of the same situation, with no clear criteria to distinguish valid interpretations, 
even if actors agree about the reliability of the available information and the expected impacts 
of an infrastructure project (Martens and van Weelden, 2014:651). Therefore, evidence is 
ambiguous due to it being interpreted in a number of ways. For example, if there is an issue 
of connectivity between two areas in a city the actors involved are likely to have different 
opinions of how to solve this problem due to the way in which they have framed the 
connectivity issue. Their normative standards could lead them to potentially different 
solutions. It is difficult for one group of actors to claim that their solution is a better option 
than another group’s. The stronger the different interests amongst the groups then the 
stronger the incentives will be to make evidence more contested and devalue it.   
There are different types of risks associated with mega-projects. The first being ecological 
risks. This relates to the effects that the project may have on the environment. Opposition 
groups to mega-projects, especially those concerned with transport, identify ecological risks 
with the hope of halting the project. By demonstrating through evidence that the ecological 
risks outweigh the benefits of the project is sometimes enough to halt or hinder it. An 
example of this is in Thailand where the National Council for Peace (NCPO) recently ordered 
state agencies to halt projects related to the Pheu Thai Government’s 350 billion-baht flood 
control and water resources management scheme (Blake, 2014). The water scheme was ‘one 
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of several infrastructure mega-projects worth a combined 2.35 trillion baht (approximately 
$71 billion) that had raised the suspicions and ire of many government opponents, fearful that 
the borrowed funds would be used for nefarious purposes, such as buying rural votes, leading 
to environmental destruction and social division, while quietly feathering the nests of the 
select few who controlled the purse strings’ (Blake, 2014). An example in which opponents 
to a project were not successful is the Tiergarten-Tunnel mega-project in Berlin. Those 
opposed to the development focused on asserting that ‘the tunnel project would cause severe 
and permanent environmental damages to the Tiergarten Park’ (Peters, 2010:95). They 
employed academic researchers to assist them in finding evidence that would offer an 
alternative environmental report. However, the university researchers ‘deemed the ecological 
risks and possible permanent environmental damages to the Tiergarten Park to be less 
substantial than the activists had hoped, crushing their hopes of halting the projects on the 
basis of environmental arguments’ (Peters, 2010:96). These are two instances where 
opponents to mega-projects raised concerns about the ecological risks of mega-projects with 
only one being successful.  
The second type of risk associated with mega-projects is financial risks. It would be very 
difficult for economists to predict up to thirty years in advance what the economic and social 
situation would be for an area or country. As Priemus (2010b) stated: 
‘Generally speaking, prognoses and estimates – implicit and explicit – are based on 
assumptions about trends in supply and demand, and hence the price developments in 
relevant markets. A whole host of factors come into play, such as the availability of engineers 
and other experts for the preparation phase; the supply of tradesmen, building materials, 
installations and raw materials for the execution phase; developments in energy prices; the 
overall economic situation; the capital market (including trends in long-term interest rates); 
inflation and the land market’ (p.25) 
83 
 
All of these factors need to be considered in the early stages of a mega-project as they can all 
create financial risks for the project. Another factor that could alter financial risk is mobility 
patterns. If a new high speed rail link is designed and built with the assumption of a certain 
amount of passengers to make the project financially viable may be affected by the increase 
in cheaper air travel provided by airlines such as RyanAir and EasyJet (Priemus, 2010b). In 
Europe, inland shipping is affecting the use of rail and road transport in terms of freight.  
Once the project has been completed there are then operational risks which are associated 
with uncertainty about the performance of the infrastructure during its operating phase. Ward 
(2008) identified three key features of operational risk: high capital cost, long lives and costly 
post-construction modification. Economic appraisals typically assume around a twenty year 
operating life. However, many mega-projects such as roads and railways will exceed this 
estimate. As Ward stated, ‘In some cases future operating costs (even after appropriate 
discounting) may substantially exceed the more immediate construction costs’ (2008:2). 
Stakeholders are required to have a good understanding of the potential future costs and 
revenues of a mega-project in order to reduce uncertainty and risk. One-off events can also 
have an impact on the operational risks. For example, if an incident occurs such as the 2013 
rail crash in Santiago de Compostela, Spain then investigations may lead to a change in 
maintenance or security protocols. Thirdly, operational risks can have ‘significant cumulative 
effects’ (Ward, 2008:2). Smaller scale problems encountered by mega-projects can have a 
cumulative effect if not addressed such as increased costs, shifts in organisational culture and 
lost efficiency.  This is why in many instances a Government displays a preference for 
public-private partnerships in order to divide the risk between actors.  
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4.2.3 Deception  
Deception is considered to be an act that propagates beliefs of things that are not true. It is 
associated with lying which is defined as ‘an assertion, the content of which the speaker 
believes to be false, which is made with the intention to deceive the hearer with respect to 
that content’ (Williams, 2002:96). The reason that intention is important within the definition 
is because if a person states something as being true when they know it to be false then they 
are deceiving another person but it cannot be considered  deception if they have not 
intentionally misled someone. For example, if a person (A) were to inform another person (B) 
that they had an appointment at ten o’clock believing this to be true, but the appointment is at 
eleven o’clock then they are not being deceptive. Person (A) would only be deceiving person 
(B) if they knew that the meeting was at eleven and intentionally told them the wrong time. 
This leads us to the next issue which is how to identify deception. If one were to conduct 
research into whether or not someone had been deceptive then they would have to ask that 
person if they had intentionally misled people. In many instances it is unlikely that a person 
will admit to being deceptive. Therefore, the researcher cannot conclude that someone 
deceived another. At best they can suggest that it was a possibility, just as much as it could be 
a possibility that someone unintentionally misled another. Linsky (1963) and Barnes (1997) 
suggested that the definition of deception must include that the false belief is caused by 
evidence, and that evidence is brought about by the person in order to cause the other person 
to have false belief. For example, if a person intentionally deceives another and they have 
presented them with evidence that suggests something is true when it is not then they are 
being deceptive.   
Much of the literature on large infrastructure projects argues that the majority of projects are 
only granted funding or planning permission due to certain actors being selective with the 
evidence. Some go as far as to claim that actors deceive others in order to get a project 
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approved. Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) claimed that in certain cases actors strategically manipulate 
information or processes in order to increase the likelihood of a project being built. They 
argued that ‘these actors purposely spin scenarios of success and gloss over the potential for 
failure’ (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003:173). They gave two different explanations for why 
stakeholders and other actors might use deception: the principal-agent problem and the 
sources of strategic deception. Principal-Agent (P-A) problems are defined by relationships 
where a principal engages an agent to act on their behalf. Large infrastructure projects such as 
a new bridge or road will consist of a multiple tier P-A problem. Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) 
identified three tiers of P-A relationships including taxpayers, National Government, Local 
Government, analysts, contractors and planners and each of these tiers interact with one 
another. National Government are responsible for allocating taxpayers money to projects that 
will return the most benefits for the least amount of money. Both local and national 
Government also know that they are unlikely to complete a mega-project during one term in 
Government. Therefore, they may provide inaccurate forecasts in order for the project to be 
approved and start construction. If the project does incur cost overruns they can blame the 
successive Government for these failures. Finally, the third tier that includes contractors and 
analysts interacts with local and National Governments. They have an incentive ‘to provide 
information that is compatible with pleasing the local government, having the project 
approved, and being re-engaged on the next project’ (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003:178). Flyvbjerg et 
al. (2003) suggested that they are often aware of the real costs of a project but do not 
necessarily divulge this information to the Government for fear of the project not being built. 
Similarly, contractors know that high costs could reduce the chance of funding and so in 
order to win the tender from Government they may deceptively state what the costs and 
benefits might be.  
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The other explanation for deception in large infrastructure projects is sources of strategic 
deception. This includes differences in actors’ self-interest. Most stakeholders within a large 
infrastructure project have various incentives. Therefore those involved in the early stages 
when the economic case is examined to decide if a project should be approved may deceive 
others of the forecast costs and benefits. ‘Political and economic self-interest also exists at the 
level of cities and states’ (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003:179). A second source of strategic deception 
is the presence of asymmetric information. Sometimes the Government is not aware of all the 
relevant information regarding the mega-project. This means that in some cases the decision-
maker may be easier to deceive. The presence of different risk preferences can also create a 
P-A issue. For example, ‘if the principal is risk averse, the agent who submits a proposal for 
approval may have to downplay the possible risks of the venture in order to convince the 
principal’ (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003:180). Finally, Flyvbjerg and his colleagues identified the 
issue of asymmetric accountability. In some instances, projects have multiple people or 
groups that are responsible for the success of the project. If the project is evaluated and 
considered a failure then it is often difficult for any one agent to be held accountable. This 
lack of accountability during ex-post evaluations of projects can lead to an agent promoting 
projects that protect them from being held accountable if they fail, ‘which may not be the 
projects that maximise the principal’s total payoff’ (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003:180).  
Mega-projects are prone to delusion and deception. It is argued that ‘the most underestimated 
costs and the most over-estimated benefits is best placed to win political approval at an early 
stage’ (Priemus, 2010a:1024). It is difficult to overcome deception in these projects as actors 
are often determined for a project to go ahead and so they are selective and/or manipulative 
with their evidence. One way in which projects could decrease the use of deception is for 
principals to be better informed and for there to be better incentives for agents such as 
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planners and contractors. Having strict forecast audits may also reduce the amount of 
deception present in mega-projects.  
4.3 Decision-making within Transport Mega-Projects  
This section of the chapter offers a review of the literature that focuses on decision-making 
within transport mega-projects which  provides the context for the case study which are 
discussed in the subsequent chapter. Decisions can be conceptualised as the ‘result of the 
search for the right course of action’ (Faludi, 1998:381). In making decisions people rely on 
evidence or knowledge to make informed choices. The decision-making process involves 
relevant actors who must identify and choose a solution to a question or problem through 
examining a number of options.  At the end of the process a final choice is produced based on 
the values and preferences of those actors. As discussed in the previous chapter,  
In regards to mega-projects, Priemus (2010a) argues that a mega-project is a solution, which 
implies that there is a problem that needs solving with the mega-project being the most 
advantageous response. Due to the size and scope of mega projects, there are always a large 
number of actors with a high number of dissimilar and shared viewpoints about what the right 
course of action should be. As MTPs are a category of mega-projects, they possess a number 
of the same issues. A decision about whether or not to build a mega-project contains within it 
a number of secondary decisions that must be considered such as where should the mega-
project be built, what should it look like, what materials should be used, who should be 
involved at the various stages and so on. These choices must all be made prior to construction 
in order to receive planning approval. As mentioned above, a characteristic of a mega-project 
is that it often has a long life span and can take years to construct. Therefore, it is likely that 
many of the actors involved in the early stages of the project will not see it through until the 
end. A number of actors may only be involved at certain stages of the project, depending on 
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their role which adds to the complexity of the mega-project process. Another problem that 
can arise due to the life span of mega-projects is that certain events are very difficult to 
predict. If a country experiences a recession and the economy is affected then this can have a 
detrimental impact on a project.  
Decision-making on mega-projects is ‘the prerogative of the public domain’ due to ‘the 
characteristics of infrastructure projects (affecting the lives and interests of many actors in 
society)’ (Martens and van Weelden, 2014:650). These public decisions are made in a context 
of increasing complexity. They often involve the comparison of alternatives and the most 
favourable option is usually chosen based on which variables are taken into account and the 
assumptions that are used. Bickerstaff and Walker (2005) stated that there has been an 
increase in the number of actors that claim a stake in decision-making on mega-projects over 
the past decades. Furthermore, interests and values have diversified over the same period. As 
a result, proposed projects are assessed from a variety of different perspectives or frames. 
Often, these frames are incompatible and lead to fundamentally different interpretations of 
the same situation, with no clear criteria to distinguish valid interpretations from less valid 
interpretations, ‘even if actors agree about the reliability of the available information and the 
expected impacts of an infrastructure project’ (Martens and van Weelden, 2014:653). In other 
words, actors involved in decision-making processes may adhere to different normative 
standards and different views about what the best course of action might be. This means that 
the evidence can be interpreted in different ways.  
When making a decision about whether or not to construct a MTP, the first step is to conduct 
an analysis of the problem, because a ‘valid problem analysis is essential in order to 
determine whether a proposed alternative is effective, efficient and legitimate’ (Priemus et al. 
2008:107). This involves asking questions such as what is the problem, what is it likely to be 
in the future and who is affected by the problem? Herein lies the first dilemma: if people 
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interpret the problem in different ways then they may have a difference of opinion on what 
the solution to said problem should be. Even if two people interpret a problem in the same 
way, they may favour a different solution to another actor’s. So not only do mega-projects 
have a number of different decisions within in them but there is usually a wide range of views 
about what the best course of action should be. This adds to the complexity of the decision-
making processes for these projects. After planning decisions have been agreed and a solution 
has been chosen, there are then a number of construction and operational decisions that must 
be made. Different types of data and evidence influences each of these stages of the decision-
making process.  
4.4 Decision-making models of Transport Mega-Projects 
There is no single, unified decision-making model that is followed for all MTPs. As 
mentioned earlier, MTPs do share many characteristics but are also unique which means what 
may work in terms of decision-making for one project may not work for another. An in-depth 
literature review did not provide the thesis with one explicit example of how decisions are 
made. However, other literature that is not focused on MTPs provides a number of different 
models that are utilised by decision-makers and it is possible to compare these with some 
examples of MTPs and suggest what model most closely mirrors what occurs. For the 
purpose of this research, three models of decision-making have been selected and are 
discussed. They are the rational model, the normative model and the garbage can model. The 
rational model involves a cognitive process where each step follows in a logical order from 
the one before. It is most closely associated with the evidence-based policy making model 
presented in chapter two. There are a number of variations of the rational model but generally 
the steps are as follows: 
90 
 
 Define the situation/problem which will provide a question on which to base a 
decision 
 Identify the most important criteria in regards to the process and result 
 Consider all possible solutions/alternatives 
 Calculate the consequences of each option versus the likelihood of satisfying the 
criteria 
 Choose the most suitable option 
(Adapted from Brooks, 2002) 
Rational decision-making models assume that there is one suitable outcome that is better than 
others. It also assumes that it is possible to consider all potential solutions or alternatives in 
order to make a decision as well as understand what the future consequences might be. 
Herein lies the issue in regards to mega-projects; they have a long lifespan which meansit 
could be very difficult to predict what might happen in ten to twenty years or even longer in 
some instances. Another assumption that the model makes is that people are able to act 
rationally. The model attempts to negate the role of emotions in decision-making, however, 
this thesis argues that people are unable to be objective and are usually influenced by their 
emotions and values. If a person is going to lose their home due to a new motorway being 
built then they are unlikely to be able to ignore their feelings and emotions. Although the 
rational model makes some assumptions that this thesis questions, it remains one of the most 
utilised approaches for reducing risks and uncertainties associated with difficult decisions. It 
allows decision-makers to apply some level of logic to an otherwise messy process.  
In response to the rational model in which it is assumed that we can know all alternatives, 
Simon proposed the normative model which is guided by decision-makers bounded 
rationality (Baron, 2004). The bounded rational decision-making models suggest that people 
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consider fewer options than are available, or choose an option that is not considered the most 
suitable, but is the best within current circumstances. The model claims that these people are 
satisficing. In regards to mega-projects, it would probably not sit well with the general public 
to know that decision-makers had not considered as many alternatives as possible due to the 
costs and impacts a project would have. They would want to know that decision-makers had 
reviewed as many options as possible before picking a solution due to the large costs 
involved. Even if this model was employed by decision-makers within MTPs it would be 
difficult to identify in the literature. It is unlikely those actors would admit to considering 
fewer options and if they did this subconsciously then we would not know. The DfT model 
(2014) (See appendix B) provides guidance on how to conduct a transport appraisal process 
but determining whether or not it had been followed would be difficult. 
Similarly to the normative model, the garbage can approach grew from the rational model’s 
inability to explain how decisions are actually made. It opposes the view that decisions 
makers follow a sequential series of steps that begins with problem definition and ends with 
one solution. The garbage can approach claims that decisions result from a complex 
interaction between four independent streams of events: problems, solutions, participants, and 
choice opportunities. The interaction of these events creates ‘a collection of choices looking 
for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations in which they might be aired, 
solutions looking for issues to which they might be the answer, and decision makers looking 
for work’ (Cohen et al. 1972:3). The authors of this model liken the process to a garbage can 
because they say that these four streams mix together just as the rubbish in a garbage can 
does. In this way, attractive solutions can get matched up with a number of problems that 
exist at a given point in time. This model can be likened to the theoretical contributions made 
by Lindblom (1959) who argued against theories of rationality and claimed that decisions 
were made by ‘muddling through’ because we have limited rationality. We are therefore 
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‘satisficing’ as policy actors because we are unable to know all the possible alternatives and 
outcomes of a decision. It is more likely that decisions within MTPs follow this model due to 
their complexity. However, it is difficult to confirm this because not all processes are 
transparent at all stages and researchers may not be able to access this information.  
In regards to MTPs, GUIDEMAPS (2004) presented a six stage model that explains how 
transport decision-making can be characterised (Appendix A). The stages represent ‘specific 
periods during which pre-defined types of work take place on the project…in each case, 
appropriate information is collected, resources are employed and outputs generated’ 
(2004:12). The Department for Transport (DfT) (2014) have also produced a document that 
sets out the transport appraisal process and divides it into three stages (Appendix B). The 
model is complex compared to the GUIDEMAPS example, but it follows a similar pattern. 
The DfT claimed that stage one of the process is concerned with option development and 
reporting, stage two is centred around further appraisal and stage three consists of project 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Both models state that the first stage in the 
process is to identify and define the problem, followed by option generation and 
development/assessment of these potential options. What differs from one project to another 
is the type of work undertaken at each stage and the resources required to complete each 
stage. In regards to MTPs, the problem definition and option generation stages alone can take 
a number of years. As part of the option assessment framework, a large infrastructure project 
uses the ‘Five Cases Model’ which include conducting research that looks at the strategic 
case, the value for money of a project, and the delivery, financial and commercial cases (DfT, 
2014:4). These two models suggest that within transport projects, a rational decision-making 
model is favoured. However, even though decision-makers may claim to be adopting a 
rational approach and believes that they are, they may not be. For example, they may make a 
decision whilst following these different stages but the decisions they make within these 
93 
 
stages may not be rational or value free. Actors within an MTP will have framed the problem 
in a particular way which is based on their values and beliefs. Therefore, they will select and 
agree with evidence that supports these values and beliefs. If a person believes that the 
environment is more important than connectivity between two places then they are unlikely 
to support a project that will have a negative impact on the environment. Rational models 
also attempt to negate emotions from decision-making. It is unlikely that a person who is 
displaced by the construction of a MTP will not be influenced by emotions if they have to 
leave their home.  
4.5 Evidence within Transport Mega-projects 
Evidence plays an important role within decision-making processes, especially within MTPs. 
De Bruijn and Leijten (2007) argue that a lack of evidence often results in poor decision-
making. This implies, similarly to the rational models of decision-making, that the more or 
better quality of evidence used results in more successful outcomes. There are also problems 
associated with miscalculation in regards to costs and benefits. These are often down to either 
errors in methodological approaches or strategic misrepresentation (Osland and Strand, 
2010). There are a number of different types of evidence that is utilised by decision-makers at 
various stages of a mega project.  
The most common source of evidence that influences MTP decisions comes from data 
provided by cost-benefit analyses (CBA) as it is the most comprehensive method and 
theoretically sound form of economic evaluation available to decision-makers. It is a 
systematic approach to estimating the strengths and weaknesses of alternatives that satisfy 
activities or actions. Decision-makers use the technique to determine options that provide a 
particular approach for the adoption and practice in terms of benefits in labour, time and cost 
savings (David et al. 2013). Its purpose is to determine whether or not a decision or project is 
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justifiable and feasible and it provides a basis for comparing projects or alternatives. It does 
this by comparing the total expected cost of each option against the total expected benefits, to 
see whether the benefits outweigh the costs and by how much. This means that policy actors 
who want decision-makers to choose a particular option have to show to them that their 
solution is the most beneficial in terms of cost. The use of CBA has been widely discussed in 
the literature on mega-projects (Jones et al. 2014; Olsson et al. 2012; Guhnemann et al. 2012) 
and its use is often critiqued. The main difficulties of using the approach are forecasting over 
long periods of time and having to deal with imperfect competition in transport-using sectors 
to obtain estimations of wider transport benefits. However, it remains a valuable tool when 
used as part of the appraisal process when the inputs are carefully assessed and other sources 
of evidence are used to complement the CBA.  
There are different methodologies within CBA and each approach provides variations in 
terms of benefits. Today it is ‘often taken for granted that cost-benefit analysis is needed to 
ensure “better regulation” and avoid inefficiency in government’ (Ackerman, 2008:1). There 
are other similar approaches that are utilised in MTPs such as building life cycle cost (BLCC) 
and social benefit analysis (SBA) and they all place monetary values on each aspect of a 
project. For example, they will place a value on trees that need to be removed in order to 
build a project as well as placing a value on time saved whilst travelling. Increases or 
reductions in pollution as a result of a project will also be given a monetary value. Depending 
on the value they give these different things could alter what conclusions they make. This is 
why when evaluating a mega-project supporters often argue that costs are over-stated and 
detractors often argue that the benefits are overstated. Olsson et al. (2012) explored the 
differences in CBA methodologies amongst seven European countries. They concluded that 
results of each CBA were ‘far from similar’ depending on the applied national methodology. 
De Bruijn and Leijten (2007) also discussed issues with CBA, concluding that ‘different 
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methods can lead to completely different conclusions about the social feasibility of a project’ 
(de Bruijn and Leijten, 2007:87). What this means for decision-makers is that they must 
decide, based on their judgement, which methodology of CBA to employ.  
Similarly to CBA, environmental impact studies are now conducted for all infrastructure 
projects in the UK. The Government has published guidance and supporting material to 
‘enable departments to understand and quantify, where possible in monetary terms, the wider 
environmental consequences of their proposals’ (www.gov.uk). Their rationale for taking 
wider environmental impacts into account is underpinned by existing guidance on policy 
appraisal. The Treasury Green Book (2011) also highlights the importance of trying to 
identify all costs and benefits including environmental. The actors go on to argue that ‘while 
impacts on the environment often do not have any market prices, it is important to try and use 
evidence on non-market values attached to environmental impacts where feasible’ 
(www.gov.uk) and provide ‘Tools for Environmental Valuation’. There is a desire for 
quantifiable costs and benefits and they state that only where it is not possible to provide 
monetised or quantified assessment should a qualitative assessment be provided of potential 
impacts. Public consultations are frequently carried out in the early stages of the decision-
making process as well as stakeholder engagement to identify concerns, generate options and 
understand the current and future contexts (DfT, 2014). By consulting with the public, their 
input on matters affecting them can be considered and its main goals are improving the 
efficiency, transparency and public involvement in large-scale projects such as MTPs 
(OECD, 2006). Due to the large scale of mega-projects, there are usually great deals of 
people that are impacted upon. The types of data that consultations can produce are both 
qualitative and quantitative in nature. By consulting with other actors, decision-makers are 
able to develop an understanding of others’ ideas and beliefs or frames about a particular 
issue. They are able to ask what is important to people in terms of economic and 
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environmental benefits. Other sources of evidence include expert opinion, engineering 
studies, media coverage, and studies related to the technologies used. Different types of 
evidence are considered at different stages of a project. It is unlikely that one policy actor will 
be aware of or understand every aspect of a mega-project. This often leads to problems such 
as misinterpretations and a lack of knowledge or understanding to base decisions on.  
4.5.1 The problem of evidence 
Evidence within MTPs is often discredited throughout the course of the decision-making 
process (Martens and van Weelden, 2014). The public are frequently distrustful of evidence 
presented to them by Government and they also question evidence presented by neutral 
policy actors. This can have a substantial influence on decision-making within MTPs. 
Projects are often delayed or cancelled in part because of the lack of trust in the evidence on 
which decisions should be based. Likewise, projects have been approved and implemented on 
what later was shown to be false assumptions and evidence. Not only do the public distrust 
evidence within MTPs, but those considered experts often discredit evidence that is in the 
public domain by revealing flaws in research designs and methodologies. Cost-benefit 
analyses are the most common source of evidence that actors seek to discredit because they 
are able to question the values that are given to certain aspects of the project that would not 
usually be monetised. For example, if a motorway is being built in order to reduce congestion 
then there will be a monetary value placed on the time saved by reducing travel time. 
Different people will place a different value on the time saved depending on their framing of 
the problem which will in turn affect the cost-benefit analysis. There is also a lack of reliable 
knowledge about the future effects of MTPs (Martens and van Weelden, 2014). This is 
because ‘hard’ data about future developments do not exist, but are mere expectations or 
predictions. For example, constructing a new high speed line will be based on expected 
passenger ridership, economic growth and the development of competing modes; evidence 
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relating to these variables alone is highly disputed. Opposition to mega-projects often argue 
that it is impossible to predict at least twenty years into the future what the expected 
economic climate and people’s behaviours will be.  
Contested information within MTPs also raises some normative questions. Two trade-off 
issues arise including within the analysis and a trade-off between analyses. For example, 
when designing a new high speed train line environmental analysis may indicate that the 
construction of the line will reduce the amount of carbon dioxide emissions but it might also 
require the use of materials in construction that are scarce. This means that decision-makers 
must decide which is more important and make a trade-off between the two. The values and 
beliefs of decision-makers influences what is more important within trade-offs between 
analysis. A trade-off between analyses is concerned with questions of ‘how to weigh the 
findings from different analyses against each other’ (de Bruijn and Leitjen, 2007:89). For 
example, if we return to the case of the construction of a new high speed line, there may be a 
number of economic benefits but also a negative impact on the environment. A negative 
impact may be the destruction of an ancient woodland or wildlife habitat. Decision-makers 
must choose which they value more by weighing up the costs and benefits of different aspects 
of a mega-project based on their values and preferences.  
Finally, evidence within MTPs suffers from the same theoretical issues as discussed in 
chapter three in regards to the nature of evidence. The thesis has adopted a social 
constructivist approach to research and it rejects the assumption that evidence can be 
objective and that we will perceive it in the same way. De Bruijn and Leijten claimed that ‘it 
is reasonable to assume that no proper decision-making can take place without the right 
information’ (2007:84). However, the social constructivist approach argues that there is no 
such thing as the ‘right’ information because what is presented in reality by one group of 
actors is in many cases ‘a social construct that can be deconstructed and reconstructed by 
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other experts’ (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003:61). This is not to say that all evidence is relative, rather 
that evidence within mega-projects is disputable and difficult to measure which leads to much 
of the information being contested. This is mostly due to the nature of the evidence and the 
project itself.  
4.5.2 Evaluating Transport Mega-Projects 
Economic evaluation of MTPs is important for investors, the government, users and society 
as a whole because of the large amount of costs involved and the impact they have on the 
environment and society (Korytarova and Hromadka, 2014). Actors want to know whether or 
not a project has been worthwhile and whether or not it has achieved the goals that were set 
in the beginning. If the project outcomes are consistent with the project aims then it is usually 
considered a success. For MTPs, project aims are generally based on estimated costs and 
benefits. Much of the literature that focuses on the evaluation of mega-projects tends to 
concentrate on ‘pathologies’ such as budget overruns, failure to keep to timetables and the 
delivery of expected social and economic benefits (Cantarelli et al. 2010; Flyvbjerg et al. 
2003; Lehtonen, 2014). There are a number of different approaches and methods to 
evaluation for MTPs, the most common being cost-benefit analysis (CBA). Most evaluation 
research uses a narrow definition of project success and overemphasises the importance of 
accountability as the sole objective of evaluation of these projects, thus accountability is the 
dominant narrative in MTP evaluation literature. CBA and similar evaluation approaches are 
criticised for monetising costs and benefits. In a MTP, the loss of rural environments or urban 
green spaces are very hard to put a cash value on. There are alternatives to CBA such as 
measuring the social return on investment (SROI), multi-criteria analysis and positional 
analysis (PA). It is not the intention of the thesis to explore each of these approaches but to 
make the reader aware that there are a number of different ways evaluators could evaluate 
MTPs which results in different conclusions. 
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In regards to evidence, evaluators employ different techniques of gathering data and analysis 
depending on the approach they take. Cost-benefit analysis sets out to determine whether or 
not an MTP was a sound investment. It compares the total expected cost of each option 
against the total expected benefits to see if the benefits outweigh the costs and by how much. 
It is similar to SROI in that it expresses costs and benefits in monetary terms. Other 
techniques do not give all costs and benefits explicit monetary values. These different 
approaches to evaluation result in potentially different conclusions. Evaluators may also give 
different monetary values to certain variables. Olsson et al. (2012) conducted a study that 
examined the consequences of using different methodologies using CBA in railway 
infrastructure appraisal between seven different European countries. They found that results 
were ‘far from similar’ depending on the applied national methodology. For example, travel-
time saving is usually the most important benefit in CBA. The UK has ‘relatively high values 
for travel-time savings, long appraisal period and adjustments for GDP growth’ (Olsson et al. 
2012:34). Countries such as Sweden, Switzerland and Norway value travel-time savings 
between fifty six and sixty six percent whereas the UK values travel-time savings at eighty 
nine percent. Other studies have compared appraisal methodologies for infrastructure in 
Europe and they concluded that using different methodologies resulted in different outcomes 
(Odgaard et al., 2005; Lyk-Jensen, 2007). Due to the differences in methodologies for CBA 
and there being no unified agreement about which evaluation approach is the best or right 
way, and this enables evidence to be contested. Those who do not agree with a project may 
criticise the approach used and utilise another in order to decrease the supposed benefits. 
Travel-time saved in regards to MTPs has been contested in recent years due to the 
availability of WIFI and other resources on a train that now make it possible for people to 
work whilst they travel (DfT, 2009).  
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Although most evaluation research focuses on the ‘before and after’ of projects, a number of 
academics such as Verweij and Gerrits (2012) have now utilised different frameworks 
because ‘the dominant evaluation methodologies impede policy learning since they do not 
account sufficiently for the complex nature of policy systems’ (Verweij and Gerrits, 
2012:41). Cantarelli et al. (2010) conducted a literature study of explanations and theories 
that are used on cost-overruns of transportation infrastructure projects. Their research 
concentrated on explanations rather than causes. They found that most research on evaluation 
in MTPs had a narrow focus and only a handful had a broad focus in terms of cost overruns 
in large projects. Cantarelli et al. (2010) argued that when research utilises models, 
assumptions, premises or concepts in their explanations, ‘the likelihood understanding the 
phenomenon of cost overruns increases’ (p.13). In their research they identified a number of 
studies and assess what theories are used to explain cost-overruns. They concluded that the 
most commonly used explanations are ‘economic rational behaviour, strategic behaviour, 
optimism bias, structure of the organisation, relationship between actors and actors’ values 
and their relationship to the environment (2010:15). Political explanations and agency theory 
are recommended as a basic theory to understand cost overruns. This is because the theory 
makes use of several disciplines such as politics, economics, and sociology, ‘which make the 
theory fairly complete’ (Cantarelli et al. 2010:16).  
Verweij and Gerrits (2012) used a complexity informed framework to evaluate transportation 
infrastructure projects. They argued that ‘the locality or specific locality or contextualisation 
of a given project is important for explaining the outcome…hence there is a need for an 
ontology and epistemology that addresses the importance of contextualisation’ (p.40). They 
acknowledged that large-N quantitative studies that are variable-oriented, such a Flyvbjerg et 
al. (2003) provided an interesting insight into cost-overruns in MTPs, they ‘do not provide a 
detailed analysis of the idiosyncratic nature of such projects, even though specific events may 
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have significantly contributed to the project outcomes’ (2012:42). Their complexity informed 
framework aimed to integrate both case-oriented and variable-oriented approaches in order to 
preserve complexity and allows the examination of multiple causal configurations. Lehtonen 
(2014) argued that ‘no single evaluation framework can satisfy the multiple needs of mega-
project evaluation’ (p.280). He claimed that this is because although mega-projects share 
many characteristics, they do not represent a homogenous group of entities. He criticised 
mega-project evaluation literature of neglecting the context and multiplicity of rationalities. 
Lehtonen suggested that one way to address the emphasis on accountability and the narrow 
definition of success in mega-project evaluation is to adopt a modified version of ‘network 
mapping’. This, he claimed, enables the ‘exploration of the multiple accountability 
relationships as a central evaluation task, designed to reconcile learning and accountability as 
the central evaluation functions’ (2014:278). Similarly to Verweij and Gerrits (2012), 
Lehtonen (2014) acknowledged the usefulness of studies such as Flyvbjerg et al.’s (2003), 
but recognised a need for giving greater attention to learning and reflexivity as key objectives 
of evaluation of these projects.  
4.6 Conclusion  
This chapter considered the literature that explored transport mega-projects and how 
decisions are made within these projects. MTPs are understood as being projects that adopt 
the word ‘mega’ from their size and budget. They must cost at least $1 Billion US to fall into 
the category of ‘mega’ (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003) and display a number of other 
characteristics such as their size, being large scale and being geographically dispersed. The 
literature review identified four characteristics that were common in mega-projects: 
complexity, deception, risk and uncertainty. They are considered complex because they often 
consist of many varied interrelated parts and have a number of different purposes and 
interests. Deception is a common theme identified by Flyvbjerg et al. (2007) who claimed 
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that a number of relevant actors purposely mislead others in order to obtain approval for a 
project. This, they argued, is why ‘unfit’ projects are often built and it is one of the reasons 
that they may be considered unsuccessful. Risk and uncertainty are entwined with one 
another and occur in mega-projects because of their long planning horizons and the time it 
takes to construct them. There are different types of risks including ecological, financial and 
operational.  
The next section in the chapter focused on decision-making processes within MTPs and 
showed that there is no unified example of how decisions should be made. However, they do 
follow a similar pattern in terms of stages. It was noted that within MTPs there are a number 
of secondary decisions that must be made, many prior to construction. Due to the life span of 
MTPs actors are unlikely to be involved at all stages of the process. Of these actors, there can 
be a variety of opinions and perspectives which adds to the complexity of a mega-project. 
Not only are these decisions complex but they are often played out in the public eye. They are 
the prerogative of the public domain because they affect the lives and interests of so many 
people (Martens and van Weelden, 2014). The approach that MTPs most closely followed 
was the rational decision-making model. This does not mean that decisions are made 
rationally or that the author agrees with the assumptions set out in this model, but that the 
model follows a number of stages that begins with the definition of a problem and ends with 
a chosen solution. Policy actors may not agree on the solution chosen, nevertheless, one is 
chosen based on a consideration of possible alternatives. 
Evidence plays an important role within decision-making processes, especially within MTPs. 
A lack of evidence often results in poor decision-making (De Bruijn and Leijten, 2007). This 
implies that the more or better quality of evidence used within decision-making processes on 
MTPs results in successful outcomes. However, evidence within these processes of MTPs is 
often discredited throughout the course of the process (Martens and van Weelden, 2014). The 
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public are often distrustful of evidence presented to them by Government and they also 
question evidence presented by neutral policy actors. Not only do the public distrust evidence 
within MTPs, but those considered experts often discredit evidence that is in the public 
domain by revealing flaws in research designs and methodologies. Within MTPs, evidence is 
usually contested due to the uncertain nature of evidence. Within the literature on mega-
projects, evidence is usually discussed in terms of ‘contested information’. De Bruijn and 
Leijten claimed that ‘it is reasonable to assume that no proper decision-making can take place 
without the right information’ (2007:84). However, there is no such thing as the ‘right’ 
information because what is presented in reality by one group of actors is in many cases ‘a 
social construct that can be deconstructed and reconstructed by other experts’ (Flyvbjerg et 
al. 2003:61). This is not to say that all evidence is relative and that there is no deception 
within decision-making. Rather that evidence within mega-projects is disputable and difficult 
to measure which leads to much of the information being contested. This is mostly due to the 
nature of the evidence and the project itself. In order to decide whether or not to build a 
mega-project in the first place, research must be conducted to assess whether or not the 
project is viable and what the expected benefits should be. The evidence produced from 
research seeking to predict future benefits can only ever be predictions or estimates, thus it is 
easily disputable. For example, constructing a new high speed line is based on expected 
passenger ridership, economic growth and the development of competing modes; evidence 
relating to these variables alone is highly disputed. Opposition to mega-projects often argue 
that it is impossible to predict at least twenty years into the future what the expected 
economic climate and people’s behaviours will be.  
What became apparent after conducting the literature review was that most authors centred 
their research on the evaluation of these projects and whether or not they can be considered 
successes. Although the thesis does not conduct an evaluation of a mega-project it was 
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important to mention the differences in approaches and methodologies within evaluation 
research because they can affect the data produced which in turn will lead to different 
conclusions about these projects. The thesis differs from the most common type of research 
on mega-projects because it focuses on a live case study rather than retrospective analysis. 
This immediacy of events is a benefit in terms of understanding the nuances of the use of 
evidence in the decision-making process.   
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Chapter 5 
The Case study - HS2 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a detailed documentation and discussion of the history and 
development of a specific transport mega-project: High Speed Two (HS2). It is the chosen 
case study of the thesis that will be explored in-depth. HS2 is the new high speed rail network 
being designed and built in the United Kingdom with the aim of resolving capacity issues on 
existing routes. It tracks the evolution of the venture from the rationale and development 
stage up to the present day. This further sets the context for the two empirical chapters later in 
the thesis. High speed rail (HSR) services are be defined as ‘services faster than typical UK 
intercity limit of 200km/hour, typically over 250km/hour and up to 350+km/hour’ (Network 
Rail, 2009b:ii). High speed trains arrived in the UK with the opening in 2003 of the first part 
of High Speed 1 (then known as the 67-mile Channel Tunnel Rail Link) between London and 
Paris which was completed in 2007. However, this was actually relatively late to enter the 
high speed rail era as other countries in Europe such as France, Spain and Germany had 
already developed large high speed rail networks. Firstly the chapter provides the reader with 
an in-depth insight into the history of high-speed rail in the United Kingdom and where the 
rationale for High Speed Two (HS2) came from. This includes a discussion on the key 
documents that have influenced the debate. The current rail network in the United Kingdom 
was built during the 1840s into a national network which has seen both a decline is use 
during the fifties and sixties and an increase in use from the 1970s onwards. Rail travel 
demand has doubled in the past fifteen years and it is expected to continue to increase over 
the next twenty five years (DfT, 2009). This is one of the key issues for government and is 
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considered the main influence behind their policy created in 2009 entitled‘HS2: developing a 
new high speed rail network’.  
Secondly, the chapter explains the development of HS2 from the creation of the company 
HS2 Limited until the present day. In January of 2009, High Speed Two Limited was set up 
by the then Labour Government as the company that would be responsible for developing and 
promoting the UK’s new high speed rail network. It is an executive non-departmental public 
body, wholly owned by the Department for Transport. They have commissioned a number of 
important research studies into the development of HS2 which are discussed. Thirdly, the 
chapter sets out the main arguments being put forward by those in favour and those against 
the project. This highlights the key issues that those for the project consider answerable by 
HS2 and why the opposition to the project disagree with them or suggest a different solution.  
It is important to understand what the key arguments are informing the debate on HS2 
because they are relevant in both empirical chapters and relate to the research questions 
within the thesis.  It concludes by explaining the significance of this project in understanding 
how evidence is negotiated by policy actors within a contentious decision-making process. 
The decision was taken to focus primarily on arguments put forward by those for and against 
the project as opposed to those that are considered ‘neutral’ or ‘undecided’. This is because 
the majority of available data centres on positions of for and against. The purpose of the 
research was to capture how those with a particular stance persuaded others of their position. 
Therefore, it seemed appropriate to capture their understanding of the case study. Efforts 
were made to capture some voices of the actors that considered themselves ‘neutral’ to the 
debate which will be presented in the empirical chapters.  
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5.2 The Rationale for High Speed Rail 
High speed rail in the United Kingdom is not a new phenomenon; the rail industry has had 
the capacity to build high speed rail lines for several decades. However, our railway 
infrastructure has been unable to support safe running at such high speeds and, until the 
1970s, the speed limit on British railways remained at one hundred miles per hour.  In the 
1970s, British Rail began to explore new technologies that would enable the use of high 
speed rail services in the UK. They did this by attempting to develop a train that would be 
capable of running on existing rail infrastructure whereas countries such as Japan and France 
decided to build new tracks for their high-speed rail systems. This is most likely because ‘at 
the time the UK did not suffer from lack of capacity on the conventional network’ (Sanchez-
Mateos and Givoni, 2012:105). In 1973, the world experienced a global oil crisis which 
affected how decision-makers thought about motive power. During this time world oil prices 
quadrupled (Ikenberry, 1986). This was the end of cheap energy for most and this prompted 
the rail industry to rethink their choice in this power and British Rail later chose traditional 
electric overhead lines (Duffy, 2003).  During the same period (1970s) British Rail developed 
and invested in the Intercity 125, which was also known as the High Speed Train (HST) 
(Owen and Phillips, 1987). This was considered the first high-speed rail service in the United 
Kingdom. It was thought of as a success because it was popular amongst users and passenger 
ridership had increased each year which they believed was good for the economy. This 
success led to British Rail exploring further options for new high speed rail lines.  
The Channel Tunnel Rail Link, which is now referred to as High Speed One (HS1) was the 
first new mainline railway to be built in the United Kingdom for a hundred years. It was built 
to carry passenger traffic between the UK and Europe but is also capable of carrying freight 
trains. The project of building a tunnel between the two countries was considered as far back 
as the 1960s and it was agreed then that ‘serious modern consideration of the construction of 
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the Channel Tunnel commenced in 1957 when an Anglo-French Channel Tunnel Study 
Group was established’ (Anguera, 2006:292). A White Paper was published by the 
Department of the Environment (DoE, 1973) and it was expected that a Hybrid Bill would 
pass through Parliament by 1975. However, a change in Government (Labour) led to the 
project being reassessed and later abandoned. It was then in 1979 that the project re-emerged 
under the new Conservative government and in 1986 the Prime Minister of the UK and the 
President of France ‘issued a joint statement announcing the decision of the two 
Governments to facilitate the construction of a fixed link across the Channel’ (Anguera, 
2006:293). It took twenty years of studies and consultations in the 25 years leading to the 
construction of the Tunnel. Construction began in 1998 and was completed in 2003 and phase 
two was opened in 2007. There are conflicting opinions about whether or not HS1 can be 
considered a success. Those in favour of high speed rail claimed that it was a successful 
project that finished on time and under budget whilst reducing the need to travel to Europe by 
air (Major Projects Association, 2008). However, those opposed to the development of a new 
high speed line argued that a cost benefit appraisal of the Tunnel reveals that ‘overall the 
British economy would have been better off if the Tunnel had never been constructed, as the 
total resource cost has been greater than the benefits generated’ (Anguera, 2006:314).  
HS1 provides an example of a mega-project in which actors have interpreted the outcome of 
the project in a different way. It depends on what factors are taken into consideration as to 
whether or not they interpret the project as a success. For example, Anguerra (2006) argued 
that some of the forecasts for HS1 such as passenger ridership and economic benefits were 
overly optimistic but the tunnel did bring large benefits in the form of increased competition 
and reduced prices for freight and passengers. The Tunnel also meant that passengers could 
travel to Europe without travelling by air or sea which created some environmental benefits 
which might be considered more important to some actors than economic benefits. Returning 
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to the rationale for a new high speed line, another reason that they were explored rather than 
developing trains to run on existing lines was the outcome of the modernisation programme 
of the West Coast Main Line (WCML) in 2004. The aim of this programme was to upgrade 
the existing infrastructure to ‘allow improved services delivered by new trains running at 140 
miles per hour’ (National Audit Office, 2006:4).  
Upgrades to the WCML took four years and was completed over three phases with the 
intention of improving punctuality, reducing journey times and increasing capacity. However, 
the project ‘proved overly ambitious and the programme quickly ran into difficulty’ (HoC 
Committee of Public Accounts, 2007:3). Modernisation of the WCML was estimated to cost 
around £3 billion but the final figure now stands nearer £9 billion (HoC Committee of Public 
Accounts, 2007). The line is still prone to overcrowding and it is likely to require further 
investment in the future. It has also been suggested that further modernisation of the line will 
cause severe disruption to services for passengers (Network Rail, 2011). This influenced the 
decision to pursue further research into a separate line. There have been a number of studies 
that have shaped the debate and a review of the main high speed rail documents in the UK is 
provided below.   
5.3 The development of political commitment to HS2 
The table sets out the main documents that have influenced the high speed rail debate from 
2001 to 2014 including some of the key findings. They are discussed in more detail below: 
Source Document Key Findings 
Commission for Integrated 
Transport (CfIT), February 2004 
High Speed Rail: International 
Comparisons 
 No apparent lack of 
capacity in UK at the time 
 International market 
differences between 
countries due to 
geographical and 
demographic factors 
WS Atkins, 2005 High Speed Line Study  Forecast overcrowding 
and capacity issues on 
current lines (especially 
110 
 
WCML) 
 Suggested  a new HSR 
line could be complete by 
2016 
Sir Rod Eddington, 2006 The Eddington Transport Study  A new HS line would not 
significantly change the 
level of economic activity 
 Strong doubts about 
benefits 
 Not a sensible way to 
reduce UK emissions 
Greengauge 21, June 2007 High Speed Two: A Greengauge 
21 Proposition 
 HSR is the best solution to 
capacity problem  
 Not as expensive as 
previously estimated 
 It will boost the national 
economy 
Labour Government, July 2007 Delivering a Sustainable Railway 
White Paper 
 Increasing capacity is the 
investment priority 
 Suggests four rail-
enhancement options 
 Little mention of a new 
high speed rail network 
WS Atkins, March 2008 Because Transport Matters: High 
Speed Rail 
 Updating the business 
case for a N/S line 
 Suggests a HSR line on 
both East and West coasts 
Department for Transport, Jan 
2009 
Britain’s Transport Infrastructure: 
HS2 
 A new (government) 
starting point to consider 
HSR 
 HS2 Limited created to 
work on specific planning 
 Capacity cited as the main 
issue for classic network  
Greengauge 21, 2009 Fast Forward: A High-Speed Rail 
Strategy for Britain 
 We can learn from other 
countries how to 
implement HSR 
 HSR is needed to form a 
key part of the nation’s 
economic infrastructure 
 HSR needed to reduce 
carbon emissions and 
provide sufficient capacity 
Network Rail, August 2009 Meeting the Capacity Challenge: 
The Case for New Lines 
 Best solution to capacity 
problem is new lines 
 HSR can eradicate 
domestic air travel which 
reduces carbon emissions 
 The best route will be a 
line that travels from 
London to Scotland 
Department for Transport, 2010 High Speed Rail  HSR is the most effective 
way to increase capacity 
and improve connectivity 
in a sustainable way.  
 For every £1 spent, £2 in 
benefits will be realised.  
 The HSR network should 
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be connected to the wider 
European network. 
High Speed Two Limited, 2013 The Strategic Case for HS2  The existing capacity of 
our transport networks is a 
significant inhibitor of 
demand  
 Analysis of the 
alternatives shows that rail 
investment is the best way 
to meet the rail capacity 
challenges. 
 A new railway line – and 
specifically a new high 
speed line – presents the 
best solution 
 
(Table 3: Key documents HS2 project) 
In 2001, two privately sponsored proposals were developed by First Group and Virgin Trains 
to build high speed lines in the United Kingdom. Virgin Trains wanted to construct a new 
line and purchase a new fleet of trains that would be able to travel up to speeds of 210 miles 
per hour on the East Coast Main Line franchise. First Group proposed creating a line that 
would run from London to the South West and Wales and using a fleet that would be capable 
of running at speeds of 200 miles per hour. However, due to another external event in 2000, 
neither were welcomed by the Government. On October 17th, 2000 an Intercity 225 train 
from London King’s Cross to Leeds derailed near Hatfield station whilst travelling at 115 
miles per hour. Four passengers were killed and a further 70 were injured (Murray, 2001). 
This led to a focus on developing the existing rail infrastructure and making sure that the 
network could operate reliably.  
In 2004 a report commissioned by the Commission for Integrated Transport12  was prepared 
by Steer Davies and Gleave13 on high speed rail. The aim of the report was to: 
                                                          
12
 The Commission for Integrated Transport (CfIT) was an independent body advising the Government on 
integrated transport policy. It was abolished on 14
th
 October 2010. 
 
13
 Steer Davies Gleave is an independent consultancy working worldwide across the transport sector. 
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 Investigate whether Britain’s failure to invest in high speed rail results from 
differences in appraisal and decision making processes and criteria, or differences in 
transport markets or other factors, which mean that high speed rail is of less benefit 
in Britain than in other countries; and 
 Make recommendations on how, if at all, Britain’s appraisal criteria and processes 
should be changed to better capture the costs and benefits of high speed rail. 
 
(Steer Davies and Gleave, 2004:2)  
The report raised questions as to why the UK did not already have a high-speed network. It 
highlighted the differences between the UK and other countries such as France and Japan and 
concluded that at the time there was no apparent lack of capacity on the classic rail network 
as the main reason for there not being a high-speed network. One of the key points that the 
report made was that there are international market differences due to geographical and 
democratic factors and that high speed rail may not necessarily be successful in the UK just 
because it has proven to be successful somewhere else (CfIT, 2004). The authors believed 
that any expected environmental benefits of building a new rail line are ‘not themselves 
sufficiently great to provide a large part of the economic case for rail investment’ (CfIT, 
2004:61). It concluded by stating that ‘the case for high speed rail construction in Britain is 
now stronger than it would have been in the 1980s, when many other European countries 
were building or planning their first high speed lines’ and ‘the priority for further work 
should be to seek means of reducing costs to levels closer to those seen elsewhere in Europe’ 
(2004:69) if the UK decides to invest in high speed rail. 
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Then in 2005 the Strategic Rail Authority commissioned WS Atkins14 to perform a feasibility 
study into the transport and business case for high speed rail. The feasibility report by Atkins 
entitled ‘High Speed Line Study: Summary Report’ (2005) suggested that ‘a new high speed 
line is effective in relieving rail crowding problems and performs better in respect of 
relieving rail crowding than alternative investments such as upgrades of the existing 
networks, new lower-speed lines or highway upgrade programmes’ (2005:ii). The main 
conclusions from this report were that overcrowding on the line is forecast in the coming 
years, that investment costs in high speed trail is large but that an economic case exists under 
specific conditions. It continued to suggest that a high speed line could be open by 2016 if 
work began as soon as possible.  
In contrast to the WS Atkins (2003) report, another significant study that influenced the high 
speed rail debate in the United Kingdom is the Eddington Report (HM Treasury, 2006). The 
Eddington transport study was an examination by Sir Rod Eddington of the impact of 
transport decisions on the economy and the environment of the UK. The study was 
commissioned by the Labour Government and it aimed to advise ‘the Government on the 
long-term links between transport and the UK’s economic productivity, growth and stability, 
within the context of the Government’s commitment to sustainable development’ (HM 
Treasury, 2006:1). However, the report which was expected to strongly recommend 
investment in high speed rail did not. The report concluded that ‘new high-speed rail 
networks in the UK would not significantly change the level of economic connectivity 
between most parts of the UK, given existing aviation and rail links. Even if a transformation 
in connectivity could be achieved, the evidence is very quiet on the scale of resulting 
economic benefit, and in France business use of the high speed train network is low’ 
                                                          
14 WS Atkins plc (commonly known as Atkins) is a British multinational engineering, design, planning, 
architectural design, project management and consulting services company. 
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(2006:49). It went on to conclude that ‘a new high-speed rail line between two cities would 
not offer the economy significant new connectivity or trading opportunities, if those cities 
were already a day-trip away from each other by existing rail, road or air links (p.23) and ‘it 
is unlikely that building a high-cost, energy-intensive very high-speed train network is going 
to be a sensible way to reduce UK emissions’ (p.33). Although the report seemed to 
discourage the Government from pursuing the construction of a high speed line, they 
continued to consider proposals in favour of a new rail network.  
Greengauge 21 was established in 2006 by Jim Steer who is a transport sector specialist as a 
not-for-profit company for in which ‘all those with an interest in a high speed rail network 
can come together and openly debate the merits of alternative routes, priorities and 
technologies, alternative implementation strategies and the economic and environmental 
benefits for Britain’ (www.Greengauge 21.net). The organisation was developed for ‘all those 
with an interest in high speed rail network’ to come together and openly debate the merits of 
a project. In 2008, the company registered as a HSR Public Interest Group and in 2012 it 
became established as a HSR Industry Leaders Group to bring together industry expertise to 
help ensure that Britain’s high speed rail network is delivered successfully. So the company 
evolved from a not-for-profit company into a lobby group for HS2. Mostly rail stakeholders 
were involved in the company and from its creation high speed rail became increasingly 
popular as a solution to meet the expected increase in demand for rail transport on the West 
Coast Main Line and to gain economic and environmental benefits. This expected increase 
was generally accepted by all parties both for and against HS2.  
Greengauge 21 (2007) published their proposal for high-speed rail that would cost an 
estimated £11 billion to build which is a significantly lower figure than suggested in the 
Atkins study (2003). The report argues that ‘it is time for Ministers to press the start button 
on planning Britain’s high-speed rail network. Not to do so would fly in the face of the advice 
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from government advisers Sir Rod Eddington (HM Treasury, 2006:v). The rationale in the 
report for building a high speed line is based on the claim that there is a need for more 
capacity on existing lines and the argument that a new line will reduce the negative 
environmental impacts caused by road travel and short haul air traffic. It is interesting to note 
the proposed cost that Greengauge 21 suggested for the HS2 project as we shall see further in 
the chapter how the estimated price of the project has changed over time. This has been a 
serious cause for concern and contention throughout the planning process of HS2. It 
illustrates the problems of generating a reliable evidence based for mega projects.   
In July 2007 a White Paper was published on the future of railways entitled ‘Delivering a 
Sustainable Railway’ by the Department for Transport. The White Paper fulfilled the remit 
the then Government set itself in 2005 to provide strategic direction for the rail industry. The 
Railways Act placed a statutory duty on the Government to set out how much public 
expenditure it wished to devote to rail every five years and specify what it wants the railway 
to deliver. The 2007 paper set out a long-term ambition for the rail network stating that it 
wanted to provide a railway that: 
 Can handle double today’s level of freight and passenger traffic; 
 Is even safer, more reliable and more efficient than now; 
 Can cater for a more diverse, affluent and demanding population; and  
 Has reduced its own carbon footprint and improved its broader environmental 
performance 
(DfT, 2007:7) 
 
The report also claimed that £10 billion would be invested in order to increase capacity 
between 2009 and 2014 as this was the Labour government’s investment priority. This was to 
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reflect the increase in passenger demand on certain routes, especially the West Coast Main 
Line. The report suggested four rail-enhancement options that could make a future 
contribution to inter-urban capacity: ‘a new dedicated freight line, a maglev, multi-tracking 
an existing line or a new all-purpose line’ (DfT, 2007:65). It discusses each option and 
concludes that the Department for Transport believe that any future planning should focus on 
new line options. It acknowledges that ‘long-term rail demand cannot be forecast with any 
accuracy, and rail provision cannot be planned in isolation’ (DfT, 2007:67) and that all 
options would represent a substantial financial commitment of up to £30 billion which is the 
total enhancement budget available to the railway for between five and ten years. The report 
claimed that further analysis would be undertaken and they would deliver results in 2012 
‘before the benefits of other capacity measures are exhausted’ (DfT, 2007:67). Much of the 
studies to this point have focused on a cost-benefit analysis of a high speed rail network, very 
much following the methodology reported in De Rus (2008). The focus of the reports is 
usually on the investment required on the one hand and the economic benefits, mainly in 
terms of travel time savings, on the other. The analysis is mainly restricted to the line in 
question without due consideration of areas beyond (but close to) the line or areas bypassed 
by it. 
In response to the Eddington report (HM Treasury, 2006), WS Atkins produced a second 
report entitled ‘Because Transport Matters: High Speed Rail’ (2008). WS Atkins stated that 
their reasons for writing the report was to ‘update the business case for a North-South high 
speed line’ and ‘see if the original business case still stood up given the capacity and journey 
time improvements being presented in the current High Level Output Specification and the 
2007 Rail White Paper’ (WS Atkins, 2008:5). The report suggested that a high speed network 
on both west and east coasts could provide a benefit of £63 billion to the UK economy. It 
concluded that ‘better access to London through HSR connections benefits the whole of the 
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UK economy’ and that ‘high speed operation is essential to make the case for a new, 
segregated railway alignment economically and financially worthwhile’ (WS Atkins, 
2008:11). Although research into high speed rail up to 2009 has revealed a number of 
differences in conclusions as to whether or not the UK would benefit from a new high speed 
rail network, it seemed that plans to go ahead were well underway by the Government. They 
made it clear that they believed the only way to solve the capacity issue on the West Coast 
Main Line was to construct a new high speed line even though research was producing mixed 
evidence about the viability of a new line.  
The rationale for building a new high speed line was mostly as a result of research conducted 
by Network Rail15 which claimed that a new line would enable faster and enhanced services, 
cut journey times and increase capacity to relieve overcrowding on existing lines (DfT, 
2009). The report set out a suggestion for the new HS2 line and was put forward after 
considering numerous alternatives, and roughly follows the alignment of the WCML. Lack of 
capacity on the UK rail network was expected mainly, or first, on the WCML, the rail 
corridor leading from London to Manchester through Birmingham, even though this line was 
only recently upgraded to increase speed and capacity. The report states that HS1 and 
Crossrail were both successful rail projects due to new companies being established early on 
to ensure that financial and technical decisions were given full consideration and thorough 
study. Then in February of 2009, Sir Rowlands sent an open letter to Lord Adonis16 outlining 
his objectives for HS2 which were to increase passenger capacity, increase the speed of 
trains, provide more capacity for freight, to have a modal shift from car and modal shift from 
air (Rowlands, 2009). In response to this letter it was agreed by the government that by 2010 
                                                          
15
 Network Rail are the Authority responsible for the UK’s rail network. 
 
16 Lord Adonis was a Labour Party politician for five years. He served as Minister of State for Transport in 2008 
and in 2009 was promoted to the Cabinet as Secretary of State for Transport until 2010. 
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HS2 Limited would provide a report including a route proposal to the DfT that would include 
consideration of a line that extended to the North of the country.  
High Speed Two (HS2) is the new high speed rail network being designed and built in the 
United Kingdom with the aim of resolving capacity issues on existing routes. It is expected 
that the West Coast Main Line will have reached full capacity by 2025 and the only viable 
solution to resolve the capacity issue is to build a new high speed line between core cities. 
The first phase of HS2 is expected to be open by 2026 followed by the opening of the second 
phase by 2035. In January of 2009 the company High Speed Two Limited was established. It 
was set up by the Labour Government and chaired by Sir David Rowlands17, with the remit 
to: 
‘help consider the case for new high speed services from London to Scotland. As a first stage 
we have asked the company to develop a proposal for an entirely new line between London 
and the West Midlands. To reach a view on this, the company will need to assess the likely 
environmental impact and business case of different routes in enough detail to enable the 
options to be narrowed down. We expect work to be completed by the end of the year. The 
Government will thereafter assess the options put forward for the development of the new 
line’ 
(Department for Transport, 2009:5) 
 
Relatively soon after Network Rail’s proposal was published in 2009, alternative plans 
emerged from High Speed Two with the Department for Transport (DfT, 2009) and from 
Greengauge 21 (2009). This is because all three had different opinions and provided their 
own evidence to suggest a different route from one another. They could not agree on what 
                                                          
17
 Sir David Rowlands was the permanent secretary of the Department for Transport between 2003 and 2007 
and the chairman for HS2 between 2009 and 2010. 
 
119 
 
route the new line should take. Although the first study used traditional cost-benefit analysis 
techniques and assigned weight to time-saving benefits, the second study ‘took a broader look 
at the economic benefits and focused on potential business relocations, concluding that HS2 
would boost the economies of areas along the network as well as away from it’ (Sivaev, 
2013:3). However, this was criticised by opposition to HS2 for failing to account for 
alternatives to HS2 and having methodological flaws in the cost benefit analyses. In contrast 
to the Eddington report (HM Treasury, 2006), the main findings from the report by the 
Department for Transport entitled ‘High Speed Rail’ were that ‘over the next 20 to 30 years 
the UK will require a step-change in transport capacity between its largest and most 
productive conurbations…high speed rail is the most effective way to achieve these goals, 
offering a balance of capacity, connectivity and sustainability benefits unmatched by any 
other option’ (DfT, 2010:8). After formally deciding to advance with a new high speed rail 
line, the government began its consultation process with the public on its high speed rail 
plans from March 2010 onwards. Although this was short lived due to the change of 
Government two months later. A more recent study, commissioned by the Coalition 
Government and undertaken by HS2 Ltd was published at the end of October, 2013 entitled 
‘The Strategic Case for HS2’. The purpose of the report was to ‘explain step-by-step 
why HS2 is the best option to meet the capacity and connectivity challenges faced by the rail 
network’ (HS2 Ltd, 2013 at www.gov.uk). It refined the cost-benefit arguments by changing 
the focus back to the benefits of delivering additional capacity and used upgraded forecasting 
and evaluation techniques. As a result the benefit-cost ratio (including wider economic 
benefits) is estimated at 1.7 for phase one and 2.3 for the full network. This represents a 
decline from values of 1.9 and 2.5 reported previously (HS2 Ltd, 2013). This indicates a 
change in argument and claims which suggests that they may believe that their previous 
arguments were not necessarily persuasive enough. 
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5.4 The emergence of opposition to HS2  
It was in April of 2010 that the first major opposition group to HS2 was formed shortly 
followed by a large number of smaller groups. The largest three groups include HS2 Action 
Alliance (HS2AA), STOP HS2 and Action Groups Against High Speed Two (AGAHST). 
These voluntary national groups were set up to challenge the case for HS2. They all work 
with the numerous local groups that are situated around the United Kingdom in response to 
the Government’s announcement on HS2. HS2AA stated that their approach: 
‘…is focused on communicating a robust, evidence based, case that HS2 is not in the 
national interest. We believe that by setting out the facts about HS2 clearly and accurately 
and providing evidence where required we can set out why HS2 represents a bad deal for 
Britain’ 
(www.hs2actionalliance.org)  
Similarly, STOP HS2 is a national campaign which formed after studying the HS2 proposals 
and their mission was to stop the construction of the line and ‘facilitate local and national 
campaigning against High Speed Two’ (www.stophs2.org). Another national campaign group 
is AGAHST (Action Groups against High Speed Trains), which is a coalition of more than 
seventy organisations that are opposed to the scheme. The Right Lines Charter was set up in 
April of 2011 and is a charter that rests on four key principles including the ‘call for a 
national transport strategy, better future-proofing of big transport proposals, effective public 
participation and a more strategic approach to minimising adverse impacts’ (Right Lines 
Charter, 2011:2). Members seek to challenge the way and the context in which the HS2 
proposals have been developed. Signatories to the Charter include Campaign for Better 
Transport, Campaign to Protect Rural England, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, RSPB, 
Chiltern Society, Environmental Law Foundation, RailFuture, Ramblers, Wildlife Trusts, 
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Woodland Trust, Civic Voice and the Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings. All of 
these groups as well as other local organisations have set out to either stop the project all 
together or work with HS2 Limited to reduce any negative impacts the new rail network may 
have. 
During the planning process of HS2, the United Kingdom experienced a general election on 
the 6th May 2010 which resulted in none of the political parties achieving enough seats for an 
overall majority. This resulted in a hung parliament which led to a coalition government 
being formed between the Conservative party and the Liberal Democrats. This meant that 
Labour was no longer in control of the HS2 policy and its development. The new Secretary of 
State for Transport, Philip Hammond, requested an urgent review of the proposed route 
because the Conservative Party had previously ‘advocated any new high-speed line be routed 
via Heathrow Airport, an idea rejected by HS2 Ltd’ (www.hs2actionalliance.org). However, 
in July 2010 a report18 by Lord Mawhinney19 to assess ‘the various options put forward so far 
for a high speed station at or near Heathrow and the business cases in support of those 
options’ (DfT, 2010:4) concluded that HS2 should not connect to Heathrow until the 
construction of phase 2 had begun because ‘a direct high speed link to Heathrow fully funded 
from public expenditure, in the context of a high speed rail network extending only to the 
Midlands, is not likely to provide a good return on the public expenditure entailed’ (DfT, 
2010:12). The evidence that supported this decision included advice from organisations 
including…, written evidence from organisations such as…., evidence from modelling and 
forecasts of passenger numbers and benefits, as well as site visits to potential high speed 
stations and visits to international hubs such as Paris and Amsterdam to ask their advice.  
                                                          
18The review was commissioned by the previous Secretary of State for Transport, Lord Adonis. 
 
19 Lord Mawhinney is a member of the House of Lords since 2005 and was Secretary of State for Transport 
1994-95. 
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In December, 2010 a slightly revised line of route for HS2 was published for consultation 
based on a Y-shaped route similar to the route proposed by the Labour government in March 
2010. It was not until February 2011 that the Department for Transport undertook a national 
consultation on high-speed rail and stage one of HS2, including compensation arrangements. 
The consultation ran for five months and closed on 29th July 2011. This was shortly followed 
by a report by an independent company, Dialogue by Design who were commissioned to 
‘analyse and report back on nearly 55,000 responses to the consultation’ and was published in 
January 2012. The 2011 consultation was one of the largest ever conducted by the DfT in 
which they wrote to ‘more than 172,000 people living or working near the proposed route. 
And it held 41 days of road shows visited by almost 30,000 people over a five month 
consultation period’ (DfT, 2012c). Responses to the consultation from those that argued in 
favour of the proposed network made comments ‘in support of the strategic case, stating that 
the capacity of the UK’s inter-city rail network needs to be enhanced and emphasising the 
benefits of high speed rail in this regard’ (Dialogue by Design, 2011:8). Responses to the 
consultation from those opposed to the proposed network  ‘most often suggest that the 
economic case for new high speed rail connections is insufficient and that investments in the 
existing rail network would offer better value for money. They frequently refer to the 
proposed scheme as too expensive’ (Dialogue by Design, 2011:8). Another common 
suggestion was that HS2 will create a negative impact for communities along the line and that 
benefits will be restricted to certain areas. There were also many concerns about the negative 
environmental impacts a high speed network would create and questions were raised about 
the valuation of environmental aspects arguing that an Environmental Impact Assessment 
should have been part of the consultation process (Dialogue by Design, 2013). Shortly after 
the consultation process opposition groups decided to challenge the project in the courts.  
 
123 
 
5.5 Legal challenges to HS2 
The policy ‘High Speed Two’ has so far faced a number of legal challenges from those who 
are opposed to the project. In January 2012, the Secretary of State for Transport confirmed 
that the Government planned to proceed with HS2. The DfT published the ‘Economic Case 
for HS2: Updated appraisal of transport user benefits and wider economy benefits’ (2012). Its 
intentions were to provide an update to the economic case for HS2, published in February 
2011 and to revise the modelling and appraisal to reflect changes to economic forecasts, 
patterns of demand, Y-network development and forecast rail services without HS2 due to 
increased information (DfT, 2012). This led to the creation of a new opposition group, 51m. 
51m is ‘an alliance of councils that have come together to challenge the evidence base of the 
HS2 project. They are known as “51m” because that represents how much HS2 will cost each 
and every Parliamentary Constituency…£51 million, based on the original estimate of £33 
billion’ (www.51m.co.uk). The Local Authorities under this alliance wrote to the transport 
secretary at the time outlining their objections stating that they would seek a judicial review 
of the Government’s decision to go ahead with the scheme. The councils say they were 
‘inspired by opposition to expansion at Heathrow, which ended in the abandonment of a third 
runway proposal’ (Hayman, 2012). The judicial review was based on grounds on which the 
councils believe the decision to approve HS2 was flawed in terms of the consultation, 
compensation and the economic case. In total, four groups brought forward a legal challenge: 
51m, two from HS2 Action Alliance, Heathrow Hub and Aylesbury Golf Club. 
It was confirmed in July 2012 that the five cases from the groups would be heard together in 
December 2012. The High Court did not rule in favour of the opposition groups on nine of 
the ten broad areas of challenge presented against HS2 Phase one (from London to 
Birmingham). The Judge agreed it was lawful to choose to rule out upgrading the existing 
network as a credible alternative to HS2 and that the environmental assessment including 
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consideration of the impact on habitats and protected species had been carried out fairly and 
lawfully. The only challenge upheld was that the consultation process had been unfair 
‘because not enough information was provided to consultees and the criteria by which 
compensation options were considered were not adequately explained - he also found that the 
government had not fully considered HS2 Action Alliance’s detailed consultation response 
on compensation’ (www.gov.uk). Opposition groups then chose to continue their legal 
challenge in the Court of Appeal and then the Supreme Court but were unsuccessful. The 
diagram below sets out the key dates of the legal challenge: 
 
Figure 4: Timeline of legal events, taken from DfT, (2014) 
The results were considered a ‘landmark victory’ for HS2 which meant that the path was now 
clear for HS2 to deposit their Hybrid Bill20 to Parliament for phase one of the route between 
                                                          
20
 Hybrid bills are so called because they combine features of public bills and private bills. Essentially they are 
Government bills which affect certain individuals and bodies in ways that do not affect everybody. Transport 
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London and the West Midlands. The bill, entitled ‘High Speed Rail (London – West 
Midlands) Bill’ will secure the powers to construct and maintain phase one. The first reading 
of the Bill was in the House of Commons on the 25th November 2013 which was followed by 
the Bill entering the Committee stage in April 2014. During this stage detailed examination 
of the Bill took place and a Select Committee was set up to consider petitions made against 
the Bill. These petitions were then considered by the Select Committee which resulted in 
some amendments. The second reading took place on the 29th April 2014 in the House of 
Common which enabled the first opportunity for MPs to debate the general principles and 
themes of the Bill, as well as the Select Committee being set up. This petitioning period 
allowed all those directly or specially affected by Phase One of HS2 between London and the 
West Midlands to submit objections against the Bill during 29th of April and 23rd of May. 
There were a total of 1925 petitions made against the High Speed Rail Bill. 
 
HS2 Limited hoped that by the end of summer 2015 the petitioning period for phase two of 
the Hybrid Bill would have commenced with an expected completion date of 2033 to 2035 
for construction. The target date set by the Coalition Government for Royal Assent of the Bill 
was 2015 before the May General Election. This would have kept the project on track so 
construction of the new line could commence in 2017 with a completion date of the first 
phase by 2026. However, the Secretary of State for Transport at the time, Patrick 
McLoughlin admitted that legislation on HS2 would not pass through Parliament before the 
2015 general election and that he blamed the hold up on outspoken opposition from MPs 
(Drewett, 2014). Royal Assent is not expected until the end of 2016.  
 
5.6 The debate: For and against HS2 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
infrastructure bills tend to do this because they have different effects for different geographical parts of the 
route. 
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This section of the chapter sets out the main arguments that have been put forward in favour 
and against HS2. Initially, those in favour of HS2 placed an emphasis on the time saved per 
journey to justify their economic case which served as the basis for the rationale to build 
HS2. However, detailed scrutiny of the cost-benefit analyses used by leading academics 
which identified weaknesses and faults led to a shift in rhetoric. Capacity then became the 
leading argument in 2008 and it was claimed that the West Coast Main Line (WCML) would 
have reached saturation by 2026. This meant that the only viable solution would be to build a 
new high speed network (Atkins, 2008). However, this argument was also questioned 
because there is still a focus on improving services for those travelling to London and it does 
not take into account the overcrowding on the network in northern cities. Alternative 
solutions put forward by those opposed to HS2 have suggested that capacity on the WCML 
could be substantially increased at a much lower cost than that of HS2. After these two main 
arguments were discussed and evidence suggested that there may be other interpretations and 
explanations, those in favour of the project turned their attentions to emphasising the 
arguments for regeneration and employment benefits. Arguments focused on these two 
elements of the project are now central to the case in favour of HS2. Below are the key issues 
that have been debated in regards to HS2. 
5.6.1 The effect on journey times 
At the beginning of the high speed rail debate, those in favour of the project claimed that one 
of the reasons HS2 should be built is that it would reduce journey times between major UK 
cities (DfT, 2009). The emphasis on high speed trains rather than improving or extending the 
classic network implied that speed was an important factor in the debate. However, figures 
used by the Department for Transport were highly criticised for using old data which was 
based on an assumption that business travellers did little or no work on trains. It did not take 
into account the increase in use of mobile phones and laptops and availability of Wi-Fi on 
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trains that meant more and more people are now able to work whilst on trains. It is also 
suggested by those opposed to the project that people will not need to travel as much for 
work because technology now allows people to communicate through other means that does 
not require them to meet face to face. This particular issue was one of the first to be criticised 
by the opposition. As mentioned above, time saved appeared to be the basis of the economic 
case in 2010 to 2011. However, once the opposition found flaws in the arguments put 
forward by HS2 Ltd there was a shift in focus to capacity and economic benefits.   
5.6.2 Costs to the economy 
There has always been an assumed link between the supply of transport infrastructure and 
economic growth, even if such a link is often difficult to prove empirically (Zhenling, 2012). 
If such a link does exist, a precondition for transport investments to generate or facilitate such 
growth is that they improve accessibility (Banister and Berechman, 2000). Accessibility is 
key for any benefits from transport, and while many forms and definitions of accessibility 
exist a central element in accessibility measurement is travel time (see for example Geurs and 
van Wee, 2004; Van Wee et al., 2001). In the case of high speed rail, the name given to this 
mode of transport suggests travel time is assumed to be of particular importance. Travel time 
can be measured in different ways and accessibility is measured in reference to an activity or 
activities that can be undertaken in a specific location. On  national and regional levels, 
empirical evidence show that often the wider social–economic impacts of changes in the 
transport network are the result of, and in a way rely on, changes in accessibility to the main 
economic, political and social centres, i.e. the main cities. This also holds in the case of HSR 
(Banister and Berechman, 2000; Givoni, 2006). In the UK context, Leuning et al. (2007) 
concluded that the circumstances of many UK cities are determined by their relative 
accessibility to London, while Chen and Hall (2011) also confirmed this in their analysis of 
the impact of introducing HSR (the IC125/225 train models) in the UK since the mid-1970s. 
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Arguments about the expected costs of the HS2 project and the impact it will have on the 
economy have been widely debated by both sides of the campaigns. As part of all 
government projects, economists must carry out a benefit-cost appraisal using a particular 
methodology. They must use economic models that place specific values on a number of 
different aspects and determine what the expected costs and benefits might be. HS2 Limited 
defines a business case as the ‘overall consideration of the factors influencing decisions on 
whether to proceed with a scheme. These cover: the strategic fit with wider objectives, value 
for money (covering the economic case and environmental considerations), commercial 
issues, financial affordability and how the project might be delivered’ (DfT, 2011:5). They 
define the economic case as an appraisal that covers ‘the full economic costs and full 
economic benefits of a scheme and to quantify these in monetary terms’ (DfT, 2011:5). They 
claim to have approached this on the basis of the HM Treasury Green Book (HM Treasury, 
2011) and the Department for Transport’s Appraisal Guidance (DfT, 2013b). Due to the 
number of different approaches to cost-benefit analyses and the differences in opinion about 
what values should be placed on particular items there is often a number of different 
outcomes from an analysis. HS2 Limited  revised their analysis at least twice. It is an area of 
research in which the evidence is purely based on data from forecasts and predictions. This 
means that evidence is widely contested on the basis of methodological differences.  
Those opposed to HS2 are concerned about the expected cost of the project and whether it 
represents good value for money. They have noted that ‘HS2’s capital costs are far higher 
than the standard EU high-speed rail figures’ (Hawkins, 2011:15). Their main concerns are 
centred around the effect that such an expensive project could have on the economy. Ridley 
(2013) explored ten other project options and argued that for the same cost as HS2, the 
Government could complete several other projects including fixing all potholes and building 
a third runway at Heathrow Airport. Those in favour provide a counter argument that it is 
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‘not an either or situation’ (de Castella, 2013). The DfT has stated that they are trebling funds 
for major road schemes and that if HS2 were not built, it is unlikely that the funding would be 
invested only on transport projects. There have been several financial analyses conducted by 
a number of leading academics in order to identify any weaknesses in the business and 
economic case for HS2 (Hawkins, 2011; Savin, 2010; Aizlewood and Wellings, 2011; 
Wellings, 2013). All of these studies question the methodologies used by companies such as 
Atkins and KPMG as they do not agree with the forecasts they have provided. In terms of 
economic benefits, those in favour of HS2 claim that the project will create just over 40,000 
jobs alone in phase one and phase two is forecast to support the creation of 48,700 to 70,300 
jobs as well as around 7,000 houses (HS2 Ltd, 2013a). They also suggested that ‘the overall 
benefits to business…could be over £53 billion’ (HS2 Ltd, 2013b:99). Other benefits that 
have been transformed into monetary values include time savings, crowding benefits, 
improved reliability, car user benefits and wider economic impacts (HS2 Ltd, 2013a).   
5.6.3 The environmental impact of HS2 
Following the Climate Act (2008) which made it the duty of the Secretary of State to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by 80 percent lower than the 1990 baseline for 2050 there has been 
a focus on these targets in related policies to meet the reduction targets. This has had an effect 
on transport policy in the UK which has led to an interest in projects that will either be carbon 
neutral or reduce greenhouse gas emissions. One of the ways in which they can do this is to 
reduce domestic air travel and provide better public transport options for the public and to 
reduce the amount of freight on our roads. Promoters of HS2 argued that the new rail network 
‘can be part of a low carbon transport system in the UK that will allow us to meet the climate 
change targets established in the Climate Change Act’ (HS2 Ltd, 2013b). They claimed that 
HS2 will free capacity on the WCML thus creating more capacity for freight which will 
reduce road use. They also claimed that HS2 will reduce domestic air travel as it will provide 
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an alternative and fast way to travel between certain cities. They went on to argue that those 
opposed are merely ‘NIMBYs’ (not in my back yard) who are basing their arguments on 
environmental impacts when instead they are concerned about the effect the line will have on 
their house prices (Dominiczak, 2014).  
However, the opposition to HS2 claimed that the project will have a detrimental effect on the 
environment and that the negative impacts will outweigh any positive ones. They also 
claimed that the new trains will use fifty percent more energy than Eurostar trains to run. The 
Eddington Report (HM Treasury, 2006) mirrors this criticism and predicts that the value of 
carbon saving over sixty years will be £3.2 billion. He argued that this was a poor return on 
investment based on a line priced at £33 billion. This figure has since increased and so the 
savings will be even less. The new high-speed rail network has been criticised for not taking 
into consideration the negative effects that the line will have on wildlife habitats, ancient 
woodlands and communities along the line of route. Several newspaper articles have focused 
on individual areas and the expected effects that HS2 will have such as the destruction of 
homes and areas of natural beauty. HS2 Action Alliance argue that: 
‘The route chosen for HS2 passes through irreplaceable natural habitats and unspoilt 
ecosystems. Constructing a railway line with a landtake equivalent to a four-lane motorway 
will have a devastating effect on the natural environment in these areas – over 130 wildlife 
sites on the first stage alone will be directly affected, including 10 Sites of Special Scientific 
Interest, an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty and 50 ancient woodlands’ 
(HS2 Action Alliance, 2013) 
Environmental arguments have formed the basis of many of the claims put forward by those 
opposing HS2. This is explored further in a later chapter that focuses its attention on the way 
in which policy actors within HS2 frame the debate.  
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5.6.4 Capacity for freight 
The WCML is the busiest mixed-used railway in Europe, carrying a quarter of all UK rail 
freight (HS2 Ltd, 2012) with five freight train operators. Much of this freight traffic uses the 
ports of Southampton and Felixstowe as well as the Channel Tunnel (HS1) for through 
freight services between the UK and Europe. It is expected that over the next twenty years 
there will be an eleven percent increase per annum in domestic unitised traffic and a six 
percent increase in unitised port traffic (Greengauge 21, 2011). The discussions about freight 
are linked to the environmental impact that HS2 will have. It is claimed by supporters of HS2 
that, although rail freight will not use HS2 directly, there will be capacity released on the 
classic network by migration of passengers onto the new high speed line which would leave 
allow more freight to travel on the WCML. This implies that there will be less freight 
travelling on the roads as well. This is considered very important by those in favour of HS2 
because of the requirements set out in the Climate Act (2008). They claimed that although 
HS2 itself will be ‘carbon-neutral’ it will decrease the amount of traffic on our roads thus 
reducing carbon emissions. However, those opposed to the project have raised concerns about 
how much capacity will be released on the WCML because the argument in favour of HS2 is 
based on the assumption that passengers will migrate to the new line. If a substantial amount 
of passengers do not migrate then there will be less opportunity for freight to travel on the 
WCML.  
5.6.5 Bridging the North/South Divide 
One of the most common arguments put forward by those in favour of HS2 is that investing 
in the project will bridge the economic divide between the North and South of the United 
Kingdom (HS2 Ltd, 2010; 2013). The North-South divide refers to the cultural and economic 
differences between the South of England, in particular the South East, and the North of 
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England. It has been argued that the gap between the two areas in terms of life expectancy 
and economic trends has grown to the extent that they are almost separate countries (The 
Economist, 2012). Spatial economists argue that the reason for the divide is due to a lack in 
connectivity between major cities and that improved transport systems will decrease the 
divide between the two areas. The North-South divide issue assumes that reducing journey 
times and increasing capacity on the rail network will help firms in the North compete more 
effectively for market share in the South or encourage businesses to relocate. The new rail 
line may actually increase disparities. 
HS2 Limited’s report entitled ‘The Economic Case For HS2’ (DfT, 2011) stated that ‘It is 
difficult to analyse exactly where, geographically, the benefits of HS2 would accrue. Our 
modelling tells us where trips start and finish, but that does not necessarily tell us where the 
benefits would fall’ (2011:32). This does not support the argument that HS2 could bridge the 
North-South divide; rather it suggests that they are unable to know this information in 
advance. However, in September 2013 KPMG produced a revised report entitled ‘High Speed 
Two Limited: HS2 Regional Economic Impacts’ which suggested that the Midlands and the 
North of England will benefit more than London from the project (HS2 Ltd, 2013b). Firstly 
the report estimates that the total annual productivity impacts for Great Britain in 2037 after 
investment in HS2 (2013 prices) will be £15 billion (HS2 Ltd, 2013b). Their analysis 
concluded that ‘the productivity benefits accrue to all regions, with strong gains in the 
Midlands and the North. Though Greater London does well, it is not at the expense of 
everywhere else. In fact, areas outside Greater London and the Phase Two city regions 
account for around half of the total forecast increase in Britain’s economic output’ (HS2 Ltd, 
2013b:56). Although their findings showed positive effects on the North of England, the 
evidence suggested that HS2 may not necessarily bridge the North-South divide. The 
conclusions are also based on a wide range of assumptions as planning of Phase 2 of the 
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project is yet to be finalised. Those opposed to the project argued that instead of building a 
new high speed network from London to the North of England the Government should focus 
on improving connectivity between cities in the North of England first (Ramchurn, 2013) 
rather than increasing the London-centric nature of the UK’s transport system.  
5.6.6 The need for more capacity 
Another of the key arguments of those in favour of HS2 is that building HS2 is the only 
viable option to reduce crowding on the current rail network. Research conducted by 
Network Rail (2009) suggested that the WCML will be at full capacity by 2024. They 
claimed that occupancy on the line’s commuter trains will increase by 26 per cent between 
2011 and 2023 (DfT, 2012). Since 1995 there has been an increase in rail passenger growth 
every year. This has not been disputed by those against the project. However, they suggested 
that HS2 is not the most appropriate solution to the capacity problem and that there are less 
expensive options. Those in favour of the project expect that capacity on the WCML will 
increase by a number of current rail travellers changing to using high-speed rail. This 
expectation is not one that they can be certain of, as Hawkins (2011) states, ‘it is very 
difficult currently to assess how holders of classic train lines franchises would respond – they 
may seek to slash their prices to generate increased demand’ (2011:13).  Opposition to the 
project have suggested that the current rail network could be upgraded at a fraction of the cost 
of HS2 to meet the capacity issues (51M, 2013; Stop HS2, 2014). 
5.6.7 Modernisation and competing internationally 
The WCML is the most intensively-operated railway line in Europe serving several cities. It 
is over 170 years old and many of those in favour of the project claim that the old 
infrastructure cannot cope with the increasing demands on it and that modernising our 
infrastructure with a new high speed line is the best solution (HS2The People’s Railway, 
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2013). They also claimed that it is an opportunity for new technology to become part of our 
ageing transport infrastructure. Evidence is usually taken from case studies of other countries 
and their networks. In 2012 the Rt Hon Justine Greening MP (Secretary of State for 
Transport) argued in a report produced by the DfT (2012) entitled ‘High Speed Rail: 
Investing in Britain’s Future – Decisions and Next Steps’: 
‘Looking around the world, the evidence is clear – nation after nation is planning, 
constructing or already using high rail speed lines. High speed rail is transforming their 
societies and their economies. Self-imposed exile from this new frontier in travel would mean 
that Britain loses out, while our global competitors gain. We face a straightforward choice. 
We can take the short-term option – leaving our rail networks over-stretched and over-
burdened and risk paying the price in lost business, lower growth and fewer jobs. Or we can 
take the long-term option – investing in our global competiveness and our economic 
prosperity by pursuing high speed rail. High speed rail can transform our rail network in the 
same way that the motorways have transformed our road network’ 
(DfT, 2012c:5) 
Spain and France have the most extensive high speed networks in Europe and other countries 
are currently investing in new lines but due to the huge costs and the current economic 
climate they are reluctant to spend so much money on transport infrastructure at this time. In 
France, the high speed network breaks even in terms of economic benefits and in Spain it is a 
similar situation. Certain routes lose money and only a small number make a slight profit.  In 
2013, the French Government cancelled all new high speed projects in favour of intercity 
services because it was judged too costly (RFI, 2013). Spain and France are often used as 
case studies by those opposed to HS2 in their arguments because it appears that high-speed 
networks are not as successful now as they once were. However, there are countries that are 
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continuing to invest in high speed rail and they are often used as case studies for those in 
favour of HS2. China opened the longest high-speed line in the world last year and they plan 
to double the size of their network by 2015 (Stone, 2014). Japan also has a high-speed 
network that is considered a success.  
5.6.8 Alternative options to HS2 
Many of those opposed to HS2 argued that there are other priorities that should be focused on 
in the current economic climate or that rather than building HS2 there are alternative and 
more economical solutions to some of the problems that HS2 seeks to solve. Considering 
alternative options to HS2 was at the centre of the legal challenges brought against HS2 
Limited in 2012. However, the Judge ruled in favour of HS2 Limited stating that they had 
sufficiently investigated alternatives. A report by BetterthanHS2 argues that ‘there are better 
ways to improve capacity and speed on mainline services between London and the North. 
These alternatives can meet forecast demand, and will benefit more people, more quickly and 
at a much lower cost’ (2011:3). This was in response to a report commissioned by the DfT 
which considered road and rail improvement alternatives to the high speed rail proposition 
being developed by HS2 (Atkins, 2010). The analysis indicated that ‘the best performing 
package in terms of value for money was “Rail Package 2” (RP2) focused on the WCML’ 
(WS Atkins, 2013:3). This study was updated in 2011 to be consistent with the then latest 
assessment of the HS2 project and also to consider ‘new rail interventions and packages 
developed by the DfT (with some consultation with National Rail) as alternatives to the HS2 
ull network’ (WS Atkins, 2013:4).  
After the consultation process of Phase one in 2012, another update was added to the study 
on alternatives to HS2 claiming that it had taken into account feedback from the consultation 
process as well as changes to the HS2 modelling methodology which had been updated to 
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incorporate revised demand growth on the WCML following completion of the West Coast 
Route Modernisation (WCRM) programme and associated timetable changes. The report 
entitled ‘HS2 Strategic Alternatives’ built on previous work and consultations and aimed to 
consider ‘the extent to which capacity and connectivity upgrades to the conventional rail 
network – representing strategic alternatives to constructing HS2 - could meet the strategic 
objectives set for HS2’ (2013:2). It went on to state that ‘consideration of alternative 
investment options is standard practice as guided by HM Treasury Green Book, and 
embodied in the DfT’s guidance for assessing the case for investment in major transport 
projects’ (2013:2). The study examined only those packages identified from the earlier 
studies as likely to offer value for money as strategic alternatives to HS2 Phase One and the 
“full network”.  
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter provided a detailed documentation and discussion of the history and 
development of High Speed Two starting from an overview of high speed rail in the UK and 
its evolution from a rationale and development stage up to the present day. A large amount of 
research has been conducted since the turn of the millennium into the need for and viability 
of a new high speed line. The evidence that has been produced from the research studies does 
not provide a clear path for policy makers to take. This is because some evidence supports the 
case for a new high speed line and other evidence suggests a new line is not needed. 
Therefore policy makers must make a decision about which evidence to accept as the most 
important based on political judgement and values. This requires them to give weight to the 
evidence presented to them in the reports. How they weight the evidence depends on the way 
in which they frame the debate which is explored later in the empirical chapters.  
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Even though some of the evidence suggested building HS2 is not the most cost effective way 
of dealing with capacity issue on the current network the Labour Government of 1997-2010 
supported the project whilst they were in power as did the Coalition Government that 
followed who also adopted the policy and continued with the development of the project. 
What is interesting is that the Labour government were the instigators of the project in the 
early stages of development but by 2014 there were doubts about whether Labour would 
commit to supporting HS2 if they won the 2015 General Election after the Shadow Transport 
Secretary questioned whether the project was ‘the right way’ to spend billions of pounds of 
public funds. Rising costs and new evidence coming to light may have been the reason 
behind this decision, or it could have been the lack of public support which led Labour to 
make these comments leading up to the General Election.  
The legal challenges that have been made towards HS2 provide an indication as to how 
contentious the policy is. The section of the chapter that sets out the arguments for and 
against HS2 demonstrated how many different aspects of the HS2 project exist and the list is 
not exhausted. They are used in one of the empirical chapters to explore how policy actors 
frame the HS2 debate. The next chapter discusses the research design and methods utilised in 
the thesis. 
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Chapter 6 
Research Design 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets out the justification for the chosen research design and research instruments. 
Firstly it discusses how the research questions were developed from the literature review in 
previous chapters and from pilot interviews conducted during the early stages of the research 
and how this resulted in the chosen design. It then sets out the reasoning behind using a single 
case study approach in order to answer the research questions. The research methods included 
semi-structured interviews with policy actors and secondary data analysis of evidence 
presented to the Birmingham City Council Overview and Scrutiny Committee’s review of 
HS2 entitled ‘Maximising the Benefits of HS2’, Google alerts data on HS2 and other 
documentary sources. Each of the methods are explained in turn and how they relate to the 
research questions rather than addressing each research question. This is because data from 
each of the methods was used to answer more than one research question. All ethical 
considerations are discussed that are relevant to each method. This is followed by a 
discussion about how data analysis was conducted throughout the research process.  
 
6.2 Developing the research design 
A successful research design provides the structure of the research and connects the empirical 
data to the study’s research questions. This section addresses the design and choices taken by 
the author together with appropriate justifications. The literature review drew out a number of 
research questions regarding how policy decisions are made within mega-projects. Firstly, by 
acknowledging that mega-projects often go ahead because politicians believe they are a ‘good 
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thing’, challenges the view that evidence is the precursor to a policy decision. There are a 
number of other factors that contribute to these decisions; two being the values and beliefs of 
an individual. Schon and Rein (1994) suggested that our values and beliefs shape, or frame 
the way in which we approach a decision. The way in which we frame a policy decision 
influences the evidence that we draw on. Actors within the decision-making process have 
different frames which results in differing opinions about the solution to the policy problem. 
Therefore, they must enter into a process of negotiation in order to reach the most consensual 
option. This negotiation involves drawing on evidence to present their argument to one 
another and can occur in a number of different environments. It was the desire of the 
researcher to address the following empirical research questions in order to gain a better 
understanding of evidence utilisation in mega-projects: 
1. How do policy actors frame mega-project policy debates? 
2. What evidence do they select? 
3. How do they negotiate this evidence with one another in different policy 
environments? 
The research questions are principally explanatory, ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions rather than 
predictive or concerned with frequency. They are therefore well suited to an interpretive, case 
study approach. Case study research (CSR) is concerned with understanding the complexity 
of events and processes within single or particular settings (Stake 1995), allowing the 
researcher to ‘retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events’ (Yin 
2009:5). It is the best design to use when the investigator wants to ‘understand real-life 
phenomenon in depth’ and where this understanding ‘entails important contextual conditions’ 
that are ‘highly pertinent’ to the phenomenon of study (Yin 2009:18).  
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Single case study analysis can, through the application of multiple research methods, provide 
an empirically rich and holistic account of specific phenomena. Stake (1995) suggested that it 
is contextual uniqueness of the single case that is of primary interest. Transport mega-projects 
were of particular interest because they are notorious for finishing late and over budget (more 
so than other mega-projects). As representation is difficult to defend with what will be an 
inevitably small number of cases Stake suggested choosing one that is best suited to 
answering the research questions. He (1993, 2003) dismisses typicality and 
representativeness as being unrealistic and unachievable in terms of the single case. For 
Stake, the primary criteria should be ‘opportunity to learn’ (1993:6). By this he means 
identifying a case where there is good access and a willingness to participate. This ensures 
that the researcher can maximise the learning opportunities. 
The thesis applied the research questions to a case that had good access and a number of 
willing participants. At any one time, there are only ever a small number of mega-projects 
being designed and built due to their nature which presented the researcher with only a 
limited number of potential cases. The case study chosen encompassed a large geographical 
area and was prominently featured in the national media providing large amounts of 
secondary data for analysis. There are no other mega-projects of this kind currently being 
designed and built to compare to in the United Kingdom and accessibility issues limit the 
possibility of using an international case study for comparison.  
Focusing on one particular case does not mean studying single phenomenon as the case study 
generated ‘a multitude of qualitative-interpretive, within-case “observations” reflecting 
patterns of interaction, organisational practices, social relations, routines, actions and so 
on’(Yanow et al 2009:4). Although the research can be considered a single case study, it 
consisted of a number of sub-cases within the overall case. This in turn provided a range of 
different data sources for analysis.  
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The limitations of using a single case study are that it is difficult to generalise the findings to 
other mega-projects. However, the purpose of the research was to expand and generate theory 
on evidence utilisation and negotiation in decision-making within mega-projects which could 
be applied to other mega-projects. Rather than collect smaller amounts of data from a number 
of case studies, the choice was taken to focus on one particular case in order to gather an in-
depth explanation about the intricate details of how evidence informs decisions.  
The reason that a case study design is appropriate for this research is that the desire is to 
understand the social processes and complex practices by organising the data around themes 
and topics. By using this design it was possible to do this through data organisation which 
provided the most appropriate form of analytical handle on the data. As Mason argues, it 
enables the researcher to ‘make comparisons and build explanations in a distinctive way’ 
(2002:166). There was little to no control over behavioural events within this research. The 
only stage at which there may have been some influence is during the scrutiny process in 
which the researcher provided support for the scrutiny report, including feeding into question 
plans and contributed to the final Committee report. A brief discussion on researcher 
positionality is discussed later in the chapter.  
6.3 The case study: High Speed Two 
In the previous chapter the case study was presented in more detail; this section provides a 
summary of the case and the reasons behind its selection. The chosen case study was a new 
high speed rail network that is being designed and built in the UK. It has been named ‘High 
Speed Two’ after the Channel tunnel rail link was referred to as High Speed 1. High speed 
rail arrived in the UK with the opening in 2003 of the first part of High Speed 1 (then known 
as the 67-mile Channel Tunnel Rail Link) between London and the Channel Tunnel and it 
was completed in 2007. This was actually relatively late in terms of development as other 
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countries in Europe such as France, Spain and Germany had already developed large high 
speed rail networks. In 2004 an extensive study was published on high speed rail networks 
and it raised questions as to why the UK did not already have a network. It concluded that at 
the time there was not a big capacity issue on the classic rail network (Commission for 
Integrated Transport, 2004). Then in 2005 and 2006 reports were published that had 
conflicting views over whether or not high speed rail was needed in the UK based on 
increasing capacity issues. A report by Atkins entitled ‘High Speed Line Study: Summary 
Report’ (2005) suggested that ‘a new high speed line is effective in relieving rail crowding 
problems and performs better in respect of relieving rail crowding than alternative 
investments such as upgrades of the existing networks, new lower-speed lines or highway 
upgrade programmes’ (2005:ii). In contrast to this, the Eddington Transport Study (HM 
Treasury, 2006:49) argued that: 
‘New high-speed rail networks in the UK would not significantly change the level of 
economic connectivity between most parts of the UK, given existing aviation and rail links. 
Even if a transformation in connectivity could be achieved, the evidence is very quiet on the 
scale of resulting economic benefit, and in France business use of the high speed train 
network is low’ 
 
Regardless of this report, since at least 2007 there has been a growing consensus amongst 
politicians in the UK that construction of a high speed rail network is needed because of a 
growing problem with capacity on the current rail network. The development of a second 
high-speed line was proposed in 2008 by the Labour government to address capacity 
constraints on the West Coast Main Line railway, which is forecast to be at full capacity in 
2025.  A report published by the Department for Transport in January 2009 described an 
increase of 50% in rail passenger traffic and a 40% increase in freight in the preceding 10 
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years in the UK and detailed a number of infrastructural problems (Department of Transport, 
2009). The report proposed that new high-speed lines should be constructed to address these 
issues and after assessing various options concluded that the most appropriate initial route for 
a new line was from London to the West Midlands. After formally deciding to advance with a 
new high speed rail line the government began its consultation process with the public on its 
high speed rail plans. 
 
Much of the studies to this point have focused on a cost-benefit analysis of a high speed rail 
network, very much following the methodology reported in De Rus (2008). The focus of the 
reports is usually on the investment required on the one hand and the economic benefits, 
mainly in terms of travel time savings, on the other. The analysis is mainly restricted to the 
line in question without due consideration of areas beyond (but close to) the line or areas 
bypassed by it. In 2009, the Labour government established High Speed Two Limited (HS2 
Ltd) which was chaired by Sir David Rowlands to examine the case for a new high speed 
line. It is an executive non-departmental public body that is funded by grant-in-aid from the 
Government. The most recent study, published at the end of October, 2013 entitled ‘The 
Strategic Case for HS2’ has changed the focus back to the benefits of delivering additional 
capacity and has used upgraded forecasting and evaluation techniques. As a result the benefit-
cost ratio (including wider economic benefits) is estimated at 1.7 for phase one and 2.3 for 
the full network. This represents a decline from values of 1.9 and 2.5 reported previously 
(HS2 Ltd, 2013).  
The logic underlying the selection of HS2 is that a live case was essential in order to 
understand the complexities and messiness of the policy process. This would not be possible 
if the case was analysed retrospectively. Also, the aim of the research was to look at a policy 
issue that encompassed a wide range of decisions, different types of evidence and was multi-
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actor. In terms of practicalities, Birmingham is part of phase one of the proposed route and 
many of the stakeholders are based between London and Birmingham. Therefore, several 
interview participants were identified within a 100 mile radius. From living in Birmingham 
there was an awareness of community meetings about the proposed rail project and gaining 
access was not difficult. The community meeting in Castle Vale was attended by a number of 
key stakeholders which provided a good networking environment for future interview 
participants. The researcher established a relationship with Birmingham City Council that 
enabled them to participate in and contribute to the scrutiny review of HS2 thus enabling 
access to a setting that most researchers are unable to observe. The placement provided an 
opportunity in which to obtain large amounts of empirical data that could be used to answer 
the research questions. Also, attending meetings meant the researcher could observe how 
different policy actors negotiated different types of evidence with one another. Hence HS2 
was chosen because it presented a suitable and meaningful empirical context in which the 
research questions might be answered. 
6.4 Justifying the research methods 
The observation of a community meeting served as a preliminary research method that 
allowed the researcher to observe what sorts of claims were being made by policy actors, how 
they interacted with one another in that setting and what types of evidence were used. Other 
academics have focused their research on community meetings as a way to understand local 
democracy and how these meetings fit into the larger institutional context of citizen input into 
the policy process (Adams, 2004; Farrelly, 2009; Lowndes and Sullivan, 2008). Adams 
(2004) suggested that they are a good opportunity for attendees to convey evidence and 
information to one another and attract media attention as well as influence others opinions. 
Attending the meeting allowed the researcher to compare experience with the literature to see 
if it did provide a good environment for attendees to present and negotiate evidence with one 
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another.  It did not provide in-depth data about how actors think about evidence and how they 
frame the policy issue. This is why interviews were required. Interviews enabled the 
researcher to explore the interviewee’s experiences and it is a ‘uniquely sensitive and 
powerful method for capturing the experiences and lived meanings of the subjects’ everyday 
world’ (Kvale, 2007:11). 
 
6.5 Participant Observation of a Community Meeting 
In the early stages of the research a local community meeting was attended in order to 
experience how local residents interacted with other policy actors, what issues and arguments 
were causing most concern for attendees and to see what evidence and claims were presented 
by those present. As it was a public meeting it was not necessary to request field access. In 
research, gaining access to meetings or organisations can be very difficult as the researcher is 
often seen as an inconvenience to the organisation or group. However, in this instance it was 
relatively easy. Before entering the field it was important to know who would be present at 
the meeting, what the intentions of the meeting holders were, some information about HS2 
and some general knowledge about large infrastructure planning projects. This enabled the 
researcher to have an understanding of the potential language being used and what to expect. 
At the meeting there were approximately fifty people in the room and it was set up so that the 
organisers of the meeting were sat facing the audience of mostly residents and community 
workers. There were employees from HS2 Ltd, Birmingham City Council, Castle Vale 
Community Housing Association and other key stakeholders at the front of the room. Robson 
(2002) identifies four different levels of participant observation. They are complete 
participation, marginal participant, observer-as-participant and participant-as-observer. This 
is an example of participant observation in which the researcher was a participant-as-
observer. There was no interaction between the researcher and participants. By sitting at the 
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back of the room, the participants were unaware of the researcher’s presence or motive for 
attending the public meeting. The meeting was not recorded as there was no informed 
consent, however field notes were taken and minutes of the meeting were available online to 
the public. Emerson et al. (1995) explain why researchers take field notes and what they 
contain: 
‘In writing field notes ethnographers have as their primary goal description rather than 
analysis. But these contrasting terms – description and analysis – refer more to recognised 
kinds of writing than to separate cognitive activities. In that sense, writing field notes is a 
process of “analysis in description”. Indeed, all descriptions are selective, purposed, angled, 
voiced, because   they are authored’  
(Emerson et al., 1995: 105-106) 
This was relevant when observing the community meeting. Due to there being no informed 
consent it would have been unethical to record the meeting. Although there was little risk to 
participants and knowledge of presence was unlikely to affect their behaviour it was decided 
that they would not be told they were being observed for research purposes. It is impossible 
to say that there is no observer effect even though presence of a researcher was not known. 
As Blommaert argues, ‘you are never observing an event as if you were not there. You are 
there, and that makes it a different event’ (Blommaert, 2006:27). It is difficult to claim that 
there was no observer effect but it is possible to claim that there was a minimal as possible 
effect due to the attendees being unaware of the researcher’s presence and intentions. The 
community meeting can be considered a natural setting as it was at the community college 
building which participants were familiar with. Although attendees were unaware of the 
motive of the researcher, a select few already knew that there was a PhD student as a 
volunteer at the Castle Vale Tenants and Residents Alliance. By attending the meeting the 
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hope was to understand the context of HS2 within which the study is situated. In summary, 
the reasons for using a community meeting as a sub-case study were that it was easily 
accessible, no consent was needed and it was possible to observe the use of evidence in a 
natural setting. Also, there are few opportunities to be present in policy environments where 
evidence is presented and negotiated orally without being invited. Many of the occasions 
within this policy process in which evidence is negotiated is not accessible to me and so this 
community meeting provides a good opportunity to experience the use of evidence within 
HS2. 
6.6 Interviews 
The first method for the research involved conducting semi-structured interviews with a 
number of relevant policy actors. This section discusses the sampling techniques, profiles of 
the interviewees and a discussion about how interview data enhanced the study. The 
interviews were used to explore how policy actors within HS2 frame the policy issue and 
how they conceptualise evidence. They also enabled the researcher to find out what evidential 
resources actors draw on within the policy process and describe in their own words how they 
interact with other policy actors. The interview questions were developed from an in-depth 
literature review of evidence within the policy making process and mega-projects as well as a 
review of media coverage of the case study.  
 
6.6.1 About the interviews 
 Qualitative interviewing is typically characterised as flexible, responsive and informal, 
enabling the interviewee to produce rich, detailed responses or ‘thick description’ (Mason, 
2002). Unlike structured interviews they are designed to explore the distinctive features of 
specific contextualised events focusing in on the experiences, understandings and beliefs of 
individuals (Vromen, 2010).By using a semi-structured interview it allowed for a less formal 
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approach and covered the grounds that the researcher wished to cover through prompting. It 
is more appropriate for complex situations as the interviewee can be briefed before the 
interview in person about any complex concepts such as evidence. The main reasons for 
choosing this particular research method to answer the research aims were that questions can 
be explained which leads to less misunderstanding and an interview can be used with almost 
any type of population (Kumar, 2005). Trying to understand how an actor conceptualises a 
particular concept can be difficult and so if the interviewer is able to explain what they mean 
then more clarity ensues as opposed to closed questionnaires. By choosing a number of 
participants with different interests and beliefs it ‘lends itself to building general theories 
about the nature of social phenomena’ (Taylor and Bogdan, 1998:91). 
6.6.2 Limitations of interviewing 
There are some disadvantages to interviewing which include time-consumption, cost, the data 
quality, bias and emotion. Interviews themselves can take a lot of time as well as transcribing. 
Travelling to interviews was expensive as some interviewees did not live locally. The quality 
of the data often depends on the quality of the interaction and the quality of the interviewer. 
As Kumar notes, ‘the quality of the responses obtained from different interviews may vary 
significantly’ (2005:131). In regards to emotion and bias, the interviews were difficult to 
conduct because the case study is live. Being a live case, interviewees came into the 
interviews with their own agenda and it was difficult at times to steer the interviewees in the 
direction that the interviewer wanted. Emotions were still very prominent with some 
interviewees and they were more interested in arguing either for or against the project rather 
than discuss the evidence and claims-making process of which they were a part of.  
 
Two rounds of interviews were conducted over the course of the project; six pilot interviews 
and eight subsequent interviews. The guiding format of the interviews was based around key 
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themes identified in the initial literature and policy review. In pilot interviews with 
experienced managers, communicators and educators in the public, private and NGO sectors 
were explored with a view to establishing their relevance and appropriateness for future 
interviews. The questions did not focus on HS2 as the case study had not been chosen at this 
point but the key themes remained the same. It became apparent in the pilot interviews that 
certain questions about the nature and conceptualisation of evidence proved difficult for 
interviewees to answer and so the interview guide was amended. Subsequent interview 
guides were designed to accommodate a range of differently placed interviewees with the 
intention of using them flexibly in a manner suited to each individual’s specific professional 
role and experience. In practice the original interview schedules served only as a broad 
indicative framework of issues to be explored. Understood as a collaborative and interactive 
process, the interviews were guided both by the experiences and perceptions of interviewees 
as well as the researcher’s own framework. The outcome of this style of interviewing meant 
at times focusing down on particular issues or themes whilst at others going off on tangents to 
the original schedule. In discussions that explored experiences of the policy process and in 
more conceptual reflection over how they understood issues such as ‘evidence’, or ‘claims’, 
the researcher evolved a style of ‘vignette’ questioning aimed at getting them to explore real 
life experiences so as to avoid getting text book answers to questions (Mason, 2002; Wilks, 
2004). ‘Vignette’ questions proved particularly useful in generating reflective thinking and 
helped ground beliefs and accounts of behaviour in particular lived contexts.  
All interviews were recorded and transcribed and interviewees were offered the opportunity 
to receive a summary of the transcription to check for accuracy or edit if they felt this was 
necessary. However, no participants took the opportunity to view a summary of the 
transcribed material. The table below provides an example of interview topics that were 
discussed: 
150 
 
 Motivations for being involved in the case study 
 How do they conceptualise evidence? 
 What types of evidence they rely on to make claims 
 How they negotiate evidence with one another 
 Utilisation of social media to present claims  
 
Figure 3: Interview topics 
 
6.6.3 Sampling 
 It is important when sampling to identify and choose participants that belong to the relevant 
population of actors within HS2. The purpose is to question what is needed from the sample 
in terms of answering the research questions (Mason, 2002).  The sample needed to provide 
access to data that allows the researcher to empirically and theoretically develop some 
arguments about claims-making within the chosen case study. Therefore, interviewees were 
identified by conducting an online search of organisations involved in the production and use 
of evidence in relation to HS2. The nature and purpose of the research was outlined in 
introductory emails and fully explained to participants prior to the interviews, along with the 
uses intended for any data produced.  The email invited them to take part in an in-depth 
interview and covered details pertaining to the aims of the research and broad thematic areas. 
Of the emails that were sent out, the response rate was somewhat lower than expected. Eight 
interviewees were chosen based on their position on HS2 and their role within the policy 
process. Two of the interviewees were contacted after being recommended by another 
interviewee. It should be noted that in no way were participants made to feel obliged or 
coerced into being involved in the research. The case study was chosen due to its 
characteristics and sampling for proportionality was not the main concern. Hence just as High 
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Speed Two was selected as a case study through a process of purposive sampling so 
interviewees were initially identified on the basis of their relevance to the research questions 
and the theoretical and analytical framework employed. 
 
6.6.4 Interview Participants 
 Thirty people were contacted and a request was made for an interview with them. This 
number of participants is recommended by Patricia Adler (2012) as a guide for students 
conducting qualitative research. However, she acknowledges that for each study the answer 
of how many participants are necessary will differ from project to project. The aim was to 
include a range of perspectives on the case study including those for, against and those that 
consider themselves impartial or neutral. A total of eight people agreed to participate in the 
study. This may appear to be a small number of participants; however the interviews were 
very in-depth and ranged from one hour to two and a half hours. The interview data was 
supported by large quantities of primary and secondary data in the form of participant 
observations, High Speed Two related documents and the media. .  
The profiles of the research participants were as follows: three were in favour of the project, 
two were opposed to HS2, and three claimed to be neither for nor against the project. Two of 
the participants are local residents that could be impacted by the construction of the new high 
speed line, four of the participants were directly linked to the project because of their careers 
in either local government or the rail industry and two of the participants are involved with 
HS2 but only to a certain extent. A number of organisations were approached but many were 
unavailable for an interview including HS2 Limited. Many of the respondents to emails 
directed the researcher to their websites for information as they were too busy to participate 
in an interview. One of the problems with choosing a live case study is that those highly 
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involved in the project may not have much time for interviews. The table below sets out a 
description of each interviewee whilst retaining anonymity 
 
Profession Interest in the project For or against HS2? 
Retired academic Lives near proposed 
route 
Against 
Rail magazine editor 
and retired rail industry 
employee 
Writes about project 
and consults on certain 
issues of HS2 
For 
Transport manager in 
the West Midlands 
Company is involved 
in HS2 project 
For 
Rail engineer Lives near proposed 
route 
Against 
Manager at a well-
known organisation 
that provides research 
and expertise on 
transport issues 
Organisation provides 
research and advice to 
HS2 Limited 
Neutral 
Rail consultant Provides expert advice 
to HS2 Limited 
For 
Chief executive of a 
community 
organisation 
Area that they serve is 
affected by the project 
Neutral 
Council worker Conducts research into 
the effects of HS2 for 
the area in which they 
work 
Neutral 
 
(Table 2: Interview participants) 
 
6.7 An Ethical process 
Ethical considerations are an important part of the research process because they can ensure 
that a researcher’s findings are trustworthy and that the welfare and rights of the participants 
are protected (Social Research Association, 2003). Ethical review is required when the 
research involves human subjects. Ethical approval is ‘also a requirement of the University of 
Birmingham’s Code of Practice for Research. If you do not obtain full ethical approval for 
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your study, you are at risk of disciplinary action’ (University of Birmingham, 2015). The 
research undertaken in this thesis has passed a University of Birmingham ethical review. The 
following sections set out the ethical considerations of the researcher.  
 
6.7.1 Consent and withdrawal 
 Ethical research requires that all participants agree to the research before it commences. 
Informed consent implies two related activities: ‘participants need first to comprehend and 
second to agree voluntarily to the nature of their research and their role within it’ (Israel and 
Hay, 2006:61). It entails informing the participants of the ‘overall purpose of the 
investigation and the main features of the design, as well as of possible risks and benefits 
from participation in the research project’ (Kvale, 2007:27). Consent of participants within 
this research was both informed and voluntary. Formal consent was sought in writing using 
an information sheet and consent form. Both the interviewer and participant retained copies 
of signed forms. The initial consent form covered one interview, the exchange of feedback, 
and the possibility of further contact to arrange a follow up interview. Participants were 
informed of their right to withdraw from the research prior to the commencement of the 
interview both verbally and in the information sheet provided. Following interviews, 
participants were verbally  given the option of withdrawing from receiving feedback or 
participating in follow up interviews. All subsequent communications contained a disclaimer 
to the effect that further participation is optional and that the participant may withdraw at any 
time. Following interviews participants were given two months to withdraw their data from 
the study. After two months, interview data was used in line with the purposes outlined in the 
participant information sheet. However participants retained the right to withdraw from 
follow up work at any stage. The primary concern when it comes to ethical responsibilities of 
the researcher is their duty of care towards the research participants. Due to the case study 
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being live it was extremely important that the confidentiality of respondents was kept and 
they remained anonymous throughout the thesis.  
 
6.7.2 Confidentiality 
 Confidentiality in research ‘implies that private data identifying the subjects will not be 
reported’ (Kvale, 2007:27). Research participants often do not want data published that 
makes them potentially recognisable to others. A range of measures were taken towards 
ensuring the confidentiality of participant data. Participant names and employing organisation 
were anonymous and non-attributable in accompanying transcript extracts, both in the PhD 
thesis and in any other research outputs. Participants were not identifiable by name through 
their responses to interview questions; as well as in the interview data and anything that is 
published with extracts from the interview data. Primary research data and research evidence 
is accessible in confidence to other authorised researchers for verification purposes for 
reasonable periods after completion of the research; data will be preserved and accessible for 
ten years. This period is in accordance with current University guidelines. These guidelines 
can be found at http://www.ppd.bham.ac.uk/policy/cop/code8.htm.  Data has been stored in 
their original form. Storage media will not be erased and/or reused, but will be stored 
securely. The principal investigator complies with the Data Protection Act (1998). By 
undertaking ethical research, the steps that were taken to ensure the protection of the 
participants’ identities were clarified to them and assurances were given during interviews.  
 
6.7.3 Storage and disposal of data 
 Respondents were told that they were able to choose not to be recorded when interviews 
were conducted but all agreed to be recorded. They were informed if they wanted the tape 
recorder turned off then they could request this. All data for this project was stored in 
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accordance with the Data Protection Act (1998). Transcripts, recordings and code sheets have 
been stored in a separates file under separate passwords. All data is stored on an encrypted 
laptop computer; any back-ups made were similarly encrypted. Raw data and participant 
identities are only be accessible by the principal investigator, though supervisors have access 
to transcript extracts. Participants have the right to access all data pertaining to their own 
interview on request, and were reminded of this when interview summaries were sent. 
Interview summaries were sent to participants by email or post using recorded delivery in one 
instance. All data will only be used for the purposes of the PhD and nothing else. Data will be 
stored for ten years.  
 
6.7.4 Minimising harm 
 One of the aims of ethical scrutiny is the attempt to balance the risk of harm against the 
potential for benefits that can accrue to participants (Social Research Association, 2003). 
Consideration has been given to different types of harm and the liklehood of their occurance 
and how they can be minimised in this project. Psychological stress is more common  as a 
consequence of social research as opposed to physical harm (The British Psychological 
Society, 2010). Harm is often overlooked by researchers and one should never anticipate the 
emotional effects questions can have on respondents. To reduce psychological distress to 
participants selection and use of language was carefully considered and participants were 
shown respect and courtesy. In regards to harm to the researcher, which is equally important, 
all interviews took place in either public locations or in the offices of participants. As a 
precaution the researcher left travel plans accessible to their supervisor or family  to ensure 
their location is known during field work and carried a mobile phone in case of emergencies. 
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6.8 The scrutiny review 
Scrutiny in local government was formally created by the Local Government Act 2000. It is 
‘an independent function led by local elected councillors that works with local people and 
other local bodies to help improve services’ (www.cfps.org.uk) and call executive (Cabinet) 
members and chief officers to account for their actions. Councillors not holding cabinet 
positions are eligible to sit on overview and scrutiny committees in which they can ‘work 
across party lines to collect information and draw out conclusions and recommendations on a 
consensual basis’ (Coulson, 2011:108). The reason for participating in the scrutiny review 
was to explore how actors within HS2 engage with the process of presenting and negotiating 
evidence and claims. The setting took place within Birmingham City Council’s scrutiny 
review of HS2 and its benefits initially focusing on the way in which organisations are 
invited to present evidence, how they respond to a call for evidence and the nature of the 
evidence they present. One of the reasons for taking evidence in an Overview and Scrutiny 
(O&S) meeting is that it helps committees to reach conclusions and the evidence supposedly 
strengthens those conclusions. When making recommendations to Cabinet and Council, the 
O&S committee cannot compel the executive to take up its recommendations. However, by 
using evidence it increases the ability of the scrutiny committee to persuade. If 
recommendations are backed up with reasons, based on evidence including information 
surrounding the issue and the opinions of stakeholders, experts and other interested Parties 
then the recommendations begin to have some force. In theory, ‘evidence-based work carries 
more weight with the executive and is a crucial accountability mechanism’ (Sandford and 
Maer, 2004:39). By taking evidence from officers and cabinet members, back-bench 
councillors have an opportunity to pursue a line of questioning with those who have 
executive power. This allows for both decisions and actions, as well as policy positions to be 
examined. Questions can be asked in full council as well as committee, but in full council 
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there is rarely the opportunity to take a line of questioning. Evidence also allows information 
to become public. By questioning officers on their reports, the committees can ask for 
additional information, which is put into the public domain. It is therefore an incentive for 
officers to maintain performance levels and for cabinet members to have real reasons for their 
decisions. 
In September 2013 the Birmingham Economy & Jobs and Transport, Connectivity and 
Sustainability Overview and Scrutiny (O&S) committees joined together to undertake a joint 
review entitled ‘High Speed Two: Maximising the Impact for Birmingham’. Other 
councils have investigated the pros and cons of HS2 but none have undertaken a review into 
how their area could maximise the impact of HS2. As the project progresses it is likely that 
other councils affected by the high speed line will undertake similar reviews, especially if the 
Hybrid Bill is passed. On the 20th September the scrutiny office published a ‘Call for 
Evidence’ on their website as well as contacting key stakeholders individually and requesting 
that they submit some written evidence as well as an invitation to come to one of two 
meetings to join a discussion with the two committees. The online ‘Call for Evidence’ listed a 
selection of questions and key lines of enquiry that would be discussed at the two meetings in 
November. People were given six weeks to respond to the call and were advised that 
Birmingham City Council ‘are not looking to re-open the debate as to the pros and cons of 
HS2 – these have been well debated elsewhere. Rather, we are looking forward to the 
introduction of the Hybrid Bill later this year and ensuring that Birmingham is well placed to 
realise the promised benefits’ (BCC, 2013:1). There were four key lines of enquiry that were 
asked and these include: 
1. What are the opportunities and challenges for Birmingham and the wider region in 
relation to: 
 The local economy and inward investment; 
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 Connectivity (including digital and local, national and international 
transportation issues for goods, people and services);  
 Employment; 
 Sustainability and the natural and urban environments; 
 Design (including planning), heritage and culture. 
 
2. How will these benefits be realised? 
 What are the infrastructure and planning requirements needed to yield the 
benefits? 
 How are plans for local transport links – including rail, bus, metro, cycling and 
walking – developing?  
 How will Birmingham residents be supported to get the jobs generated by HS2, 
both in construction and later?  
 What resources / investment opportunities are available for this?  
 Who are the key partners and how are they being engaged?  
 How are innovative and creative future-focused ideas being collected and 
included in the planning? 
 
3. What is the passenger perspective on the wider rail/bus/metro connectivity issues and 
on the stations’ general utility (including modes of movement between stations) for 
users? 
 
4. What messages should the City Council be conveying to Government, and what asks 
should be made? 
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The ‘Call for Evidence’ concluded by stating ‘An Inquiry is only as good as the evidence it 
receives. We would welcome a written statement of your views and experience on any of the 
above points, along with any other comments or ideas you might have. We will collect all the 
written submissions and use these as evidence to support our work’ (BCC, 2013:2). In terms 
of sampling, who is included in the scrutiny review has implications for the claims that can 
be made about conclusions and recommendations at the end of the process. This review 
undertook predominantly purposive sampling which involves selecting particular 
organisations with characteristics relevant to the review that are thought to be most 
informative (Patton, 1990). There were a total of fifteen responses to the call for evidence in 
the evidence packs from a number of different organisations. The response length from each 
organisation or person was as follows: 
Response No. Pages 
Professor Kathryn Moore, Professor of Landscape architecture, Birmingham 12  
Greater Birmingham Chamber of Commerce  3 
The National Skills Academy for Railway Engineering 24 
Centro 14 
Dr Mike Hodder, Planning Archaeologist, BCC 7 
Black Country Local Enterprise Partnership 2 
The Birmingham Group 4 
Shilpi Akbar, Assistant Director of Employment, BCC 3 
Birmingham City Council 105 
High Speed Two Limited 5 
Marketing Birmingham 20  
West Midlands Campaign for Better Transport 9 
Campaign for Rail West Midlands 4 
Railfuture West Midlands 2 
Birmingham Friends of the Earth 2 
 
It was not necessary to seek consent from anyone as the data was publicly available and 
anonymity was also not an issue. Whilst this placement provided a large amount of written 
empirical data, the experience also allowed the researcher to observe policy actors 
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negotiating evidence with one another in meetings. Field notes were taken in all the meetings 
attended, both public and private, in order to observe the process by which claims were 
presented and the evidence was negotiated and then how this in turn led to the creation of a 
scrutiny review document.  
6.9 Researcher Positionality 
It is important for a researcher to consider their positionality within their project because 
research represents a shared space, shaped by both researcher and participants (England, 
1994). The researcher must identify and acknowledge their biases wherever possible because 
‘just as the participants’ experiences are framed in socio-cultural contexts, so too are those of 
the researcher’ (Bourke, 2014:2). Through researching the case study for the project some 
opinions were formed about High Speed Two and its effects on communities and the 
environment. This was unavoidable; however, some attempts were made to reduce this 
influence in two ways. During interviews the researcher made sure not to provide their own 
personal opinion even when asked by participants. Due to the immediacy of events, many of 
the participants sought the researcher’s opinion on the project as well as validation for their 
arguments. Every effort was made to remain neutral during interviews by refraining from 
answering opinion-based questions by participants. During the scrutiny process at 
Birmingham City Council, involvement included obtaining evidence for the scrutiny report 
and writing parts of the report. In order to reduce impact on the process, the researcher did 
not write any recommendations or give opinions when possible. This reduced the influence of 
the researcher on the scrutiny process.  
6.10 Documentary sources 
Although interviews and empirical data from the scrutiny review were a primary means of 
encountering evidence negotiation between policy actors, documentary sources also played a 
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valuable role in answering the research questions. This included newspaper articles, policy 
documents, research papers, reports and social media data. Documentary sources proved 
invaluable for the research because they provided an understanding of the case study, direct 
quotes to cross reference with the interviewees, empirical data to apply the theoretical 
framework to and also as a source of interviewees. Many of the participants were chosen by 
reading about them in news stories and then contacting them to request an interview. This 
section explains how each type of documentary source was used and the following section 
explains how the data was analysed.  
6.10.1 Google Alerts 
Google Alert is an automated web search service that began in 2003 which enables a person 
to receive email notifications any time the search engine Google finds new results on a topic 
that interests you. For example, you could get updates about a particular news story or find 
out when people post something about a topic. Results are sent to subscribers by daily email. 
The topic of High Speed Two (HS2) was set up as an alert on Google so each day all online 
news stories containing HS2 were detected and sent as a document via email. The alert was 
active from 15th July 2013 to the 24th June 2015. During this time daily emails were received 
which contained anywhere from between one and seven news stories. Over twenty three 
months a minimum of seven hundred articles were received and read. The reason for using 
this service is that it provided updates on all online media coverage about the chosen case 
study which was then utilised in the empirical research to provide support for the findings 
and data references to the stories the interviewees told. Media coverage indicated how the 
project was being discussed by policy actors at the time, who some of the key stakeholders 
are in the project, and what evidence they were choosing to present in the media.   
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6.10.2 Policy documents 
Throughout the case a broad corpus of electronic and printed policy documents was 
assembled. The majority of relevant documents are available on the HS2 website which at the 
time had a total of 288 policy documents authored by HS2 Ltd and the Department for 
Transport. A benefit of choosing this case study was that almost all policy documents are 
available in electronic form online. In regards to documents that were not specifically related 
to high speed rail but transport in general, were collated into an electronic folder and utilised 
in mapping the case study chronologically.   
6.10.3 Research papers and reports  
A number of research studies have been conducted to assess the viability of a high speed line 
by various individuals and companies. Most of the studies were commissioned by those in 
favour of HS2 with the aim of creating more evidence to justify their claims. There are fewer 
reports commissioned by those opposed to HS2 mostly due to a lack of financial resources. 
These documents were used to provide an insight into the claims that were being presented 
and the evidence that was used to support these claims. The cost benefit analysis of the 
project is at the centre of many of these reports and is used to justify or criticise HS2. The 
approaches to CBA were analysed in order to understand the values that were being given to 
various elements of the project. Other documents include the evidence packs from the 
scrutiny review that provided fifteen different responses from a number of stakeholders in the 
Midlands. A lot of the responses were presented in report form and set out the position of the 
respondent as well as their claims and supporting evidence.  
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6.10.4 Social media 
During the research project the researcher had the benefit of working with a colleague on a 
project concerned with policy ideas on social media in 2013. In particular, the focus was on 
data collected from Twitter. One of the topics that data was collected on was HS2. A number 
of ‘tweets’ concerning HS2 were obtained which provided some initial data on how people 
discussed the issue of capacity, and identified a number of arguments and claims being 
presented both for and against the project. This influenced some of the interview questions 
further into the research. Some of the Twitter accounts that regularly posted about HS2 and 
ones that were specifically set up to present evidence and claims about the project were 
followed as well as a number of online blogs of both supporters and opponents of HS2. This 
provided an understanding of how people were discussing the project, what they emphasised 
the most and who they engaged with on social media. 
6.11 Data analysis 
This final section outlines the approach to data analysis. It was a continual process during 
fieldwork which involved writing up interview notes, transcribing, observing meetings and 
drafting chapters. The first data collected was from a field note taken whilst at the community 
meeting in Castle Vale attended in late 2012. As mentioned before, the reason the meeting 
was attended was to gain an understanding of the types of discussions that were being held 
between policy actors and what evidence they were utilising to present their arguments. Any 
evidence mentioned was identified and notes were taken of the way in which speakers were 
presenting and receiving claims. From this it was possible to gain a better understanding of 
the issues that were important to local residents that would be affected by the project and 
some insight into how those in favour of the project justified their claims. The field note 
acted as an insight into the main issues concerning the case study and it influenced the 
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interview questions asked of the participants. After the meeting some engagement with 
several of the attendees occurred in order to request interviews with them.  
The rest of the field notes were taken whilst on placement at Birmingham City Council 
during meetings concerning the scrutiny review. Notes were taken in all the meetings with 
both Council staff and in the evidence gathering sessions which were open to the public. 
Analysis of the field notes involved highlighting any discussions about evidence that would 
be used in the reports and how they planned on presenting it. Notes were made in the 
evidence gathering sessions of any discussions or comments that the researcher considered 
were relevant when attendees were discussing the case study. For example, the way in which 
they spoke about the evidence that was supporting their claims was important as well as how 
they rejected claims of those that had a different opinion.  
The evidence packs that were created for the meetings were predominantly used to identify 
what claims were being presented by the respondents and what evidence they were using to 
support these claims. Firstly, each of the two evidence packs were read and as many claims as 
could be identified were highlighted. Toulmin’s model of argumentation was then applied to 
some of the responses in the evidence packs in which attempts were made to locate the claim, 
the evidence and the warrant. From this a decision was made about how useful Toulmin’s 
model was as a tool for deconstructing an argument.  
The data provided from the Google Alert on HS2 was used for a number of different 
purposes. Firstly, it was useful for tracking the case chronologically as all key events were 
documented in the media and it was useful to refer to in order to clarify dates. Each day notes 
were taken of what the media was focusing on in regards to HS2 in order to establish the key 
points of interest. Secondly, framing theory was applied to the data in order to identify the 
ways in which groups of policy actors framed the debate based on the arguments they put 
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forward either for or against the project. For example, how local residents along the line of 
route and the types of media coverage they received was documented. Any evidence within 
these news stories was then cited. Due to their nature there was not a large amount of 
evidence cited within the news stories but the Google Alerts data did provide an insight into 
how policy actors are portrayed in the media by others and the way in which they discussed 
the case study. When evidence was cited a note was made of the type of evidence it was 
which led to some inferences being made about what types of evidence different policy actors 
drew on. Some interview participants were identified from media stories that provided 
contact details online.  
Familiarisation with the interview data began as soon as the interview process commenced by 
listening to the recordings. The pilot interviews with experienced managers, communicators 
and educators in the public, private and NGO sectors served as a tool for refining the 
interview questions once the case study had been chosen. From these interviews it was clear 
that discussions of evidence with the participants would probably be difficult because they 
struggled with questions about conceptualisation. In terms of reading the interview data, this 
was a three stage process. Firstly the data was read and coded in a literal way almost as a 
story; then the theory was applied to the data through a narrative lens within the context of 
the claims-making framework. The data was viewed in a reflexive way in order to determine 
if there were any limitations and the theory needed adapting. The interview data existed in 
two forms: electronic audio files and as verbatim written text. Firstly everything that related 
to evidence, opinions and claims-making was ‘free-coded’. This resulted in several codes 
which were then refined into a smaller number with more specific titles that centred on the 
research questions. The codes were organised by grouping them meaningfully and identifying 
conceptual relationships between the codes. They were derived from research questions and 
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key concepts and themes that emerged during the data collection, data management and 
analysis stages.  
 
Computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software is available and is capable of performing 
a wide variety of functions including sorting and coding. However, they are only able to 
provide logical or numerical analysis and do not help with interpretation of complex areas 
such as evidence negotiation and framing. The decision was made to code the data manually 
rather than using a computer programme because the programme was unnecessary as it did 
not provide the analytical sophistication needed to identify frames within the data or concepts 
of evidence. Preference was given to having paper copies of the transcripts set out on the 
desk whilst conducting analysis rather than only being able to view one at a time. Different 
data sources were then compared with one another in order to identify any similarities and 
differences that emerged. Categories were given a code name and the coding system refined 
as new themes emerged.  
 
6.12  Conclusion  
This chapter has set out the approach to research design, methods and data analysis. The 
chosen methods offer a complementary way of analysing evidence utilisation and negotiation 
in a mega-project. Secondary documents such as policy papers and media stories provided a 
chronological record of events prior to and during the empirical research. Then the interviews 
and scrutiny review provided greater insight into how policy actors frame the case study and 
how they negotiate evidence with one another through a process of claims-making. In 
summary, the data included: 
 Six pilot interviews 
 Eight interviews ranging from one to two and a half hours 
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 A field note from an observation of a a community meeting in Birmingham 
 Overview and Scrutiny documents totalling 216 pages 
 Over 700 newspaper articles sourced from Google Analytics 
 Over 280 policy documents published on the HS2 Ltd website 
 A number of research papers and reports; and 
 Several hundred tweets from Twitter accounts associated with the HS2 project 
The chapter also documented and justified the specific details of the research methods used. 
Purposive sampling was used for the interviews because it was the most appropriate means of 
interview selection. Choosing participants that had experience and knowledge of the case 
study resulted in valuable data. The interviews were all conducted face to face bar one 
because of their availability and the questions they were asked derived from the research 
questions. The process of data analysis has also been explained. By setting out the research 
design in detail readers are able to check the validity and reliability of the work. The next 
chapter provides an in-depth overview of the case study High Speed Two. 
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Chapter 7 
The Framing of High Speed Two 
 
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter employs frame analysis to examine the ways in which policy actors within HS2 
frame and reframe the policy debate and explores the impact this has on the types of 
evidential resources they draw on. It tells the story of the policy through frame conflict as a 
notional lens in order to answer the research question: How do actors within HS2 frame the 
policy problem? The majority of actors within HS2 accept that there is a capacity issue on the 
current rail network; the conflict arises because they have different ideas and beliefs about 
how the goal of increasing rail capacity should be achieved. Since 1995 there has been an 
increase in rail passenger growth every year. Railways all over the UK are considered to be 
under pressure with parts of the WCML almost at capacity in terms of the number of trains it 
can carry as well as passengers. Rail capacity is dependent on two things: how many people 
each train can carry, and how many trains there are. The WCML is under stress because there 
is more demand for train services than there are train paths available. Research conducted by 
Network Rail (2009) suggested that the WCML will be at full capacity by 2024. They 
claimed that occupancy on the line’s commuter trains will increase by 26 per cent between 
2011 and 2023 (DfT, 2012). Some in favour of the project have argued that building HS2 is 
the only viable option to reduce crowding on the current rail network. In order to meet rising 
demand they claim that there will need to be more trains. Others have suggested there are 
alternative ways of increasing capacity that does not involve building a new line.  
 
Schon and Rein (1994) identified three main traditions of policy research that have evolved 
since the 1950s. These traditions contain a view of ‘how policy is made, how it ought to be 
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made, how disputes arise, and how disputes can be settled’ (1994:10). The first model, policy 
science, is concerned with policy choice as its central question. It argues that policy actors are 
capable of being rational and since World War 2 is considered the dominant approach to 
theory and practice. We can compare it to the ‘linear’ or ‘knowledge-driven’ models 
suggested by Weiss (1986) and Young et al. (2002) in chapter three which views actors as 
rational and derives from the natural sciences. The second model of policy research is called 
‘politics’ by Schon and Rein (1994) with the perspective that policy making is a process of 
political contention and policy outcomes are the products of a competitive political game. 
Other academics that have written about research models (Weiss, 1986; Young et al. 2002; 
Monaghan, 2010) also identified a political model in which policy is seen as the outcome of a 
political process. The model recognises that political imperatives and evidence are central to 
policy making. The third model that Schon and Rein identified is that of consensual dispute 
resolution which accepts the political model and ‘proposes a theory and practice of mediated 
negotiation, rooted in a model of economic rationality, for setting policy disputes in such a 
way as to achieve joint gains’ (1994:10). They do not identify the enlightenment model as 
Weiss and Bucuvalas (1980) and Young et al. (2002) which they consider to be the one that 
most closely typifies the relationship between research and policy formulation.  
 
These three models share the same assumption: policy makers are rational actors who choose 
the strategies of political action that they believe to be best suited to the achievement of their 
ends, which are rooted in their interests. Schon and Rein argued that these models are 
inadequate for explaining or coping with policy controversies. They claimed that because all 
three are versions of instrumental rationality, and they cannot explain the intractability of 
policy controversies. This is why they suggested a fourth alternative framework ‘which sees 
policy positions as resting on underlying structures of belief, perception, and appreciation’ 
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(1994:23) which they call “frames”. They identify policy controversies as disputes in which 
contending parties hold conflicting frames. A party’s framing of an issue shapes their policy 
decision; determines what they consider evidence or facts to be, and what arguments they 
take as being relevant and persuasive. These frames are tacit which means that they are 
exempt from conscious attention and reasoning. This empirical chapter utilises the HS2 
debate as a case for understanding how policy actors engage in framing to persuade their 
audience to accept their point of view on contested issues. The reason for choosing this 
example is because proposed mega-projects frequently give rise to prolonged disputes 
between actors. Within a mega-project it is inevitable that there are a wide range of actors 
with a number of different values and opinions about why the project should be built, what its 
purpose should be and how it should be delivered. These actors also bring different expertise 
to the project and levels of understanding vary.  
 
In chapter three the differences between a policy disagreement and a policy controversy were 
discussed.  A policy disagreement indicates differences between parties that can be resolved 
by examining and evaluating scientific evidence and a policy controversy refers to gaps 
between parties that cannot be solved solely by appealing to data (Schön and Rein, 1994). 
Policy controversies emerge where mutually incompatible policy frames compete to define a 
given issue and to dictate the policy responses to it. They are considered immune to 
resolution by appeal to the evidence and tend to be obdurate, long-term and are rarely 
resolved. Frames affect conflicts by determining how people define issues and they influence 
preferences for dispute resolution. For example, a person’s frame within HS2 influences their 
preference for how to solve the capacity issue on the current rail network. HS2 can be 
considered a policy controversy because it is a long-term debate and one that has so far 
eluded resolution. It is highly polarised and involves a complex array of stakeholders. The 
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first section of the chapter explains why HS2 is considered a policy controversy rather than a 
debate as distinguished by Schon and Rein (1994). The second part of the chapter focuses on 
how policy actors have framed the controversy followed by an in-depth review of the 
evidential resources that they draw on. The purpose of this is to identify whether or not policy 
actors of certain frames rely on particular types of evidence which they will then use to make 
claims.  
 
7.2 A new high speed line on the political agenda  
The emphasis of early feasibility studies for a new high speed line between 2001 to 2004 was 
that a new railway line would need to be constructed in order to meet demand on the current 
West Coast Main Line (WCML). However, the Labour Government at the time chose not to 
pursue this particular policy. The Eddington report (2006) assessed all modes of transports 
and concluded that although investment in high speed rail was recommended, it did not 
suggest that a high speed rail link would be the most cost-effective option to obtain higher 
capacity on the rail network and therefore should not be built. It was not until 2007 that the 
Labour Government acknowledged the findings of a proposal from Greengauge 2121, led by 
Jim Steer, for High Speed Two. It evaluated options for high-speed rail in the UK and 
recommended an £11 billion route from London St Pancras and Heathrow to Birmingham 
and the North West, which they christened ‘HS2’.  
 
Whilst one report recommended a new line be constructed, in July 2007, the Transport 
Secretary at the time delivered a white paper on the future of the railways 
(http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk). The report outlined the government's strategic 
plan for the railways until 2037. It overlooked high-speed rail options, the government opting 
                                                          
21
 Greengauge 21 was established in 2006 as a not for profit company with an interest in HSR. The company 
seeks to carry out research and bring forward evidence so that a full and open debate on HSR can take place.  
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instead for "further study" stating that freight lines were too expensive. What these studies 
tell us is that there were mixed opinions about whether or not a new high speed network was 
viable or cost-effective and if it would solve issues on the current rail network prior to the 
decision to proceed with HS2. This means that whoever was involved with deciding to 
construct HS2 believed that it was the most suitable option. What we may never know is their 
underlying motivations for proceeding. They may have genuinely believed that it was the best 
option or they may have wanted to leave a legacy and be known for building the biggest 
transport mega-project in years. Either way, from reviewing the literature it is clear that the 
main driver for research within these studies was to increase capacity on the current rail 
network.  
 
A key event occurred in 2008 when Parliament approved the Climate Change Act (2008). It 
established the ‘world’s first legally binding climate change target’ stating that they ‘aim to 
reduce the UK’s greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80% (from the 1990 baseline) by 2050’ 
(www.gov.uk). This is significant within the HS2 debate because this Act required 
Governments to reduce their carbon emissions. One of the ways in which they could do this 
is to reduce the amount of freight on our roads by transferring it to rail. The current rail 
network is unable to increase freight use due to lack of capacity and building a new line may 
resolve this issue. This Act was shortly followed in 2009 by the publishing of a study by 
Greengauge 21 into high speed rail which was far more extensive than other proposals and it 
called for a full, integrated high-speed network totalling around 1500 kilometres. On the 11th 
March, 2010, a high speed rail link from London to the Midlands and the North was 
announced by the government based on suggestions made in the 2009 Greengauge 21 study. 
It is unclear whether or not the Climate Act acted as a catalyst for the project or the decision 
to build HS2 was already taken and it added support for the decision.  
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7.3 Framing and reframing within HS2  
This section identifies the most documented ways in which the debate about HS2 has been 
framed by those involved that are for and against the project. It does this by firstly exploring 
the ways in which those for the project frame the controversy including a discussion about 
the types of evidential resources they draw on. Then the way in which those opposed to the 
project is explored. The purpose of this is to investigate whether the way in which a person 
frames a debate impacts on the types of evidential resources they draw on and the claims they 
make within the policy process.  
 
7.3.1 Economic-developmentalism 
Although increasing capacity has been the dominant argument used by those in favour of 
HS2, for some individuals the secondary arguments or supporting claims are centred on 
economic growth, productivity and competitiveness. They claimed that constructing the new 
high speed network will lead to almost 25,000 full-time jobs being created (Temple ERM, 
2013) with other published analysis estimating that HS2 will create 50,000 jobs at its peak 
(Greengauge 21, 2013). Both studies relied on alternative methodologies to reach their 
estimations. Another economic argument presented by those in favour is that the new high-
speed line will bridge the perceived economic divide between the north and south of the 
country. The North-South divide refers to the cultural and economic differences between the 
South of England, in particular the South East, and the North of England. It has been argued 
that the gap between the two areas in terms of life expectancy and economic trends has grown 
to the extent that they are almost separate countries (The Economist, 2012). A report 
published by KPMG in 2013 entitled ‘High Speed Two Limited: HS2 Regional Economic 
Impacts’ suggested that the Midlands and the North of England will benefit more than 
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London from the project (HS2 Ltd, 2013b). The report estimated that the total annual 
productivity impacts for Great Britain in 2037 after investment in HS2 (2013 prices) will be 
£15 billion (HS2 Ltd, 2013b). Their analysis concluded that ‘the productivity benefits accrue 
to all regions, with strong gains in the Midlands and the North. Though Greater London does 
well, it is not at the expense of everywhere else. Areas outside Greater London and the Phase 
Two city regions account for around half of the total forecast increase in Britain’s economic 
output’ (HS2 Ltd, 2013b:56). Their findings show positive effects on the North of England, 
however, the conclusions are based on a wide range of assumptions as planning of Phase 2 of 
the project is yet to be finalised.  
 
Initially one of the key arguments put forward by those in favour of the project was the value 
that decision-makers should place on time-saved by using high-speed trains to reduce journey 
times. They claimed that the value these decision-makers should place on time-saved should 
be high based on the assumption that business travellers did not work on the train. By 
reducing time spent on the train it was suggested that people could spend more time working. 
It did not take into account the increase in use of mobile phones and laptops and availability 
of Wi-Fi on trains that meant more and more people are now able to work whilst on trains. In 
the early development of the project, research focused on journey time savings. HS2 Limited 
claimed that ‘by applying the values of working and non‐working time…we calculate the 
average benefit to each rail passenger between London and the West Midlands region at 
around £6.70 per trip in 2009 values and prices as a result of the journey time savings’ (HS2 
Ltd, 2011:8). However, by 2013 documents published in favour of HS2 mentioned that 
journey times will be reduced but do not emphasise it as being one of the key arguments for 
building the new high-speed line. This is partly due to increased criticism by those in 
opposition about what the value for time-saved should be. This can be identified as what Rein 
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and Schon referred to as reframing. Reframing is the ‘process of changing the way a thought 
is presented so that it maintains its fundamental meaning but is more likely to support 
resolution efforts’ (Sprangler, 2003). 
 
These examples indicate that there are a number of arguments framed around economic 
growth which the thesis labels as the economic-developmentalism frame. This means that 
framing of HS2 is concerned with economic growth, productivity and competiveness 
constitutes the foremost and single-minded priority. Their arguments attempted to show that 
by building HS2 certain areas will see an increase in the economic output and more jobs 
could become available to residents. Those who have framed the issue of HS2 in this way 
tend to have business interests. Examples of groups considered to be economic-
developmentalists include the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce, Atkins, KPMG, Arup 
and Marketing Birmingham. They do not focus as much on the environmental impact of the 
project but prefer to frame the issue in a way that shows HS2 as an opportunity for growth 
and claim that if it is not built that the UK economy could become stagnated, therefore, the 
only solution is to build HS2. The evidential resources that these actors usually rely on 
consist of forecast models and estimations. Historically, demand and growth forecasts for 
large infrastructure projects have been inaccurate (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003) so depending on 
these for evidence may not be the best support for their claims. Some of the problems 
associated with ex-ante appraisal include problems with modelling, anticipating the future 
and behaviours and using methodologies with large elements of subjectivity. In particular, 
cost benefit analysis which may include putting monetary values on things which are not 
bought or sold such as travellers’ time or loss of landscape.  
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7.3.2 Ecological Modernisation 
There are also a number of actors within the policy debate of HS2  who are less concerned 
with the monetary benefits the new high speed line could bring and more concerned about 
having the ability to connect smoothly and efficiently across the United Kingdom. They are 
particularly interested in promoting sustainable development as a central story line with the 
emphasis being on how areas can be regenerated and existing structures improved by 
constructing HS2. The concept of sustainable development is an approach to development 
‘that looks to balance different, and often competing, needs against an awareness of the 
environmental, social and economic limitations we face as a society’ (www.sd-
commission.org.uk). It does not just focus on the environment; it is about ensuring a strong 
society that meets the needs of people now and in the future whilst promoting wellbeing and 
inclusion. Living within ones environmental limits is one of the central principles of the 
concept. An implication of not doing so is climate change. Following the Climate Act,2008, 
placed a duty on the Secretary of State to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80 percent 
below than the 1990 baseline by 2050 there has been a focus on these targets in related 
policies to meet the reduction targets. This has had an effect on transport policy in the UK 
which has led to an interest in projects that will either be carbon neutral or reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions. Some of the ways in which they suggested this can be achieved is to reduce 
domestic air travel, provide better public transport options for the public and to reduce the 
amount of freight on our roads. Promoters of HS2 argued that the new rail network ‘can be 
part of a low carbon transport system in the UK that will allow us to meet the climate change 
targets established in the Climate Change Act’ (HS2 Ltd, 2013b). They claimed that HS2 will 
free capacity on the WCML thus creating more capacity for freight which will reduce road 
use. They also claimed that HS2 will reduce domestic air travel as it will provide an 
alternative and fast way to travel between certain cities. They went on to argue that those 
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opposed are merely ‘NIMBYs’ (not in my back yard) who are basing their arguments on 
environmental impacts when instead they are concerned about the effect the line will have on 
their house prices (Dominiczak, 2014). This frame has been labelled ecological 
modernisation. 
 
Examples of groups that adopted this frame include some local authorities such as 
Birmingham City Council, the Campaign to Protect Rural England, the Royal Society for the 
Protection of Birds, and the Campaign for Better Transport. Framing the issue in this way has 
led to these groups pursuing evidence that suggests HS2 will support sustainable 
development and improve our living environment.  In September 2013 the Birmingham 
Economy & Jobs and Transport, Connectivity and Sustainability Overview and Scrutiny 
(O&S) committees joined together to undertake a joint review entitled ‘High Speed Two: 
Maximising the Impact for Birmingham’. The key lines of enquiry focused on exploring 
how Birmingham and the West Midlands could maximise the benefits available from the 
project such as opportunities related to sustainability and the natural urban environment as 
well as design, heritage and culture. They also investigated not only this project but how 
plans for other local transport links could benefit and develop from HS2. Their evidential 
resources came from a number of different sources submitted to them in the form of two 
‘Evidence Packs’ which were used in scrutiny meetings. Within the responses there was a 
great deal of economic data which did not necessarily answer the lines of enquiry. Some 
responses contained expert opinion and the smaller groups referred to local knowledge and 
design studies. One group that presented evidence is the Campaign for better Transport. It is 
considered one of the leading authorities on sustainable transport. They argued that the 
‘Government’s plans for High Speed rail can help meet carbon emissions targets - but only if 
supported by a set of bold policy initiatives which are not currently in place’ 
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(www.bettertransport.org.uk) and it must be part of a wider transport strategy. Other actors 
within this frame included Kathryn Moore, a professor of landscape architecture from the 
Institute of Art and Design at Birmingham City University. She published a report that 
investigates what the opportunities are with HS2 for landscape, spatial development, 
conservation and urban regeneration. The report synthesised three studies:  
 HS2LV: REINVENTING THE REGION, a spatial, conceptual proposal devised over 
18 months to transform what is in effect, a singular, linear engineering project into an 
iconic landscape infrastructure (see attached proposal note). 
 The forthcoming article “How can new and redeveloped stations on the UK’s 
proposed HS2 line add value to the surrounding landscape?” (Moore, 2014), 
published in the 2014 Annual Report for “Railway Terminal World” (available Nov 
25th 2013); and 
 DVD HS2LV REINVENTING THE REGION (produced by Arup and Kathryn 
Moore, October 2012) 
(Birmingham City Council, 2013:1) 
The evidential resources that this frame draws on are rather varied. This is because they are 
concerned with both the economic aspects of the project and the environmental ones. They 
claimed that the project should be designed and built but it should be done so in a way that is 
considerate of the surrounding landscape and not at its expense. Not only did they cite some 
of the same arguments as the economic-developmentalists, they also presented claims that 
indicate the project will have a positive effect on the environment by providing regeneration 
to areas and value to spaces near to the train line. This means that design and planning studies 
as well as environmental impact data become relevant sources of evidence.  
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7.3.3 Economic Modernisation 
There are also a number of actors within the project of HS2 who are keen to promote the new 
high speed line because they claim the current railway network is in desperate need of 
modernisation as it is struggling to cope with the pressure of increased capacity. Due to the 
network being over 170 years old, and being the most intensively-operated railway line in 
Europe, they claim that the old infrastructure cannot cope with the increasing demands on it 
and that modernising our infrastructure with a new high speed line is the best solution (HS2: 
The People’s Railway, 2013). The empirical data indicates that people with a career in the 
rail industry are most likely to adopt this frame which in this research is labelledeconomic 
modernisation. They framed the debate in a way that emphasises the economic benefits as 
the previous frames do but also stress that there are a number of other benefits to be gained 
from constructing a new HSR network such as ‘catching up’ with our competitors and 
becoming leaders in HSR. They also claimed that it is an opportunity for new technology to 
become part of our ageing transport infrastructure which relates to the modernisation part of 
the frame. When interviewing actors that have framed the debate in this way they all recited 
their experience of dealing first hand with the pressures of an ageing rail network. For 
example, one interview said that: 
 
‘we have a rail network that was built by the Victorians, we need to move with the times and 
realise that it isn’t going to work forever. We need a new line’ 
(Interviewee 5, retired engineer) 
 
They argued that a culmination of things have led to the need for a new high speed line such 
as privatisation in the 1980s, the closing of several train lines and a lack of funding being 
spent on the current infrastructure. Interviewee 7 said: 
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‘they (the government) privatised the railways in the eighties which was possibly the worst 
thing they could have done. That and closing lots of the lines, well they need to open some 
again in my opinion and build some new ones’ 
(Interviewee 7, anti HS2 campaigner) 
 
No other group of individuals referred to historical information such as this in order to 
support their claims. These individuals are relying on their experiences of working within the 
rail industry as evidence and often refer to passenger ridership figures to stress the urgency 
that something needs to happen sooner rather than later. Other evidence is often sourced in 
the form of secondary data from case studies of other countries and their networks. The three 
countries that are usually referred to include Spain, France and Japan. They are deemed 
successful by HS2 Ltd in having a high speed rail network that promotes regeneration and 
development. The HS2 Ltd report that centres its investigation on these three countries refers 
to them as ‘competitors’, arguing that the UK is far behind them in terms of rail 
infrastructure. In 2012 the Rt Hon Justine Greening MP (Secretary of State for Transport) 
said in a report produced by the DfT (2012c) entitled ‘High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s 
Future – Decisions and Next Steps’: 
 
‘Looking around the world, the evidence is clear – nation after nation is planning, 
constructing or already using high rail speed lines. High speed rail is transforming their 
societies and their economies. Self-imposed exile from this new frontier in travel would mean 
that Britain loses out, while our global competitors gain. We face a straightforward choice. 
We can take the short-term option – leaving our rail networks over-stretched and over-
burdened and risk paying the price in lost business, lower growth and fewer jobs. Or we can 
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take the long-term option – investing in our global competiveness and our economic 
prosperity by pursuing high speed rail. High speed rail can transform our rail network in the 
same way that the motorways have transformed our road network’ 
(DfT, 2012c:5) 
The economic-modernisers did not agree with the argument that it is possible to upgrade 
existing lines and open old ones in order to deal with the capacity issue. They believed that 
the only solution is to build a new line and that it ‘may as well be’ a high speed one. As 
mentioned previously, the key issue that all frames centre on is how to increase capacity on 
the current rail network, in particular, on the WCML. All policy actors within HS2 agreed 
that there is a lack of capacity but they had different beliefs about how we should solve the 
issue. Economic-developmentalists and economic-modernisers preferred to discuss the 
economic benefits that can be gained from increasing capacity on the current network. They 
see the ‘existing capacity of our transport networks as a significant inhibitor of demand’ (HS2 
Ltd, 2013:11). The ecological-modernisers tended to cite arguments based on the benefits of 
improving connectivity between major cities when discussing capacity.  Now the chapter 
focuses on the frames that are against HS2. 
7.3.4 Eco-centric Environmentalism 
There appeared to be two main groups of actors that were opposed to the project: those that 
are concerned with the negative environmental impact the project may cause and those that 
claim HS2 is not the most economical way to increase capacity on the current rail network. 
The frame that centres on an environmental point of view in this research is labelled eco-
centric environmentalism, in other words, the conservation of nature. It has been argued 
that ‘seven Sites of Special Scientific Interest (the very best of our wild places), three 
Wildlife Trust nature reserves, 66 Local Wildlife Sites and 25 proposed Local Wildlife Sites 
182 
 
are all directly affected and will be damaged or destroyed by the line for Phase 1 between 
London and Birmingham. A further 92 wildlife sites are indirectly affected’ 
(http://www.wildlifetrusts.org/hs2). These figures do not include the expected number of 
wildlife sites damaged by phase two of the project. Eco-centric environmentalists argued that 
the economic benefits of constructing HS2 do not outweigh the negative effects it would have 
on the environment and that these natural habitats and unspoilt ecosystems are irreplaceable. 
They also argued that the project will not reduce carbon emissions as suggested and that it 
will create a great deal of noise pollution. HS2 Ltd published their ‘Environmental Impact 
Assessment’ in 2013 which was required by law and Parliamentary rules to accompany the 
Hybrid Bill. HS2 Ltd’s aim is to ensure that, during construction of the project significant 
adverse environmental effects will either be avoided or mitigated.  
 
Unsurprisingly, groups that framed the debate in this way are often environmental or wildlife 
groups as well as people concerned with the conservation of particular heritage sites. 
Examples include the Chiltern Society, the Wildlife Trusts and English Heritage. For these 
groups, evidential resources often come in the form of visual aids and secondary data 
analysis. Supporters of HS2 have already declared that the project will take a particular route 
so these groups are tasked with identifying what will be affected by the new train line. They 
do not have to spend a great deal of money on research in order to demonstrate what the 
negative environmental impacts will be. What they must do though is have the ability to 
persuade others that we should value the environment more than expected economic benefits. 
Local residents along the proposed route of HS2 also tended to adopt this particular frame in 
order to shape arguments and claims as this is the most accessible for them. They are unlikely 
to gain support for arguments based on self-interested reasons such as depreciating house 
prices and so must adopt a way in which to frame their disagreement that will persuade others 
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to frame the issue in the same way. For these people, evidential resources comein the form of 
local (and tacit) knowledge.  In interviews they stressed that they wished to conduct their own 
research but that they just could not afford to: 
 
‘There are some things on which we wouldn’t mind doing that like we wouldn’t mind 
commissioning our own noise studies which we don’t believe the HS2 limited ones but so far 
we haven’t found the money to do that or indeed the expertise I mean I’m sure we could 
but…’ 
 (Anti HS2 campaigner, interviewee 1) 
In regards to issues of the environment and HS2 local residents are at less of a disadvantage 
in terms of evidential resources. They had local knowledge of their areas that they can draw 
on as well as the evidence base of environmental groups and the impact of infrastructure 
projects. Although much of the scientific and technical data is specific to HS2, the 
environmental impact of the project is not dissimilar to other large infrastructure projects. 
The train line will cross through a number of ancient woodlands and wildlife habitats and this 
will have a negative impact on the environment. The only defence that HS2 Ltd and their 
supporters can use is that they will try to minimise the negative environmental impact. This is 
potentially why many of those opposing the project adopted the environmental discourse 
because it is the one that they can most easily defend and the evidential resources are more 
accessible and persuasive. 
 
7.3.5 Economic-environmentalists 
Another frame identified within the empirical data has been labelled economic-. These actors 
were concerned with not only the negative environmental impacts the project may have but 
they also argued that the best way to solve the capacity issue is to improve existing train lines 
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and not build a new rail network. They based this on both economic and environmental 
arguments. These actors claimed that the forecasts for future demand on our railways can be 
met by lengthening trains, decreasing the number of first class carriages and increasing the 
length of train platforms. They have relied heavily on the research conducted for other high 
speed rail projects which they consider to have been not so successful as well as critiques of 
evidence that supports the project such as the report entitled ‘High Speed Fail’ (Hawkins, 
2011) and the Institute of Economic Affairs report entitled ‘The High Speed Gravy Train’ 
(Wellings, 2013). Both these reports took data produced by HS2 Ltd and attempt to find 
faults with the economic modelling and the methodologies used. By decreasing the expected 
benefits of HS2 they were able to argue that updating the current railways will be adequate to 
solve the capacity issue. They also referred to lesser known research reports that are 
concerned with the viability of re-opening old lines. In the 1980s and 1990s several train lines 
were closed but could still be operational if re-opened. They believe this, combined with the 
upgrading of existing lines, will meet the demand for extra capacity. Whilst those in favour 
argued that demand will continue to increase, economic-environmentalists claimed that 
demand will only increase for a few years and then it will remain the same because less 
people will use public transport and travel for work. Just as those arguing in favour rely on 
international case studies as evidence for successful HSR projects, economic-
environmentalists also refer to these case studies but interpret them in different ways due to 
their framing of the issue and claim that they have been failures, rather than success stories. 
The empirical data indicates that there is one main account of what the problem is (lack of 
capacity) and a number of different solutions that are warranted. Whether or not a new train 
line is needed has been at the centre of this debate. From Schon and Rein’s (1994) definition 
it is clear that the case of HS2 can be categorised as a policy controversy. This is because in a 
policy controversy, two or more parties contend with one another over the definition of the 
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problem and vie for control of the policy-making process. Typically, these actors enter into 
the process on the basis of their interests in the policy situation. For example, companies such 
as KPMG and Atkins may be attracted by an opportunity for profitable development and 
local residents along the line of route may be concerned about the effect on house prices that 
the project may have. Each frame has constructed its view of social reality through a process 
of naming and framing. They described what is wrong with the present situation of capacity 
on the current rail network in such a way as to set the direction for its future path. From a 
problematic situation that is rich and complex such as HS2, each frame ‘selects and names 
different features and relations that become the “things” of their story’ (Schon and Rein, 
1994:26). This thesis  also focuses on whether different groups or frames use different types 
of evidence to supplement arguments. The types of ‘evidence’ that were presented to support 
various claims were categorised into a number of different groups. They included statistical 
or numerical data which comprised presentations of numeric data or other statistics including 
mentions of statistical analyses such as passenger ridership figures. Economic models include 
mostly cost benefit analyses and demand/growth forecasts. Anecdotal or personal experience 
included evidence offered in the form of personal narratives, whereas prior experience with a 
particular area such as the rail industry or engineering industry was intended to capture 
discussion of an experience from a career perspective rather than a personal experience. 
Study results captured non-specific mentions of studies and their results and expert opinion 
refers to any time another actor was referred to as being a credible source of information. 
Below is a table that identifies the main features in each of the frames that are composed 
from interview transcripts as well as the evidential resources that they refer to: 
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 Economic 
developmentalism 
Ecological 
modernisation 
Economic 
modernisation 
Eco-centric 
environmentalism 
Economic 
environmentalism 
 
 
Features 
 
Capacity, growth, 
connectivity, 
speed, 
competitiveness 
 
 
 
 
 
Capacity, 
connectivity, 
regeneration, 
sustainable 
development 
 
Capacity,  
modernisation, 
technology, 
competitiveness 
 
Capacity, 
conservation of the 
environment 
 
Capacity, 
alternatives, 
growth, 
sustainable 
development 
Evidential 
resources 
Statistics, numeric 
data, economic 
modelling, expert 
opinion, study 
results 
Environmental 
study results, 
Statistics, 
numeric data, 
economic 
modelling, prior 
experience of 
regeneration and 
sustainable 
development 
Statistics, 
numeric data, 
prior experience 
of working in the 
rail industry 
Anecdotal/personal 
experience, 
environmental 
study results 
 
Counter-claims to 
the numeric data of 
economic 
developmentalists 
Statistics, numeric 
data, 
environmental 
study results, 
expert opinion 
(primarily 
engineers and rail 
industry workers) 
 
(Table 4: Frame features and evidential resources they draw on) 
These are not the only types of evidence and features within each of these frames, however, 
they were the most documented for each group as identified in the empirical data. The vast 
majority of evidence used by frames in favour of HS2 is used to support scientific, economic, 
and implementation claims. Those with a background in economics preferred statistical and 
numerical data. Organisations, in particular HS2 Ltd, have produced a disproportionately 
large amount of the evidence that is cited within this case study. They have access to funding, 
resources and expert advice which has meant they have been able to conduct research to 
produce evidence that is specifically centred on this project. Those against HS2 relied 
primarily on personal stories and anecdotal experience as evidence. They referred to local 
knowledge of the area in which they live to highlight the negative environmental impact the 
project could have. In terms of statistical, numerical data and study results they were limited 
in resources. There are only a small number of documents published that criticise the 
economic data presented by those in favour which are mostly written by economists that 
disagree with the methods and approaches used in the economic models. These are 
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considered to be primarily made up of counter-claims rather than new ones. Opposition 
groups also depend on referring to case studies of other countries that have high speed rail 
and have selected evidence that suggests it is not very successful. This put the opposition at a 
disadvantage in terms of evidential resources. However, it has not stopped these opposition 
frames from making any less claims and arguments than those in favour of the project. They 
have received just as much, if not more media coverage throughout the process and have also 
been allowed to attend Select Committee meetings in order to petition against the project.  
In the dominant school of policy studies, evidence is seen as a tool for grounding policy in 
fact and reason and guarding against the political agendas of policy actors (Banks, 2009; 
Stoker, 2010). Within framing theory, the role of evidence is to legitimise the claims being 
presented by the policy actors and shape public consciousness about the issue of capacity. 
This view is in disagreement with the evidence-based policy making model that suggests 
actors seek evidence to make better informed decisions. What the interview data from the 
case study has shown is that these frames are resistant to refutation by appeals to evidence. 
Almost all of those interviewed that did not support the project made it clear that they did not 
accept the majority of evidence being presented by those in favour and attempted to either 
discredit it or dismiss it as being irrelevant. They went as far as accusing HS2 Ltd of lying in 
order to persuade their audience:  
‘…they lie, they deceive, they’re economical with the truth, they’re not straight forward’ 
(Anti HS2 campaigner, interviewee 1) 
A person may not be intentionally dishonest; they may simply be interpreting data differently 
to another person. As Schon and Rein argued, ‘those who construct the social reality of a 
situation through one frame can always ignore or reinterpret the “facts” that holders of a 
second frame present as decisive counter-evidence to the first’ (Schon and Rein, 1994:30). 
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Evidence is not objective, it is subjected to interpretation by competing frames and it is 
possible as we shall see in the next chapter for one frame to reinterpret “facts” and present a 
counter claim that is supported by the same evidence.  
A frame impacts on the types of evidence a person relies on. However, from analysing this 
case it appeared that resources are a more significant factor. Those against the project were at 
a disadvantage in terms of finance and access expertise which means they were unable to 
produce as much evidence as those in favour of the project. This did not appear to  weaken 
their argument or lead to them presenting fewer claims in the policy process. A comparison 
of the process of production and the framing of the initial policy problems suggests that 
evidence plays an important role in problem-framing. The analysis presented here suggests 
that evidence has little bearing in situations where there is frame conflict amongst different 
policy actors and communities. A policy solution is likely to ‘make sense’ to most interested 
parties provided they share a common diagnosis of the problem. The role of evidence, then, is 
not to fix or solve policy problems, as rational-actor policy models suggest. Instead, its role is 
to help construct a common ‘frame’ through which meaning is applied and resolution sought. 
Although much evidence has been used throughout HS2, it has been done so selectively. It 
appears that what each side sought was a warrant and backing to strengthen its own case. In 
situations of frame conflict between policy communities, the political stakes are higher and 
policies become politicised. In these situations, evidence is more likely to be used selectively 
for political gain than might otherwise be the case in less contested policy domains.  
7.4 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the ways in which policy actors within HS2 frame the debate by 
identifying a number of different frames and their features. By focusing on the evidence that 
is presented by each frame it is possible to make some inferences about the inclination of 
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particular frames to particular types of evidence. For example, those who frame the policy in 
an economic-developmentalist way tended to select numerical and statistical data. Whereas 
those opposed to the project that live along the line of route selected anecdotal and personal 
experience. This may be due to their paradigmatic approach but it is more likely that it is due 
to their resources. Those opposed stressed  in their interview that they wanted to conduct 
empirical research that consisted of numerical data but they did not have the funding. This 
desire to produce quantitative data suggests that within policy-making quantitative data is 
considered more valuable than local knowledge. The most important finding from this 
research so far is that it appears the quality of evidence is not as important in the policy-
making process as some models would like us to believe such as the evidence-based policy 
making model. What matters is whether or not the evidence is in agreement with the frame of 
an actor and their argument. Those opposed to the project are unwilling to accept the cost-
benefit analysis of the project that suggests the economic benefits outweigh environmental 
damage it will cause because of the value they place on the landscape. So the decision-
making process is not about finding the highest quality evidence to support decisions which 
legitimises them; it becomes about who is better at presenting a believable argument that will 
persuade others their claims are more agreeable. The next chapter uses Toulmin’s model of 
argumentation to deconstruct some of the key arguments within HS2 in order to identify the 
evidence and claims. From this deconstruction it then explores how the evidence is negotiated 
with other actors through a process of claims-making. This involves considering what 
environments they negotiate with one another in, what outlets they use to present claims and 
in what way.  
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Chapter 8 
Negotiating the evidence through a process of claims-making 
8.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter different frames utilised by policy actors within HS2 and the effect 
that these frames have on the types of evidential resources these actors draw on were 
identified. This chapter focuses its attention on the way in which these forms of evidence are 
negotiated through a process of claims-making. Firstly, Toulmin’s refined model of 
argumentation is used to deconstruct a number of key arguments put forward by those in 
favour and those against the project. The purpose of this was to demonstrate the justification 
for the alteration made to the model in the theoretical chapter. Also it supports the argument 
that claims-makers select and interpret evidence rather than accepting it at face value as 
Toulmin suggests. In other words, evidence is a tool for both legitimising claims and 
decisions and persuading an audience that a particular course of action is the most suitable. 
The claims that the model is applied to are as follows: 
Claim 1 There is insufficient capacity on the current 
rail network to meet demand 
Claim 2 High Speed Two will create over 50,000 jobs 
Claim 3 HS2 will generate significant carbon benefits 
Claim 4 Improving the current network will meet 
demand so there will be sufficient capacity 
Claim 5 Building HS2 will not bridge the North/South 
divide  
Claim 6 HS2 will cause overwhelming and 
irreversible damage to the environment 
 
(Table 5: Claims addressed in chapter) 
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Secondly, the chapter explores how evidence is negotiated between claims-makers in 
different policy environments. Data was gathered from the community meeting in Castle 
Vale, interview transcripts, news articles from Google Alerts and the scrutiny review 
conducted by Birmingham City Council. This provides a number of different arenas in which 
policy actors must select evidence in order to present claims. A feature of the framework that 
enriches our analysis of this case study and the policy process in general is the recognition of 
an audience. A good claims-maker will have mastered the art of appealing to a range of 
audiences, shaping and presenting their evidence in a way that best suits their audience. The 
concept of evidence-based policy making does not acknowledge the role of humans in this 
sense. For example, if HS2 Ltd have to present their case to policy makers they are likely to 
emphasise the economic benefits of HS2 and present rigorous, quantitative evidence. If they 
were at a public meeting where residents affected by the high speed rail link were in 
attendance then they would be more likely to present claims and evidence that appeal to this 
audience. So it is not necessarily about having the ‘best’ evidence, it is about whether or not 
actors are able to appeal to their audience and persuade them of their case. By exploring a 
number of different environments some conclusions can be drawn about the difference in 
audiences and the effects they have on the way in which actors present claims and the 
evidence they refer to. Some conclusions are also made about the nature of evidence within 
transport mega-projects, in particular, the planning stages.  
8.2 Deconstructing the arguments 
8.2.1 Supporting claims for HS2 
There are several arguments that have been presented by those who are in favour of HS2. The 
first claim presented is: 
There is insufficient capacity on the current rail network to meet demand 
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This claim is considered as being probably the most important in terms of justifying why a 
new high speed network should be built. As mentioned in the previous chapter the key issue 
for this policy is the perceived lack of capacity on the current rail network and the action that 
should be taken to solve the problem. Those in favour of HS2 were tasked with convincing 
their audience that building the new high speed line was the only viable solution. The 
evidence that they cited for this claim was to show firstly that there is indeed a capacity issue 
on the current network. They used passenger figures provided by the rail industry which 
provides a comprehensive database of every ticket sold, which allowed them to identify the 
station of origin and station of destination of the ticket, to determine whether this number has 
risen each year:  
 
Estimated Rail Demand 1950 – 2010 (HS2 Ltd, 2013:15) 
This graph demonstrates that rail demand has increased over the past sixty years between 
1950 and 2010 based on the database. What they must do is convince their audience that this 
demand will continue to increase over the next sixty years by using demand forecasting 
models. These models are ‘used to predict the demand to travel and, in many cases, to assess 
the impact of these forecasts on the level of service offered by the transport network. They 
‘are also used to estimate the impacts of changes in transport networks caused by investment 
in capacity or decisions about managing demand by means of pricing or other interventions’ 
(Worsley, 2012:3). There are a number of different models that can be used by analysts to 
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predict how many people will use the rail network. However, these are predictions and not 
considered factual. No one can determine exactly what the demand will be. However, those 
in favour of HS2 had to convince their audience that these forecasts are extremely likely and 
that ‘the existing capacity of our transport networks is a significant inhibitor of demand’ 
(HS2 Ltd, 2013a:11). The point being made is that the evidence is being interpreted to suit 
the claims-maker in this instance and they are choosing evidence that supports their claim. 
They are ignoring available evidence that suggests there is an alternative solution to solving 
the capacity issue on the WCML. If we were to apply the refined model of argumentation to 
this, it would be as follows: 
Evidence: Demand forecast model =    Claim: insufficient capacity to meet demand Rail 
demand expected to grow by 32%              
     
Warrant: If demand increases capacity will decrease (implicit) 
Each element of the model is identified. It shows that the evidence is interpreted in order to 
make the claim by introducing another arrow to the model. The claim is based on the 
assumption that rail travel will increase. As mentioned previously, actors within HS2 do not 
disagree that there is a capacity issue; they disagree on how much rail demand will increase 
by and the solution to the problem depending on the way in which they frame the issue. This 
can be considered a policy controversy because two or more parties are contending with one 
another over the definition of the problem and are vying for control of the policy-making 
process. Therefore it becomes a process of argument in which competing sides must convince 
their audience that their chosen resolution is the most agreeable.  
The next claim that the chapter explores is concerned with the expected number of jobs that 
the project could generate. An economic argument in favour of the project was based around 
the claim that building the new train line will create a large number of jobs. They argued that 
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there will be a number of employment opportunities during the construction phase and once 
the line is built there will be permanent jobs to maintain the train line and stations. One such 
claim (2) that was highly cited by these actors is as follows: 
High Speed Two will create over 50,000 jobs 
Estimates released in 2013 by HS2 Limited indicated that they believed while HS2 is being 
built it will create 24,600 full-time construction jobs and that other published analysis, using 
alternative methodologies, have estimated that, at its peak, HS2 will create 50,000 jobs, as 
illustrated in the graph below: 
 
Expected number of jobs created by project (HS2 Ltd, 2013b:29) 
The approach used here has been to estimate job calculations from ‘bottom up’ principles 
wherever possible. Detailed relationships have been developed between cost budgets, 
physical outputs, wage rates and employment, by type of job and skill level, drawing on a 
number of evidence sources and ‘coalface’ industry expertise. This includes the National 
Skills Academy for Railway Engineering’s published work on jobs and skills in the railway 
industry, as well as benchmark evidence from other High Speed Rail projects, including HS1 
and TGV. The approach work and outturn results were reviewed by Industry Leaders Group22 
                                                          
22
 UK companies brought together to create a ‘centre for excellence’ for high-speed rail. Some members include RIA, 
Atkins, Bechtel, Carillion, CH2M Hill, Parsons Brinckerhoff and Siemens. 
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(ILG) member organisations and been refined in light of such. Once again, similarly to cost-
benefit analyses, these job calculations are merely estimates of potential jobs that may be 
created if the project goes ahead. Different methodologies would produce different 
conclusions because they include different factors and the weight that they give to these 
factors varies. Opposition to the project selected different sources of evidence and argued that 
HS2 will end up ‘destroying more jobs than it creates’ (Gilligan, 2013). So once again these 
actors must persuade their audience that their arguments are the most convincing through 
selecting particular supporting evidence. The refined model according to the Toulmin might 
look like so: 
E: Analyses of major civil engineering projects =     C: Building HS2 will create 50,000 jobs 
Job forecast model 
   W: Building a Transport Mega Project creates jobs 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, ecological-modernisationists were concerned with 
sustainable development and potential environmental benefits that the project may create 
rather than focusing on the possible economic benefits. Although the project was not 
designed with the intention of reducing carbon emissions (Environmental Audit Committee, 
2014), because of the Climate Act 2008 there has been a focus on the environmental impact 
the project will have. HS2 Ltd set up a low carbon focus group to ‘explore sustainable 
construction options and to help define HS2 Ltd's design approach to ensure efficient 
delivery, innovation and the realisation of carbon savings’ (HS2 Ltd, 2013b:48). In 2011, the 
Transport Select Committee concluded that ‘at best, HS2 has the potential to make a small 
contribution to the Government’s carbon-reduction targets’ (HoC Transport Committee, 
2012:54). They argued that it could nonetheless produce less carbon than alternative 
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capacity-enhancing solutions such as expanding the motorway network or increased reliance 
on domestic flights. Comparing high speed rail to other forms of transport, Greengauge 
claimed in their fact sheet that:  
‘If HS2 was available for use today, the carbon emissions arising from making a trip by high-
speed rail (HSR) would be 73% lower than making the equivalent journey by car and 76% 
lower than flying’ 
(2012:2) 
It has been suggested that although freight will not use the new high speed line, building HS2 
will free up capacity on the WCML for freight which will lead to less lorries on UK roads 
which in turn leads to a reduction in carbon emissions. Claim 3 is presented as follows: 
HS2 will generate significant carbon benefits 
The way in which claims-makers defended this claim was to mostly appeal to environmental 
impact studies. Calculations presented in HS2 Ltd’s environmental statement (2013) 
suggested that ‘when juxtaposed against the UK’s projected carbon footprint for 2030, the 
emissions from the HS2 scheme would amount to 0.15% of the UK’s overall annual 
emissions’ (HS2, 2013b:57). Their predictions were based on a number of different 
assumptions such as what type of track will be used, how long the construction phase could 
take, and how many tunnels and viaducts there will be. Until construction begins there is no 
way to know for sure what will happen and what unexpected occurrences there will be. Based 
on the assumption that HS2 will create more capacity on the WCML for freight, the refined 
Toulmin model would be as follows: 
E: One freight train can move the     C: HS2 will generate significant carbon benefits 
same amount as 60 HGVs                
                    W: Freight will use the WCML   
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These examples of claims in favour of the project all share something in common which is 
that they are based on a number of assumptions. This is common in the planning and 
development stage of mega projects (Flyvbjerg, 2005). Rather than acknowledging their 
assumptions, policy actors within HS2 attempted to convince others that their argument is 
based on unquestionable evidence.  
8.2.2 Opposition claims to HS2 
This section of the chapter focuses on the claims presented by those opposed to the project. It 
presents three counter claims that mirror those above in terms of subject. One claim is about 
the capacity issue, another is about the economic effects of the project and the third relates to 
the potential environmental impact of the project. As mentioned earlier, capacity is the key 
issue within the HS2 debate and both sides have different views about how the problem 
should be solved. Those in favour believe building HS2 is the only viable solution whereas 
those against the project believe that there are ways of solving the problem without having to 
build a new high speed line. They claim (4) that: 
Improving the current network will meet demand so there will be sufficient capacity 
There were mixed opinions amongst those against HS2 as to what the most appropriate 
alternative should be but they believe these alternatives meet capacity requirements more 
effectively and more quickly than HS2. An opposition group argued that ‘alternatives to HS2 
indisputably more than meet even the Department for Transport’s optimistic rail forecasts and 
offer a better, low risk incremental option for future investment’ 
(www.hs2actionalliance.org). Probably the most commonly cited alternative is Atkin’s 
development in 2012 known as Rail Package 2. The improvements suggested in this package 
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were assessed at over twice the value for money of HS2 in 2012. Another option was 
developed by the opposition group 51M which improved on the DfT’s best alternative. It was 
called the ‘Optimised Alternative’ and would triple standard class capacity from a 2008 base 
and only cost a tenth of what the HS2 project would cost. However, those in favour disagreed 
that this option would create the capacity needed over the next thirty years. This issue of 
capacity becomes about who is able to better convince the audience that their solution is the 
better option. This claim would be presented like so in the refined Toulmin model: 
E: Longer platforms = longer trains                            C: Improving the current network will create                     
able to operate       sufficient capacity 
   
W: Increasing supply will meet demand 
 
Another claim put forward by those in favour of HS2 was that the project will decrease the 
perceived economic divide between the north and south of England. They argued that 
improving connectivity between major cities and reducing journey times will increase 
economic activity in places such as Manchester and Leeds. However, some people argued 
that the city that will benefit the most is London and ‘government claims for 
“transformational” benefits are based on belief, not impartial evidence’ 
(www.hs2actionalliance.org). The counter claim (5) presented by the opposition would be as 
follows: 
Building HS2 will not bridge the North/South divide  
There has been some disagreement between academics about this particular issue over 
whether high-speed rail helps or hinders deprived regions. The main type of evidence that 
actors from both sides drew on is to select examples of other HSR countries in which they 
believed a new high speed line has bridged an economic divide between regional areas. For 
example, Lille in France is considered to have improved economically since being connected 
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by HSR to Paris, whereas other cities such as Lyon have seen an increase in unemployment 
since the TGV line was built which is often referenced by those in opposition to the project 
(Waddell, 2014). Opposition groups argued that in France, Spain and South Korea the 
evidence suggested it is capitals that benefit by drawing more wealth to the centre. This could 
result in Birmingham becoming part of the South East labour market (Tomaney, 2013). 
Harford (2013) suggested that history does not support the claims being made by HS2 Ltd in 
terms of regeneration. Once again we see a mixed picture in which both sides of the argument 
were able to cite evidence from other case studies that suggest different outcomes. If we 
employ Toulmin’s refined model once again this is how the argument could look: 
E: HSR in France has not bridged the economic                      C: Building HS2 will not bridge the N/S divide 
divide between Paris and Lille 
          
W: There is an economic divide in the UK 
 
Other evidence that opposition groups referred to in relation to this claim are job creation 
estimates produced by HS2 Ltd and KPMG. They critiqued the methodologies employed by 
these groups and claimed that the assumptions made led to over-estimations of the economic 
benefits that will arise through the construction of a new high speed line. This is one example 
of many from the data identifying opposition groups challenging the methodologies used and 
assumptions made by those in favour of HS2. Their goal was to identify weaknesses in their 
argument because they are at a disadvantage in terms of evidential resources.   
 
What the key issue has been for those opposed to the project is the possible effects that HS2 
will have on the environment. It is undeniable that the construction of a new high speed line 
will impact the environment but the value placed on this differs amongst actors depending on 
their framing of HS2. Most of those in favour of the project argued that the economic benefits 
outweigh the environmental costs whereas those against believed the opposite. It is the task 
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of each side to persuade their audience that their evidence and argument is stronger than their 
opponent’s. Eco-centric environmentalists depended a great deal on local knowledge and 
expertise as an evidential source. Not only did environmental groups frame the issue in this 
way, but many local residents that live along the proposed route. They claimed (6) that: 
HS2 will cause overwhelming and irreversible damage to the environment 
After reviewing the proposed lines of route for phase one of the project opposition groups 
believed that ‘seven Sites of Special Scientific Interest (the very best of our wild places), 
three Wildlife Trust nature reserves, 66 Local Wildlife Sites and 25 proposed Local Wildlife 
Sites are all directly affected and will be damaged or destroyed by the line for Phase 1. A 
further 92 wildlife sites are indirectly affected’ (www.wildlifetrusts.org).  The map below 
identifies the sites that will be affected along phase one of the proposed line of route: 
 
Wildlife sites affected by the HS2 project (www.wildlifetrusts.org) 
Environmentalists were not satisfied with the environmental impact research that has been 
conducted by HS2 Ltd and argued that no value has been put on the potential lost output from 
farming or tourism during the construction and operation of HS2. The value placed on the 
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countryside that would be destroyed by tracks for HS2 is a mere £1 billion. This is extremely 
small in comparison to the estimates that suggested ‘HS2 could boost the economy by £15 
billion every year’ (DfT and HS2 Ltd, 2013:5). As mentioned above, those in favour of HS2 
were unable to argue that the project will not have a negative impact on the environment. 
Instead they stated that they will do whatever they can to reduce the damage that will be 
caused. The refined Toulmin model would look like so: 
E: 66 local wildlife sites are situated           C: HS2 will cause overwhelming and irreversible  
    on the line of phase one                                      damage to the environment 
 
W: People want to protect the environment 
 
We can see from these examples that High Speed Two is a highly contested policy 
controversy with little agreement over what course of action should be taken. They highlight 
how actors can frame an issue differently which in turn affects the evidential resources they 
use.  
The chapter now concentrates on one particular illustration of this by using the case of high 
speed rail in France. High speed rail was developed in France during the 1970s by Alstom 
and SNCF (Société nationale des chemins de fer français). The first service opened between 
Paris and Lyon in 1981 which was followed by the opening of several other high speed lines 
such as the LGV Atlantique, the LGV Méditerranée and the LGV Rhône-Alpes. There have 
not been a great deal of protests in France against the building of these train lines apart from 
some opposition to the construction of the LGV Méditerranée line as environmentalists 
argued that it was unnecessary. Other complaints have been from residents in towns and 
villages near the train lines which have led to the SNCF building acoustic fencing along large 
sections of the LGV to reduce noise pollution. Those in favour of building HS2 viewed 
France as a success story of high speed rail whereas those against building HS2 argued that it 
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is no longer successful and we should abandon our plans for a new line. The question then 
arises of how do these competing sides take the same example and use it as supporting 
evidence for their argument?  
By exploring what evidence they refer to we can see how they been selective in what they 
present and how they have interpreted it differently. Below is a table is taken from HS2 Ltd’s 
‘International Case Studies Review’ (2014) to highlight successful global HSR projects. The 
French examples indicate that passenger ridership on one line was higher than predicted, that 
four of France’s lines have positive ex-post financial return and that there has been a modal 
shift from air and road to rail travel. What this table does not include is evidence that suggests 
the TGV has seen a fall in passenger numbers since the economic crisis of 2008 with 
operating margins falling from 29% to just 12% in 2013 (Court of Auditors, 2014). It also 
does not include data that indicates ‘most of the lines are running at a loss and even the 
profitable ones are not earning enough to cover their cost of capital’ 
(www.theeconomist.com). It also does not take into account that France is a much larger 
country than the United Kingdom which means travelling by air between major cities is 
sometimes preferable in terms of time saved. If we take HS2 as an example, Leeds is 
currently the furthest city the line will serve which is only 313km away compared to Lyon 
which is around 500km from Paris. There are few people that currently travel by air between 
London and Leeds so it is unlikely that there will be a modal shift as great as in France.  
203 
 
 
Measures of Success and Examples (HS2 Ltd, 2014:18) 
The review of case studies by HS2 Ltd  identified Lille as an exemplar of a city which has 
experienced significant economic growth and regeneration benefits as a result of having a 
connection to the high speed rail network. The city used it location on the TGV Nord line as a 
catalyst for major growth (Greengauge 21, 2006) and has transformed from an industrial city 
in decline, to a business success story. However, opposition to HS2 argued: 
‘The impact of high speed rail in regenerating central Lille has been dwarfed by massive 
public regeneration funding. This, not HSR, has been the primary catalyst for growth. 
Moreover, the wider regional impact of the concentration of growth in central Lille has been 
to accelerate inequalities between Lille and other nearby towns. Further, between 1999 and 
2009, the rate of unemployment in Lille actually increased in relation to the rest of France’ 
(Geddes, 2015) 
Looking at other evidence selected from the French example it is clear that the country is still 
committed to investing in HSR. There are four extensions to existing lines currently being 
built which will shorten journey times for a number of cities and there are plans for new lines 
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to be built by 2030 including the first section of a line from Lyon to Milan. However, a recent 
Court of Auditor’s report suggested that the French network had not reached its promised 
target for passengers carried (CoA, 2014). It also claimed that no French high-speed line 
could be said to be covering its total capital investment and maintenance costs. This example 
highlights the nature of evidence utilisation in the policy process and how actors select 
relevant data for their claims. The next section explores how they negotiate evidence with 
one another in different environments. 
 8.3 Evidence negotiation by claims-makers 
8.3.1 The Community Meeting 
Public participation is a key feature in policy decision-making and community forums are 
often provided by local councils as a way for members of the community to ‘meet the people 
who make decisions that affect the local area; find out more about what is happening to 
improve the neighbourhood’ and a chance for people to have their say ‘about plans and 
changes for services and facilities in the area’ (www.leicestershireforums.org). In recent 
years public participation has increasingly contributed to policy decision-making (Bickerstaff 
and Walker, 2001; Martin and Boaz, 2000; Barnes et al, 2003; 2007; Roberts et al, 1999; 
Rowe and Frewer, 2005). While participation is typically seen as a progressive enabling 
mechanism, drawing the public and policy makers closer together (Rowe and Frewer, 2005), 
much of the emphasis is on how decision makers engage the public through participatory 
mechanisms such as citizens’ juries and consultations (Fishkin, 2009). These meetings can 
provide an opportunity for claims-makers to interact with the public as their audience and 
attempt to persuade them that their framing of HS2 is preferable. The more support they gain 
then the less resistance they will face when decisions are made on the Hybrid Bill. The 
community meeting took place on an evening in December, 2012 in a community building on 
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the Castle Vale estate in Birmingham. The aim of the meeting as advertised by HS2 Ltd was 
to involve representatives from the community and HS2 Ltd to: 
• discuss potential ways to avoid and mitigate the environmental impacts of the route, 
such as screening views of the railway, managing noise and reinstating highways; 
• highlight local priorities for the route design; and 
• Identify possible community benefits. 
(www.hs2.org.uk)  
Attendees were invited through their various organisations and an announcement was placed 
in the local newspaper (Tyburn Mail) which informed residents of the meeting. A number of 
leaflets were printed to advertise the meeting and were posted through people’s doors on the 
estate. There were around fifty people present in the meeting with over half of this number 
made up of local residents who had concerns about the project and the negative impact it 
might have on their area. At the beginning of the meeting it was highlighted by the Chair that 
the forum was not intended for local residents to attend but for representatives who would 
feed the information back to them. This angered many of the residents who had attended as 
they argued that: 
‘The meeting, itself, was well attended by residents and it was good to see that level of 
support and attendance for the meeting. What I found less impressive though, was the 
statement made at the start of the meeting, by HS2 representative Donovan Bailey, stating 
that it wasn’t a public meeting and should only have been for the community organisation to 
attend and feed the information back down the rest of the Castle Vale residents. I am sorry, 
but I have to completely disagree with that drivel. As one resident said at the meeting, every 
person on Castle Vale who is going to affected by the building, operation and/or changes 
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caused by HS2, has a right to be there in person to see how they will be affected, for 
themselves, and to voice their concerns directly to the HS2 representatives’ 
(www.tyburnmail.com) 
Some inferences can be made about the way in which the room was organised and the 
representatives who would address people. Firstly, the room was set up in a similar way to a 
traditional classroom environment. There were more or less straight rows of chairs facing the 
front of the room. This kept attention focused on those at the front and it allowed for little 
discussion to happen amongst those in the audience (Rosenfield et al. 1985). If sat in rows the 
audience is less likely to respond during discussion, but are also less disruptive (Sommer, 
1977). So the setup implied that those in the audience listen to those at the front of the room. 
If the meeting holders intended the meeting to be more interactive they may have set up the 
room with chairs around a table so everyone can interact and no one is deemed to be at the 
front addressing an audience. The lack of communication meant that attendees felt as if they 
were treated in a dismissive way and that their opinions did not matter:  
‘All in all I, for one, was not at all impressed with HS2 or their proposals, or the way in 
which they engaged with the residents (or lack, thereof). They seemed not to understand, or 
care, about our concerns’ 
Although residents were able to voice their opinions there was little acknowledgement of 
their concerns and HS2 Ltd were often unable to provide clarity on some of the points raised. 
They appeared unsure of many of the answers to the questions. It is worth noting that this 
uncertainty is not apparent in documents that campaign for the high speed line. The language 
used is almost factual and very assertive about the benefits of HS2 yet in regards to the 
design and construction phase there are uncertainties that become apparent. There was also 
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some debate about whether HS2 Ltd were being dishonest in regards to what information 
they were presenting. A local resident wrote: 
‘During the meeting, a big bone of contention was whether HS2 were actually telling all 
communities the same information, or whether they were telling each individual community 
what they wanted to hear. The specific point that seemed to catch HS2 out was whether the 
train tracks were going to be laid on the north side or the south side of the M6. Apparently, 
residents at the previous meeting were told that HS2 had not decided which side of the M6 
the tracks were going to be lain. I was not at the previous meeting, so I cannot comment on 
that, but HS2 were telling Castle Vale residents that the tracks were definitely going on the 
south side of the M6, which would affect properties on the Vale, but there were a number of 
attendees of the previous HS2 community meeting maintaining that they had been told, by 
HS2, that no decision had been made. This just makes me question the HS2 account of that 
meeting and their motives for having these meetings’ 
(www.tyburnmail.com)  
Attendees stated that they were frustrated by the lack of information and the restrictive and 
formal nature of the meeting. This was also apparent in a study conducted by Crompton 
(2013) which interviewed a number of people involved in HS2 who described ‘the problems 
they faced in understanding the complexity of the case of HS2 and there was a perception that 
much of the information distributed by HS2 Ltd was not in “plain English”. Perhaps more 
worryingly, ‘interviewees harboured concerns that information had been withheld which 
made it difficult for people to respond to the consultation’ (2013:7) which resonates with 
what is being said about this particular community meeting.  
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According to claims-making literature, a successful claims-maker sympathises with the 
audience and relates to them on a personal level (Best, 1987). They do this by trying to get 
the audience to imagine how they would feel in the same circumstances. This can invite 
sympathy and understanding, so the problem becomes less abstract and the claims easier to 
comprehend (Best, 1987). One attendee who was noticeably different from his colleagues 
was the Director of External and Parliamentary Relations. This gentleman remained quiet 
throughout most of the meeting and only addressed the residents when the meeting became 
uncontrollable. Residents were complaining about the compensation package they would 
receive or lack of and HS2 Ltd spokespeople started to look panicked and unsure of what to 
say. The Director of EPR spoke to the residents in a comradely manner by sympathising with 
them and sharing their experience. He stated that he too would be affected by the construction 
of HS2 but that he understood it was for the greater good. This utilitarianist response 
appeared to calm the audience and return control to HS2 Ltd. This was noticed by the 
resident who authored the letter:  
‘I did note that there seemed to be a HS2 ‘spoiler’ who seemed to pipe up every time 
questions got too heated for the HS2 panel. I found this extremely disconcerting and 
unwanted distraction from HS2 answering our concerns (which was probably the point of 
having them there)’ 
Although many Councils along the line of route have declared their support or opposition to 
HS2 there are some that have remained neutral within discussions.  If claims-makers are able 
to capture these groups in support of their argument then it will without doubt make their case 
stronger. In any policy debate those who have the support of stakeholders usually find it 
easier to persuade the public that their argument is legitimate and valid. Legitimacy is the 
‘justification of a particular state of affairs with a rationale that a relevant social audience 
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considers acceptable’ (Mulcahy, 1995:450). If a person accepts an argument as legitimate 
then they are accepting certain claims about it as valid. Those opposed to HS2 have argued 
that pro-HS2 campaigners have blinded stakeholders with evidence and claims to the point 
where they give their support without being fully aware of the implications. In this example 
of a community meeting the types of evidence being presented by HS2 Ltd were very 
technical and complex so it was difficult for recipients to understand. The local residents had 
only local knowledge at this stage as evidence but they did not present many claims in this 
meeting, rather concerns about the impact on their area.  
8.3.2 HS2 in the Media 
The media is possibly the most widely used arena by policy actors and stakeholders to make 
claims and negotiate evidence in both orally and written. It acts as a channel between groups 
and the public and two of the ways in which it influences public perceptions about HS2 is 
through the volume of coverage and accuracy of reporting. Coverage of HS2 when the 
project was first announced was vast but over the last five years volume of coverage has 
varied. Claims presented in the media play a key role in ordering and maintaining audience 
perceptions of social reality. Media messages may “cultivate” certain perceptions among 
readers, and thus may shape the ways in which readers define situations and interpret the 
world around them (Ogle et al.2003:4). In regards to claims-making the media has an 
important role because it is a key outlet for information which is interpreted by the public. 
The information provided by the media plays a role in influencing people’s perceptions of the 
world.  
 
Not long after, in April and May of 2010, once the scheme had been announced, groups 
mobilised to fight the plan with those who were in favour. Voices from these groups used 
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different strategies to persuade and shape beliefs about HS2, leading to claims and 
counterclaims that were complex and emotional. Some national newspapers (Telegraph, 
Independent) and the BBC initially presented a neutral stance on HS2 in 2010 and 2011 
whereas the Guardian had a biased approach from the offset with headlines including ‘Our 
village will be ripped in half if HS2 goes ahead’ (Guardian, 2010) and ‘Local heartache over 
route of high-speed rail route’ (Guardian, 2010). Local newspapers also varied in coverage 
and it was predominantly only local areas that would be affected by the route that reported on 
HS2. Industry newspapers like Rail News devoted many stories to the project. Due to the 
coverage by local newspapers on HS2 being mostly against the project, when evaluating the 
articles it would seem that the majority of media coverage is negative towards HS2. Some 
appear to offer a balanced argument but many choose to report the more sensationalist 
stories.  The media often tries to present itself as being objective, however, ‘media content is 
rhetoric in that its form and content necessarily reflect a certain set of motives and values’ 
(Ogle et al. 2003:3). For example, newspapers are often restricted to a certain word length in 
articles which sometimes leads to ideas being presented simply and conclusively. Writers 
may also cite multiple others in an attempt to show that their story was thoroughly 
researched. They may also be pressured by the public to present answers to provide solutions 
which may also shape their article. This is the nature of journalism and the style of writing.   
 
So how are these claims channelled through the press? Many of the actors involved in HS2 
provide the media with various press releases. They also write letters to the editor which they 
hope will be published. This platform allows them to present claims and evidence to those 
who may be undecided about HS2 or produce counter claims to their opponents. Social media 
and the internet have also provided claims-makers with a new platform for presenting claims 
and evidence. Twitter enables actors to debate with each other and blogs allow actors to write 
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about HS2 which can sometimes be viewed by many people. Claims-making does not just 
take place in traditional environments; we can see it in several places and digital spaces. In 
regards to more traditional environments interviewees were asked about their perceptions of 
the coverage of HS2. Those in favour of HS2 felt that media coverage was biased and did not 
provide a balanced argument in most cases. One interviewee said that he did not bother to 
give interviews or provide comments now to certain media publications. However he did 
think that in most cases they did present both sides of the argument in regards to the national 
press: 
‘I don’t bother giving comments to * and others like them anymore because all they do is find 
some right wing nut to give a counter argument or comment so I just don’t bother anymore’ 
‘I think probably the media are now more negative but as the media are they do try and 
maintain some sort of balance I suppose so if you get a lunatic from one side they’ll find a 
lunatic from the other side to go and give the opposing point of view and then say it’s 
balanced it’s still lunacy’ 
(Retired academic, Interviewee 1) 
He was less impressed with local newspaper coverage of the debate stating that they were 
definitely biased but that he did not blame them considering who their audience were. 
Intermediary groups found it slightly harder to participate in media discussions. One 
interviewee said: 
‘firstly we’ve found it very difficult to talk to the wider world about this because a view which 
says when somebody says well what do you think about HS2? It depends um it’s not 
something that the media find particularly interesting because they’re much more interested 
in talking to people who are gung ho supporters or more likely the people who are really 
strongly opposed’ 
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(Retired engineer, Interviewee 5) 
Anti HS2 campaigners initially campaigned for the rail project to not go ahead. Their 
arguments were not based so much on rigorous evidence because they had not yet mobilised 
to conduct their own research. They relied on local knowledge to argue against HS2. 
Headlines such as ‘High-speed rail line threatens quiet life of historic Ladbroke’s villagers’ 
(Guardian, 2010) with an emotive picture of a local disabled person below the headline were 
in many newspapers. Once the anti-HS2 campaigners had commissioned their own research 
they were able to debate about the economic case for HS2. From 2011 to 2012 the focus was 
on presenting counter claims to the business case. Then from late 2012 onwards there was 
more of a focus on the environmental debate. This is most likely due to the public 
consultations at the time. Those in favour of HS2 framed the problem from the beginning 
with an emphasis on the economic benefits of HS2. However, claims and evidence presented 
by opposition left HS2 Ltd and its supporters having to reframe the issue. They then focused 
on the capacity issues of the West Coast Main Line arguing that HS2 was needed in the UK 
as the current line could not cope with the amount of passengers and freight. They attempted 
to win support from those who use the WCML through reframing the argument and 
presenting different claims. As Beck argued: 
‘Claims-makers learn ways to mobilise and maintain public support; they learn how to get 
press coverage by constructing claims which are newsworthy; and they learn to identify key 
policy-makers and recognise the levers which can move policy. These lessons may come 
through personal experience, or through watching the successes and failures of other claims-
makers promoting other issues, but the result is increasingly polished claims’ (1992:115) 
 
From an in-depth analysis of media coverage from 2010 to 2015 there is very little in the way 
of pro-HS2 stories compared with anti-HS2 stories. Those in favour have presented less 
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claims in the media and released fewer statements than those opposed. The reasons for this 
are unclear but further research may be able to provide some insight. So should the media be 
blamed for the way in which the HS2 debate is covered? Their aim after all is to increase 
readership and present interesting stories. They cannot help that people are often more 
inclined to read eye-catching headlines rather than neutral, in-depth discussions. Maybe this 
is why so many groups and organisations have moved towards using social media to present 
claims and negotiate evidence.  
 
8.3.3 Social Media 
Until the last decade or so policy actors have had to rely on the media to present many of 
their claims to the general public. One interviewee said that ‘social media is so important 
these days…people respond to things in seconds’ (Retired engineer, Interviewee 5). Within 
the last decade social media websites such as Facebook, Twitter and Tumblr have emerged 
and provided policy actors with another platform to voice their opinions and make claims.  
Academics have reported on their relationship using many different case studies (Mulcahy, 
1995; Ogle et al, 2003; Harrington et al. 2012). Social media, however, and its role in the 
policy process is somewhat under-researched. There has been little rigorous evaluation of the 
causal influences of social media. As such, its ability to contribute to social change remains 
contested. The benefits of utilising social media include being able to reach a wide range of 
people almost instantaneously, recruit supporters, increase interactions with others and 
cultivate leads. HS2 Ltd has profiles or accounts on Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, YouTube 
and Vimeo. HS2 Ltd produced a social media policy document in July of 2012 stating ‘how 
HS2 profiles and accounts, and content published on them, will be managed by HS2 and in 
particular by the HS2 Digital team’ (HS2 Ltd, 2012:2). Those opposed to the project have 
criticised HS2 Limited’s use of social media claiming they are incompetent and slow to 
214 
 
respond despite having a media team designed to deal with social media sites. They have 
been criticised in 2012 for not updating their Facebook account, not responding to tweets and 
have been accused of monitoring the twitter feeds of Stop HS2 campaigners.  
The most popular of social media sites used by actors within HS2 is Twitter. It is used not 
just for ‘tweeting’ but providing links to blogs and research by actors. Almost all of the 
campaign groups within HS2 have an active twitter account and one can view daily debates 
between various actors. They use the digital arena to present claims, counter-claims and 
persuade audiences of their argument. Blogging is also popular amongst HS2 actors and it is 
possible to access new blog articles on a weekly basis. One interviewee said of Twitter: 
‘It’s quite fun actually it’s like a chess game because if you’ve only got a hundred and forty 
characters to play with you’ve got to use them in a way that lays the ground for the response 
to the response so it’s like almost laying a trap for an opponent for them to fall into so you 
can go along with the killer line which is a bit like playing chess and I quite enjoy that as an 
intellectual exercise I mean I know that’s not what people tend to think of Twitter but I do 
find it quite fun’ 
(Rail consultant, Interviewee 4) 
He went on to stress the importance of using social media to present claims and have open 
debates with ‘opponents’. Social media enables claims-makers to present evidence to an 
audience that has become more demanding for increased transparency. It has broken down 
communication barriers for those in positions of power to local communities. It is an area in 
which researchers are struggling to keep up with the technological advances and the 
anonymity that some social media sites allow means that sampling can often be difficult.  
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8.3.4 The Scrutiny Review of HS2 
This section explores how actors within HS2 engage with the process of presenting and 
negotiating evidence and claims in an official government setting. The name of Birmingham 
City Council’s scrutiny review was entitled ‘High Speed Two: Maximising the Impact for 
Birmingham’. The online ‘Call for Evidence’ listed a selection of questions and key lines of 
enquiry that would be discussed at the two meetings in November. People were given six 
weeks to respond to the call and were advised that Birmingham City Council ‘are not looking 
to re-open the debate as to the pros and cons of HS2 – these have been well debated 
elsewhere. Rather, we are looking forward to the introduction of the Hybrid Bill later this 
year and ensuring that Birmingham is well placed to realise the promised benefits’ (BCC, 
2013:1). There were four key lines of enquiry that were pursued and these included a 
question about the opportunities and challenges for Birmingham in relation to the economy, 
connectivity and sustainability; a question about how benefits can be realised, what the 
passenger perspective is on connectivity issues, and what message the Council should be 
conveying to Government. By selecting the key lines of enquiry the scrutiny team were 
expressing what they deem to be relevant issues and it is exclusionary in nature as they only 
requested evidence on these particular points. They were unwilling to revisit the debate about 
whether or not HS2 should be built. There were a total of sixteen responses to the call for 
evidence in the evidence packs from a number of different organisations.  
The responses varied in the way in which they submitted responses. This is demonstrated in 
the table (appendix A). The table includes the name of the organisation, the way in which 
each organisation responded and a list of the data they used in their responses. From the table 
one can see that the responses ranged from detailed reports quoting secondary data to letters 
that included no data, only suggestions. Not all responses answered all of the questions 
included in the four key lines of inquiry suggested by the Call for Evidence listed above. 
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None of the responses included primary data that had been collected especially for the 
scrutiny review. They relied on either secondary data or data that had been used for other 
reports and research on HS2 and expert or personal experience. Most of the responses failed 
to address question three or provide a limited answer which asked the passenger perspective 
on the wider connectivity issues and on the stations’ general utility for users. Although some 
consultations had been carried out none of the organisations presented findings from 
consultations. All of the responses that included statistical data regarding demand and growth 
forecasts rely on the Centro commissioned research conducted by KPMG. This research has 
been controversial and its methodologies questioned by a number of leading economists 
(Graham, 2013; Overman, 2013). The responses also varied in size. They ranged from two 
pages to twenty pages and Birmingham City Council’s response spans 105 pages. The types 
of organisations that have responded have implications for the claims that can be made about 
conclusions. There was only one response from an environmental organisation which is quite 
brief whereas the majority of responses were from organisations concerned with transport and 
the economy. Smaller community groups and local residents are also under-represented in the 
list of responses. These groups are often engaged within a different setting such as a 
community meeting or forums. Marketing Birmingham appeared to have used the most 
amounts of secondary data for their report compared with RailFuture and Campaign for Rail 
West Midlands who chose not to include any data within their response.  
What was different about this environment compared with the community meeting and the 
media is that almost all of the attendees were in agreement that HS2 should be built. There 
were some concerns about the exact details but there was no one present that objected to the 
construction of a new high speed line. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, there were 
several claims presented and supported by evidence in the documents but when speaking in 
the meeting, policy actors presented claims whilst rarely referring to evidence. Evidence 
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becomes implicit because the claims-maker is aware that their audience already shares their 
frame or a similar frame and they do not need to use evidence to legitimise their claim. They 
know that the claim will be accepted and their audience will be convinced without referring 
to evidence. Toulmin (2003) argues that only the warrant can be implicit but this data 
indicates that evidence can also be implicit depending on the policy environment. This further 
supports the claim made by this thesis that evidence is used to persuade an audience to 
support a particular view. 
8.4 Conclusion 
This chapter used the refined model of argumentation presented in the theoretical chapter to 
highlight the subjective and selective nature of evidence within the policy process. A number 
of examples were identified within the case study, perhaps the most interesting was French 
high speed rail. In this example both actors for and against HS2 referred to France as an 
exemplar of why we should or should not build a new high speed line. They selected different 
evidence to support their claims and ignored evidence that did not. The evidence-based policy 
making model suggests that policy actors are rational and capable of leaving politics, ideas 
and values out of decision-making. The empirical data suggests otherwise and indicates that 
people take a position and then look for evidence based on their choice. If they disagree with 
evidence they attempt to disprove it by producing counter claims and new evidence.  
 
The chapter also focused on the way in which evidence is negotiated between claims-makers 
in different environments. In the community meeting it was clear that HS2 Ltd and their 
colleagues were at an advantage in terms of knowledge and evidence. Local residents could 
only rely on local knowledge and what they had read so far in the media. HS2 Ltd presented 
very detailed data to support their claims but it was difficult for attendees to understand. If 
the residents could not understand the evidence then they were not in a position to refute it at 
218 
 
the time.  The next environment examined was the media and social media. What is evident 
from this data is that claims-makers use the media as a platform for presenting claims to a 
wide audience. Due to the nature of the media there is little attention paid to intermediary 
groups. Sensationalist stories provided by those for and against are more appealing to them. 
Although the media was seen as a useful platform, most interviewees disagreed with how 
they and their arguments were portrayed. This may be why they prefer to utilise social media 
such as Twitter to present claims. In the local government setting of a local authority that is in 
favour of HS2 we see that evidence can become implicit in nature. This may be because the 
audience already shares a similar opinion to the claims-maker and so they do not have to 
legitimise their claims with reference to data. What these two empirical chapters tell us about 
the role that evidence plays within contested policy processes is that traditional evidence 
utilisation models are too simplified and that the process is much more complex. There are 
many things that affect evidence utilisation such as political judgement, values and beliefs, 
how a person conceptualises evidence, the environment and the audience. Another difficulty 
faced within the planning process of transport mega projects is that the majority of claims are 
all predictions. No one really knows exactly what will happen if the Government does or does 
not build the new high speed network. If it were possible to predict the future with accuracy 
then no mega project would ever fail. What is importantto remember though is that, more 
often than not, there are unexpected occurrences that affect a mega project during its lifespan 
and these are not always planned for so they cause problems. One cannot expect all factors to 
be considered before it is built. Therefore the goal of those in favour is to predict as 
accurately as possible what the costs and benefits will be and persuade decision-makers to 
agree to fund the project.  
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
 
9.1 Introduction 
The conclusion chapter is divided into four parts; firstly it explains what the researcher set 
out to achieve. Secondly, the main findings are discussed in relation to each of the research 
questions. Thirdly, the key contributions are presented including both theoretical and 
empirical. Finally, the chapter provides reflections on the research process and outlines an 
agenda for further research.  
9.2 Aims of the research 
The main aim of the research was to explore the process by which policy actors select 
evidence to support their claims and how they negotiate this evidence with one another in 
different policy environments within High Speed Two. Critiques of the rational, evidence-
based policy making model argue that it is impossible to remove values, beliefs and politics 
from the decision-making process (Sanderson, 2002). Rigorous research designs are able to 
reduce the effects of these factors on the decision-making process to an extent but it is 
impossible to completely remove their effects from the process. Framing theory was used to 
identify the ways in which people think about or ‘frame’ the policy issue in order to assess 
whether their framing of the issue impacted on their evidence utilisation. There was an 
expectation at the beginning of the research project that a person’s frame would affect the 
types of evidence that they drew on and the claims that they would make. To establish 
whether there was a relationship required firstly identifying frames within the data and then 
asking what types of evidence were associated with each frame. From this some inferences 
could be made about the relationship between the two. 
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Secondly, the research intended to examine a number of different policy arenas in which 
evidence was negotiated to compare the use of evidence within HS2. The reason for this was 
to establish whether evidence was utilised differently by claims-makers in different 
environments. The first environment was a community meeting in which local residents of 
Castle Vale were provided with information about the mega project and they had the 
opportunity to ask questions and voice their concerns. This particular environment was 
important to observe because there was an imbalance of knowledge and power and it was 
vital in the early stages of the research to discover what the concerns were of various parties, 
how they interacted with the “experts” of the mega project and what the positions were of key 
stakeholders in relation to the project.  
The second environment was an overview and scrutiny process at Birmingham City Council. 
Attendance at a number of meetings with scrutiny officers and two evidence gathering 
sessions enabled the researcher to observe how evidence was selected and negotiated in a 
quasi-governmental setting. The experience provided essential data for understanding how 
claims-makers presented evidence to an audience that was mostly in agreement with their 
position. It also provided an insight into how evidence was interpreted by the scrutiny 
officers and how they used it to inform their final report and recommendations.  
The third environment that the thesis examined was the media (including social media). The 
media enables claims-makers to reach a wide audience in the hope of persuading the audience 
to share their opinion about a policy issue. The difference between the media and social 
media is that social media provides all citizens with a mass mediated platform to distribute 
claims publically. The press still functions as ‘cultural gatekeeper of newsworthiness’ 
(Maratea, 2015:114) and newspapers only publish particular stories, but social media allows 
claims-makers to disseminate claims to a global community without the need of 
acknowledgement by the press. Until now, the majority of research on claims-making 
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focused on the media rather than social media. This is because the use of social media is 
relatively new to the last ten years. By exploring claims-making in the media and the online 
world, the researcher was able to examine how policy actors use these channels to reach 
audiences and whether they present their arguments in a particular way in this environment.  
9.3 Main findings 
The initial assumption of the thesis was that evidence is not the precursor to a policy 
decision; selecting evidence to support a claim is a product at the end of a long line of 
assumptions and choices and decisions are based on strategically crafted arguments as 
opposed to solely being based on objective evidence. Policy making occurs within the context 
of values, ideologies and beliefs. Therefore the policy process is about reconciling different 
value perspectives which leads to the most consensual option. The role of evidence within 
decision-making is to help construct a common frame through which meaning is applied and 
resolution sought. Evidence has less relevance in situations where there is frame conflict 
amongst policy groups. This is because a person’s frame determines what they consider to be 
evidence and what arguments they take as being relevant. If two people have conflicting 
frames then they will not be in agreement about what the chosen course of action should be. 
Therefore, a policy decision is based on which actor or group of actors is most effective at 
presenting a believable argument that will persuade others to support their claims rather than 
about finding the highest quality evidence to support or legitimise decisions. By studying the 
way in which people frame a policy issue and negotiate evidence with one another, some 
conclusions were made about evidence utilisation and how decisions are made.  
The main findings of the research are set out under four headings below and relate to each of 
the research questions. Firstly, findings from the literature review regarding the relationship 
between political judgement and evidence utilisation are summarised. This is followed by 
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summaries of findings of the three empirical research questions relating to how actors frame 
the chosen case study, what evidence they draw on and finally, how they negotiate their 
evidence with one another in a number of policy environments.  
9.3.1 Political judgement and evidence utilisation  
The first research question developed from an initial literature review on evidence utilisation 
in decision-making processes by UK Governments. The purpose of the second chapter was to 
historically document that, despite efforts from UK Governments since the end of the Second 
World War to increase the role of evidence in decision-making, there has been little success. 
The chapter identified several examples of politicians ‘ignoring’ evidence or interpreting it 
differently when making decisions about airport expansion, drug policy and housing policy as 
examples. What this means for evidence-based policy making is that politics, judgement and 
beliefs are not excluded from policy making and they should be acknowledged when 
explaining the mechanics of the decision-making process. Although the evidence-based 
policy making model provides a useful approach for decision-makers to make systematic and 
logical decisions, it does not explain why policy actors perceive policy problems in different 
ways and why they select evidence and interpret it differently to others. Therefore, a more 
interpretive theory was needed to understand these phenomena.  
9.3.2 Frames within HS2 
The second research question centred on the way in which actors within HS2 framed the 
policy problem. Chapter seven told the story of the development of HS2 and its policy 
through frame conflict as a notional lens in order to answer the research question: How do 
actors within HS2 frame the policy problem? The data revealed that the majority of actors 
within HS2 accept that there is a capacity issue on the current rail network; the conflict arises 
because they have different ideas and beliefs about how we should achieve the goal of 
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increasing rail capacity. In the context of public policy, this is what Schon and Rein (1994) 
refer to as ‘intractable policy issues’. They argued that it is important to attend to the very 
framing of the issue in order to understand how policy actors might reach a solution to the 
problem. More and better evidence does not necessarily solve the problem or allow actors to 
reach a consensus. Framing theory assisted in explaining contestation between policy actors. 
The purpose of identifying the frames was to investigate whether the way in which a person 
framed the debate impacted on the types of evidential resources they drew on and the claims 
they made.  
Five frames were identified that describe the ways in which actors perceived the policy 
problem of HS2. These frames were considered to be the most dominant amongst those either 
for or against HS2. In other words, these frames were the most commonly identified in the 
empirical data. The most common frame that was identified amongst those in favour of the 
project was the economic-developmentalism frame. Arguments they gave for building the 
new high speed line often focused on the economic benefits the project would bring to the 
United Kingdom, in particular, the North of England. In comparison, those against the project 
predominantly focused their arguments on the environmental impact that the project would 
have. They claimed that the negative effects that would occur on the environment and the loss 
of peoples’ homes outweighed any economic benefits that would be created. Griggs (1998) 
suggested that people that adopt an eco-centric environmentalist position tend to select this 
frame because they believe it will receive the most support from an audience. He refers to a 
‘volvo-vegan’ alliance between middle class individuals and environmentalists who support 
the same cause in order to halt a project such as this.  
Particular frames identified more with certain types of evidence, however, evidence selection 
and utilisation was primarily based on the resources available to the claims-makers. The table 
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below presents the features of each frame and the most common types of evidential resources 
that they drew on:  
 Economic 
developmentalism 
Ecological 
modernisation 
Economic 
modernisation 
Eco-centric 
environmentalism 
Economic 
environmentalism 
 
 
Features 
 
Capacity, growth, 
connectivity, 
speed, 
competitiveness 
 
 
 
 
 
Capacity, 
connectivity, 
regeneration, 
sustainable 
development 
 
Capacity,  
modernisation, 
technology, 
competitiveness 
 
Capacity, 
conservation of the 
environment 
 
Capacity, 
alternatives, 
growth, 
sustainable 
development 
Evidential 
resources 
Statistics, numeric 
data, economic 
modelling, expert 
opinion, study 
results 
Environmental 
study results, 
Statistics, 
numeric data, 
economic 
modelling, prior 
experience of 
regeneration and 
sustainable 
development 
Statistics, 
numeric data, 
prior experience 
of working in the 
rail industry 
Anecdotal/personal 
experience, 
environmental 
study results 
 
Counter-claims to 
the numeric data of 
economic 
developmentalists 
Statistics, numeric 
data, 
environmental 
study results, 
expert opinion 
(primarily 
engineers and rail 
industry workers) 
 
9.3.3 Evidence utilisation within HS2 
The third research question explored the types of evidence that actors within HS2 utilised. 
The purpose of this question was to establish whether the way in which a policy actor frames 
HS2 has an effect on the types of evidential resources that they draw on. As the literature 
suggested that the way in which someone frames an issue will impact on what they consider 
to be evidence and what arguments they consider relevant there was an expectation that 
particular frames would favour certain types of evidence more. However, the data indicated 
that resources had more of a significant impact on the types of evidence people drew on 
rather than their frame. It also revealed how all actors, regardless of their frame, weighted 
systematic, rigorous and scientific evidence as more relevant than evidence such as local 
knowledge or qualitative surveys.  
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There was an imbalance of evidence generation between those for and against the project. 
Looking at the types of evidence being presented by groups of actors, there was a definite 
difference between those in favour and those against. The volume of evidence produced by 
those in favour was greater than those against the project. The types of evidence also differed; 
those in favour produced many more scientific or technical studies that contained quantitative 
data compared those against who relied heavily on local, tacit knowledge. They did not have 
the resources to fund their own studies. Most importantly, those in favour of the project had 
the resources to conduct cost-benefit analyses of the project which are the dominant types of 
studies that policy actors within a mega-project appeal to in order to determine whether or not 
they should proceed with a project. This led to those against the project being embroiled in 
game of catch-up with those in favour of the project. They predominantly presented counter 
claims in response to the claims put forward by those in favour of the project.  
However, in terms of media attention and argumentation those opposed to the project 
appeared to warrant much more interest in their stories and claims. The media is an important 
channel for claims-makers because it provides a platform for them to reach members of the 
public and it can influence public perceptions about a project. Some of the interviewees 
viewed the media in a negative way as they felt that they were sometimes misinterpreted. 
Neutral or intermediate interview participants stated that they found it difficult to present 
claims in the media and they were under-represented. They believed that the media preferred 
sensationalist or dramatic stories such as the loss of houses because of the construction of the 
high speed line as opposed to a more neutral view of the project.   
Social media was considered a useful channel by claims-makers to reach an audience of 
people that might be undecided or neutral. It enabled them present claims instantaneously 
without having to go through the ‘cultural gatekeepers’ within the media. Twitter was by far 
the most utilised application where claims-makers interacted with each other. The data 
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revealed how claims-makers engage with one another via Twitter and one interviewee 
likened it to a game of chess in which they would lay ‘traps’ for their opponents. Blogging 
was another way in which claims-makers utilised the internet to reach a wider audience.  
9.3.4 Claims-making and negotiating evidence within HS2 
The final research question focused on how policy actors within HS2 make claims and how 
they negotiate these claims with one another in three policy environments – a scrutiny review 
process, a community meeting and the media (including social media). What the data 
revealed is that the audience of the claims-maker had an effect on the way in which they 
presented their evidence and claims. In the scrutiny review process, data and warrants were 
not always present in arguments – based often on whether or not they were trying to persuade 
because the audience had a different frame. Those that shared the same frame did not need to 
convince of their argument so didn’t always refer to evidence.  
One of the most significant findings of the research was how policy actors interpreted an 
experience or situation within the project. The data revealed how different groups cherry-
picked evidence from the same situation in order to support their claims. In the example of 
international high speed rail, both those for and against the project referred to rail projects in 
France and Japan yet presented different evidence from the example in order to support their 
claims. Therefore, selecting evidence to support a claim is a product at the end of a long line 
of assumptions and choices; decisions are based on strategically crafted arguments rather than 
objective and systematically reviewed evidence.  
9.4 Key contributions  
The research project provided analysis of the case study that has until now not been 
conducted. It also provided a theoretical contribution in the way of a refinement of the 
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Toulmin model of argumentation. Finally, it contributed to how evidence negotiation is 
understood in different policy environments of a transport mega-project. The following 
sections explain the significance of these contributions.  
9.4.1 A new perspective on High Speed Two 
The High Speed Two project is somewhat under-researched due to its infancy. The thesis is 
original because it provided one of the first in-depth analyses of the project, and is the first of 
its kind to analyse framing and negotiations of evidence and claims within the project of High 
Speed Two. The immediacy of events was crucial for understanding the nuances of evidence 
utilisation in the decision-making process. The researcher was able to observe real-life 
examples of claims-making which would have been impossible had a case been chosen 
retrospectively. The importance of providing this new perspective is that it presents an 
analysis of the largest mega-project ever to be designed and built in the UK and it widens 
understandings of the role of evidence within decision-making in transport mega-projects and 
allows for comparisons to be made between other projects.   
9.4.2 Refining the Toulmin model 
One of the key contributions that the thesis makes is a refinement of the argumentation model 
presented by Toulmin (1958). According to Toulmin, the way in which to construct a claim is 
to appeal to evidence. The warrant is defined as ‘statements which justify drawing 
conclusions from the’ evidence (Best, 1987:108). One of the assumptions that this model 
made is that the warrant is a rule without any exception and that evidence is taken at face 
value. Toulmin did not go into great depth about how one should conceptualise evidence and 
argued that if evidence is not taken at face value then it risks becoming a claim itself that 
must be defended. At the early stages of the research this was not considered a limitation as 
the purpose of utilising the model was to deconstruct arguments within the data. However, 
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what became clear after attempting to apply the model to the empirical data was that it was 
not as straight forward as first thought.  
Using the evidence packs from the Birmingham City Council scrutiny review on HS2, 
attempts were made to identify a number of claims and then locate the evidence and warrant 
in the data. Indeed, as Toulmin suggested, the warrant was often implicit in nature. However, 
it became apparent that the evidence was often implicit as well. Claims were made and there 
was no reference made to evidence in all instances. As mentioned in section 9.3.4, evidence 
was interpreted and understood differently by each frame. This led to the suggestion that the 
Toulmin model should not be a linear process but should rather look more like this: 
                     (Evidence)       Interpreted         Claim 
 
            (Warrant) 
 
What this model demonstrates now is that evidence and claims can be interpreted by policy 
actors and that the process is not a linear one. Evidence is not resistant to interpretation and is 
interpreted differently depending on a person’s framing of the HS2 debate. The implication of 
this for the evidence-based policy making and similar models is that rather than viewing 
evidence as objective facts that we can appeal to, evidence is interpreted information about a 
given issue. Evidence is often contested as we can see from the empirical data and one way 
that this can be explained is by claiming that the evidence itself is interpreted in different 
ways. If evidence was interpreted in the same way by all actors then it would not be 
contested. The brackets represent the implicit nature of the two components – sometimes they 
are identifiable and other times they are not depending on the audience.  
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9.4.3 Understandings of evidence negotiation 
The thesis provided a rich explanation of how evidence is negotiated by claims-makers 
within the case study of High Speed Two. The majority of research conducted on evidence 
utilisation in mega-projects is done so retrospectively and focuses on the success or failure of 
the project. This project is unique as it focused on a live case study and it expanded and 
generated theory on evidence utilisation in decision-making which could in turn be applied to 
other mega-projects. The findings present a number of implications for rational decision-
making type models such as the evidence-based policy making approach.  
 
Firstly, these models assume that evidence is accepted at face value and not interpreted by 
policy actors. The thesis demonstrated that claims-makers interpret evidence differently and 
cherry pick evidence that supports their arguments. They refuted rigorous, scientific research 
because it did not coincide with their particular frame. One interviewee went as far as 
accusing HS2 Ltd of lying about their evidence and wanted to conduct his own noise study 
because he did not believe the results of HS2 Ltd’s. Decision-makers need to acknowledge 
that within a policy controversy there will be actors that do not accept evidence that is in 
contrast with their values and beliefs. Therefore, the goal of decision-makers should be to 
reach an agreement on the most consensual solution. Secondly, rational decision-making 
models assume that the process is a linear one. The thesis exposed claims-makers who 
changed the way in which they presented claims in different environments depending on their 
audience. When the audience shared a similar frame and accepted the arguments the claims-
maker did not provide evidence to support their claims because they knew that they would be 
accepted. If an audience rejected the evidence then claims-makers revisited their data, 
reframed it and presented it in a different way thus creating a more ‘messy’ process. The 
implication of this in  
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Until now, the claims-making framework has mostly been applied to the negotiation of 
claims and evidence in the media as opposed to social media. This is because social media 
has only been used by policy actors within the last ten years or so. The thesis provides an 
original contribution to the small evidence base of claims-making within social media. It is 
the first of its kind to apply the framework to a mega-project.  
 
 9.5 Reflections 
There was an assumption that there would be a very good response rate to the invitations to 
potential interview participants that were sent out. However, it was not as high as expected so 
a decision was taken to conduct more in-depth interviews with those that had agreed to 
participate. In hindsight the invitation could have been extended to a larger sample with the 
intention of increasing the number of interviews. This may have provided a wider perspective 
on the policy in question. Although the project will eventually be a national project, phase 
one of the project is based between the West Midlands and London, and most of the data 
available related to this particular phase. The north of England is experiencing the very early 
planning stages of the project and much of the decision-making so far has not been discussed 
in the public domain. Therefore, if the sample size was extended, it is likely that the 
participants would have been associated within the geography of phase one of the project 
rather than phase two.  
The case study itself led the researcher to question its suitability due to it being a live project 
rather than a retrospective case. It was appropriate to choose a live project because the 
intention was to understand the social processes and complex practices in real time. One of 
the issues experienced whilst dealing with a live case study was the constant influx of new 
potential data. In hindsight it may have been preferable to select a more definitive time period 
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in which to collect data with an end date rather than waiting until nearer the end of the project 
to decide. The Google Analytics data kept to a strict timeframe, but additional data did not 
have an agreed timescale until towards the end of the project.  
When reflecting on the process, it can be useful to consider alternative research methods that 
may have been appropriate for answering the research questions. One approach which centres 
on the question of how policy actors within HS2 frame the debate could be to use Q-
methodology. It is used by researchers to systematically study individual’s personal points of 
view on a particular topic or issue. It uses statistical applications of correlational and factor-
analytical techniques to ‘provide researchers with a systematic and rigorously quantitative 
means for examining human subjectivity’ (McKeown and Thomas, 1988:5). Q studies 
explore correlations between people by asking them to decide what is significant from their 
perspective. ‘Participants are required to sort a predefined set of statements (the Q-sort) 
relating to the issue at hand, which are then subjected to statistical analysis and further 
interpretation by the researcher’ (Venables et al. 2009:1092). It is another way in which to 
reveal shared viewpoints around a topic within a particular population of actors. This would 
have produced some interesting data for the research. 
9.6 Agenda for further research 
Part of the reflection process involves thinking about the ways in which this research project 
could be developed further. Firstly, the research could be extended by applying the refined 
Toulmin model of argumentation to other data sources from HS2 to determine whether or not 
evidence was implicit in other policy environments. This would further test the claim that 
evidence can be implicit within an argument as well as the warrant if the audience shares a 
similar frame. Although the thesis only applied the simple model of argumentation to the 
data, it could be beneficial to apply the six component model to the data to determine whether 
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those additional components are presented by claims-makers. Data could be sourced from the 
evidence submitted to the High Speed Rail Bill Select Committee and the model could be 
applied to test the refinement of the model and the extended model. The data is published 
online so there would be no issues with access. 
Secondly, the research questions could be applied to other mega-projects and transport 
projects to build on the findings of this thesis in relation to evidence utilisation. The research 
could involve selecting other mega-projects and identifying the frames and associated 
evidence to establish whether there is a correlation between them. The way in which claims-
makers present evidence and negotiate claims could also be explored. The literature review 
highlighted a selection of other cases, most notably Griggs and Howarth (2013) who 
conducted research into UK air travel that shared similarities in terms of the consistency 
between the debates about UK air travel and the proposed High Speed Two project. The 
policy problems of airport capacity and rail capacity can be labelled as wicked policy issues 
that defy rational and equitable policy solutions. Both Griggs and Howarth (2013) and the 
thesis have identified similar narratives amongst those in favour of airport expansion and 
HS2. They argue that there are economic benefits, that there is a capacity issue, and that the 
UK is behind other developed countries in terms of modernity in our transport infrastructure. 
Those against airport expansion and HS2 both refer to the ‘environmental destruction’ 
(Griggs and Howarth, 2013:288) that could be caused. It is likely that the research approaches 
in this thesis could be transferrable to other policy problems.  
Thirdly, a more detailed analysis of claims-making in other social media platforms such as 
Facebook would provide further insight into the way in which claims-makers utilise social 
media. The thesis primarily focused on data gathered from Twitter and online blogs because 
they were the most utilised platforms by interviewees. HS2 Limited have their own Facebook 
account as do many of the opposition groups. Analysing posts from their accounts would 
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provide further insight into the ways in which these groups utilise social media to present 
claims and explore the interactions, if any, between different groups.   
9.7 Concluding remarks  
The thesis offered an insight into the intricate decision-making process of High Speed Two. 
Examining such a prominent transport mega-project provided an understanding as to how 
policy actors come to think about a policy problem (or frame it) and how they negotiate 
evidence with one another to reach the most agreeable solution. It demonstrated that more 
evidence does not necessarily lead to a better policy decision and if we are to better 
understand how evidence is selected and negotiated then a more interpretivist approach is 
required.  
Although recent interpretivist theorists have attempted to discredit the rational, evidence-
based policy making approach this project has shown that it still remains the most dominant 
and popular model within policy decision-making because it is a helpful tool for those 
attempting to make logical and systematic decisions.  
Studying an intricate case such as High Speed Two was important because the outcome of the 
project is likely to set the future tone of railway investment. However, with the recent 
‘Progress with preparations for High Speed 2’ report (2016) from the National Audit Office 
suggesting that there is only a sixty percent confidence in phase one being delivered by 2026, 
it may be some time before the project becomes a reality.  
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APPENDIX A 
Name of Organisation Form of response (and length) Data used 
Birmingham City Council 
(The local government 
body responsible for the 
governance of Birmingham 
which is a metropolitan 
district) 
Report: divided into five sections and 
relevant appendices (105 pages) 
Responses to: Phase 1 Design Refinement 
Consultation, Phase 1 Draft Environmental 
Statement Consultation, Phase 1 Property & 
Compensation Consultation. Centro KPMG 
summary, HS2 WM Connectivity Strategy 
HS2 Ltd (ALO responsible 
for developing and 
promoting UK’s HSR 
network, owned by DfT) 
Short chapter with six headings. 
Appendix includes one table and one 
map (5 pages) 
Centro KPMG report (mostly economic case 
modelling August 2012) 
Marketing Birmingham 
(Birmingham’s strategic 
marketing partnership 
responsible for Bham’s 
leisure and business 
tourism programmes) 
Report that addresses all the criteria 
from the ‘Call for Evidence’ plus other 
information they deemed relevant (20 
pages) 
Centro KPMG report, European Cities Monitor 
2010, CBI/KPMG Infrastructure Survey 2013, 
Marketing Birmingham Investment Team, 
German Marshall Fund of the US Policy Brief: 
Planning High Speed Rail Stations for Sustainable 
Urban Development (European Case Studies 
2011), 2013 Perceptions Survey TNS/Regional 
Observatory, Deloitte (2013) Unlocking Potential 
chapter, Tom de Castella for the BBC, Office of  
Rail Regulation data, Centro report, Airports 
Commission proposals for providing additional 
airport capacity 2013, WM Economic Forum 
2013, GBSLEP 2013, ONS population survey 
2012, CrossRail, Interna onal Union of Railways 
2011, Carbon Impact study Greengauge 21 2012 
West Midlands Campaign 
for Better Transport 
(An independent charity 
providing research/practical 
solutions to transport 
problems, pressuring 
local/national Gov to adopt 
them) 
Report divided into four sections with 
the final section addressing the specific 
questions put forward in the ‘Call for 
Evidence’ (9 pages) 
White chapter on railways 2007, Briefing Chapter 
on Rail Capacity ATOC 2012, Centro briefing 
chapter on Transforming Rail Travel 2012, 
Greengauge 21 Capturing the Benefits of HS2 on 
Existing Lines 2011 
Campaign for Rail West 
Midlands 
(Rail users campaigning 
and promoting for 
development of rail 
services both passenger and 
freight) 
Letter followed by short response with 
4 headings and two concerns (4 pages) 
No data presented  
Railfuture West Midlands 
(Independent organisation 
campaigning for better rail 
services for passengers and 
freight. Voluntary group 
representing rail users with 
20k affiliated and 
individual members) 
Letter to review including four areas 
where they have a special interest and 
hope to address some of the bullet 
points in the ‘Call for Evidence’ (2 
pages) 
No data presented 
Birmingham Friends of the 
Earth 
(Not for profit organisation 
that seeks to advance the 
principles of sustainability 
and positive environmental 
Written with five headings commenting 
on all of the key issues put forward in 
the ‘Call for Evidence’ (3 pages) 
Friends of the Earth Briefing on HS2 
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change. They work on local 
issues such as transport, 
planning and 
environmental justice 
issues) 
Prof. Kathryn Moore, 
Professor of Landscape 
Architecture 
(has published extensively 
on design quality, theory, 
education and practice) 
Report synthesising three studies 
including a proposal to develop the HS2 
Landscape Vision which has several 
illustrations. Concludes with a  pg  of 
people who endorse the project (12 
pages) 
HS2LV: REINVENTING THE REGION proposal 
and forthcoming article ‘How can new and 
redeveloped stations on the UK’s proposed HS2 
line add value to the surrounding landscape?’ 
(Moore, 2014) 
Greater Birmingham 
Chamber of Commerce 
(A membership-based 
 business support 
organisation that exists to 
connect its members to 
opportunity) 
Report addressing points 1 , 2 and 5 of 
the ‘Call for Evidence’ request (3 
pages) 
Transport Studies Unit study chapter entitled ‘The 
spatial effects of High Speed Rail: capturing the 
opportunity’ (2013), Centro Connectivity Package, 
Bham Chamber of Commerce, HS2LV: 
REINVENTING THE REGION 
The National Skills 
Academy for Railway 
Engineering 
(established with wide 
railway industry support to 
help tackle current and 
future skills needs within 
the railway engineering 
industry) 
Powerpoint presentation slide layout 
including picture, tables and graphs (24 
pages) 
Data including current workforce numbers, spend 
by client on Future Programme, workforce 
geography, workforce age profiles, recruitment 
forecasts, skills forecasting and HS2 skills 
forecasting (unsure on sources of all data: not 
referenced) 
Centro 
(Responsible for delivery 
of public transport in the 
West Midlands 
representing the seven 
Metropolitan District 
Councils of the West 
Midlands: Birmingham, 
Coventry, Dudley, 
Sandwell, Solihull, Walsall 
and Wolverhampton) 
Letter followed by report entitled 
‘Statement of Evidence’ including a 
number of challenges followed by 
responses to all inquiry questions with a 
map in the appendix. The report 
includes a table detailing potential 
funding sources for the HS2 
connectivity package schemes (14 
pages) 
Centro KPMG report, Centro Public Consultation 
exercise Spring 2013 
Dr Mike Hodder, Planning 
Archaeologist, BCC 
(born in Sutton Coldfield 
and has been involved in 
the archaeology of the area 
for many years as well as 
studied in Bham) 
Response including context, list of 
historic environment considerations et c 
under 6 headings concluding with a list 
of opportunities for info gain and 
building reuse. There are three maps in 
the appendices of heritage assets 
affected by HS2 (7 pages) 
List of heritage sites and maps 
Black Country Local 
Enterprise Partnership 
(An organisation with the 
aims to increase the 
conditions for enterprise in 
the BC) 
Letter to the O&S manager (2 pages) No data presented 
The Birmingham Group Letter with a  number of bullet points 
including the main points they want to 
draw to BCC’s attention (4 pages) 
Set of principles that ‘should’ underpin the 
cultural dimension of HS2 developments 
Shilpi Akbar, Assistant 
Director of Employment, 
BCC 
Two page response written as a letter 
including appendices of Job Charters 
for New Street and John Lewis (4 
pages) 
Centro KPMG report and GBSLEP remit 
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Greater Birmingham & 
Solihull LEP 
(Led by businesses and 
local authorites with the 
aim of driving sustainable 
private sector growth and 
job creation in the area) 
 
Report including foreword, followed by 
8 sections including key ‘facts’ and 
figures, opportunities and challenges, 
jobs and skills, key asks for BCC (10 
pages) 
Albion Economics HS2 Job Analysis 2013, HS2 
Growth Task Force ‘The Challenge’ 2013, and 
Centro KPMG report 
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APPENDIX B 
GUIDEMAPS (2004) Stages of the transport decision-making process: 
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APPENDIX C 
DfT (2014) Transport Analysis Guidance: Transport Appraisal Process: 
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